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The truth is not grey, it is black and white in patches. And there is nothing black or white l but thinking makes it so. - G. M. Trevelyan. ' 
ABSTRACT  
It is widely accepted that philosophy of 
history may be divided into two main parts: analytical 
philosophy of history and, what is variously termed 
- substantive, or speculative philosophy of history. 
The former is taken by many writers to be what 
Gardiner calls "a second-order form of inquiry" 2 having 
as an aim not "to elucidate and assess the human past 
itself, but ... to elucidate and assess the ways in 
which historians typically describe or comprehend that 
past." 3 It has to do with such matters as "the pre-
suppositions underlying historical narratives, the 
categories implicit in historical judgement and 
explanation, and the modes of argument whereby historical 
conclusions are supported or established." 4 It is in part 
two of this dissertation that consideration is given to 
some of the issues and questions which typically appear 
under the rubric "analytical philosophy of history." 
Speculative or substantive philosophy of 
history generally takes as its subject matter history as 
a whole. For writers whose works have been assigned by 
critics to this category of inquiry a major concern has 
frequently been that of seeking order in the apparently 
chaotic stream of historical events. Attempts have been 
made to discern "meaning" or "significance" in the course 
of events; to see in events the embodiment of a principle, 
or a necessary component in an overall scheme of things, 
the final realization of which may be worldly or other-
worldly. The course of events is variously seen as 
serving the end of the perfectibility of man and his 
social relations or the eschatological vision of religion. 
Attempts have been made by some writers, impress-
ed by the advances made by science through the formula-
tion of laws and generalizations, to discover universal 
laws of human nature or of history by which the events of 
(iii) 
history could be explained (and, as implied by some, 
predicted) with the same certainty and , precision found 
in science. 
The status of empirical inquiry has frequently 
been claimed for "speculative philosophies of history." 
But this has been denied by practising historians and 
philosophers distrustful of the over-predominant 
aprioristic overtones found in these writings. As Dray 
has pointed out, "the construction of speculative systems 
of history is 	somewhat out of fashion" 5 bUt has "still 
not quite achieved the fossil status often attributed to 
cosmology."6 He cites as the reason for this the pre-
dominantly Judaic-Christian nature of our culture and 
the expectation that history should be "meaningful." 
Part one consists of an historical outline of 
philosophical reflection on history and incorporates 
consideration of the ideas of "speculative philosophers 
of history." 
References  
1. G. M. Trevelyan„ "Clio Rediscovered", in F. Stern, 
•ed., The Varieties of History, (Macmillan, London, 
• 1970), p.2440 
2. P. Gardiner, 	 Philospy of 	(Oxford 
• University Press, 1974) p. 3. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid. 
5. W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History (Prentice-Hall, 




PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON HISTORY FROM THE GREEKS  
TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Meyerhoff describes Thucydides (c.455 B.C. - 
c.400 B.C.) as a supreme figure in "the art of history" / 
and points out that nowhere in the ancient world may be 
found a philosophy of history, either in the speculative 
sense, or in the analytic sense. 
Within Jewish and Christian tradition there 
developed an historical consciousness which has continued, 
with modification, to the present age. History was seen 
as imbued with religious significance; in the course of 
events was discerned the hand of Divine Providence. The 
goal of history in the Christian conception is a condit-
ion of man beyond history and in the perspective of this 
goal the evil and contradictions inherent in the flow of 
temporal events could be explained. 
Meyerhoff sees the eighteenth century as complet-
ing "the emancipation of history from theology." 2  
History was discovered as "an autonomous, self-sufficient 
domain" 3 and there was created an historical consciousness 
"which was predominantly immanent, not transcendent"4 
employing "rational, not religious concepts." 5 
Vico, (1668-1744) recognized today as the most 
significant figure in the change of emphasis in historical 
thinking, still used the concept of "Providence". But, 
according to Karl Lowith, with Vico this concept "has 
become as natural, secular, and historical as if it did 
not exist at all." 6 He points out further, that nothing 
remains in his use of the concept of the "transcendent 
and miraculous operation which characterizes the faith in 
providence from Augustine to Bossuet."7 
The search for a meaning of history continued. 
Writers like Kant, (1724-1804), Condorcet (174-iwo, and 
Herder (1744-1803) discerned evolutionary tendencies in 
historical change generally in the direction of the 
progressive improvement of man and his social relations. 
For Hegel (1770-1831) history was intelligible as the 
progress of Reason. And, as Meyerhoff points out, history 
was for Hegel "as unmistakably a theodicy as for St. 
1 . 
Augustine; only he used reason, instead of faith to 
justify the ways of God."8 
The nineteenth century marked the waning of the 
traditional philosophical approach to history and the 
assumption of some kind of metaphysical determinism as 
providing a clue to the meaning of history. The two most 
prominent influences on historical thinking were the 
development of an empirical, scientific approach in 
historical scholarship and the development of a line of 
thinking called "historicism." 
The term "historicism" results largely from 
Friedrich Meinecke's Die Entstehung des Historismus and 
is used to denote, says Tholfsen, an approach whereby 
the historian "seeks to grasp each phenomenon in its 
uniqueness and individuality while simultaneously placing 
it in a dynamic context of development, embracing 
continuity and change." 9 Commager's call - "Let us so 
immerse ourselves in the past that we can see with their 
eyes, hear with their ears, think as they thought, and 
feel as they must have felt: only by emancipating ourselves 
from the present and re-entering into the past can we be 
true to history; only by this renunciation of our own 
personalities can we hope to recover the character of the 
past." 10  - encompasses part of the historicist ideal. 
Herder, one of the earliest and most prominent spokesmen 
for historicist ideas also stressed the principle of 
empathy as a methodological tool for the historian. He 
must feel his way into a period of history. 
As the basic theses of historicism included 
recognition of the manifold variety and unique individual-
ity of the multiplicity of events comprising the subject 
matter of history, it was generally thought that history 
would not be susceptible of being cast into a rational, 
universal system whereby its meaning could be discovered 
in accordance with some deterministic or teleological 
principle. Marwick, however, cites Hegel and German 
historians of the Ranke school as seeing history "as a 
providential process, in which every event and circumst- 
2 . 
ance was justified in the light of the whole" 11 and notes 
that this is how some authorities would define the term 
"historicism" (which, incidentally, he describes here 
as a "dread" term and elsewhere as "troublesome"). This 
latter definition is in similar vein to the one proposed 
by Popper below. 12 
Further important aspects of the historicist 
tradition emerged also in the writings of idealist 
philosophers, Collingwood and Croce, especially in the 
stress they laid on the autonomy of history. 
The development of critical methods for evaluat-
ing historical sources and collating the results in 
accordance with rigorous standards of objectivity led to 
the hope (and belief) that history could take a place 
as an equal partner with science. Prominent among writers 
developing the idea of history as an empirical, scientific 
discipline were Ranke, Buckle, Bury and Fustel de Coulanges. 
The claim of scientific status is frequently 
made for Marx's theories. The dogmatic nature of his 
writings, however, and the prominence of emotive, 
propagandist social stereotypes in his works cast consider-
able doubt on the tenability of this claim. A more 
appropriate place for Marx's writings would appear to be 
in the positivistic and scientific stream of historicism 
noted by Meyerhoff13 as diverging from the earlier 
mainstream, and which, as Popper described it, 14 embodied 
the assumption that historical prediction was the principal 
aim of the social sciences. 
The early twentieth century saw a waning of the 
belief that history could be accommodated in the frame-
work of the empirical sciences. And the re-emergence of 
speculative philosophy of history containing deterministic 
or teleological elements, as evident in Toynbee's writings, 
appears to have stopped short before the barrier of 
rigorous conceptual and methodological analysis encompassed 
by analytical philosophy of history. 
3. 
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CHAPTER 1: FROM THE GREEKS TO THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AGE  
OF SCIENCE. 
(i) The Greeks. 
Tholfsen sees 1 Thucydides as writing a history 
that succeeded in explaining individual events in the 
light of the universal characteristics of human nature. 
He quotes a passage where, he says, Thucydides made 
explicit his conception of the relationship between 
human nature and historical knowledge: 
It will be enough for me, however if these 
words of mine are judged useful by those who want 
to understand clearly the events which happened in 
the past and, which (human nature being what it is) 
will, at some time or other and in much the same way, 
be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece 
of writing designed to meet the taste nof an immediate public, but was done to last forever.' 
Tholfsen points out' that although a strong 
sense of the regularities underlying human behaviour 
informed Thucydides' thought, he didnot conceive of his 
generalizations as scientific "laws". 
Herodotus, (c.484 B.C. - 0.425 B.C.) notes 
A. L. Rowse, 4 was the father of both social history and 
anthropology. Will Durant mentions how he finds room for 
a thousand interesting illustrations of the dress, manners, 
morals, and beliefs of the societies he describes - 
"how Egyptian cats jump into the fire, how the Danubians 
get drunk on smells, how the walls of Babylon were built, 
how the Massagetae eat their parents, and how the priestess 
of Athena at Pedasus grew a mighty beard."' 
E. H. Carr notes that he differed from Thucydides, 
who is accused of having no clear conception of,causat- 
ion, in that he specifically sought the causes of events, 
vide the introduction to his Histories - "This is a 
presentation of the Inquiries of Herodotus of 
Halicarnassus, to the end that time may not obliterate the 
great and marvellous deeds of the Hellenes and the 
Barbarians; and especially that the causes for which they 
waged war with one another may not be forgotten." 6 
5. 
In addition to the instructive and practical 
purpose of history suggested by Thucydides, there is 
another viewpoint of the purpose of history centred on the 
dichotomy of man and nature. 
Hannah Arendt says7 that Herodotus' understand-
ing of the task of history - to save human deeds from the 
futility that comes from oblivion - was rooted in the 
Greek concept and experience of nature. "Since the things 
of nature are ever-present, they are not likely to be 
overlooked or forgotten; and since they are forever, they 
do not need human remembrance for their future 
existence."8 Mortality became the hallmark of human 
existence. 
the great deeds and works of which mortals 
are capable, and which become the topic of historical 
narrative, are not seen as parts of either an 
encompassing whole or a process; on the contrary, 
the stress is always on single instances and single 
gestures. These single instances, deeds or events, 
interrupt the circular movement of daily life ... 
The subject matter of history is these interruptions - 
the extraordinary, in other words. 
In the beginning of Western history Arendt sees 10 
the distinction between the mortality of men and the 
immortality of nature, between man-made things and 
things which come into being by themselves, as the tacit 
assumption of historiography. 
The Greeks, she says 11 saw immortality as the 
common denominator between the concepts of nature and 
history. 
Immortality is what nature possesses without 
effort, and without anybody's assistance, and 
immortality is what the mortals therefore must try 
to achieve if they want to live up to the world into 
which they were born ... The connection between 
history and nature is therefore by no means an 
opposition. History receives into its remembrance 
those mortals who through deed and word have proved 
themselves worthy of nature, and their everlasting 
fame means that they, despite their mortality, 
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(ii) The Hebrews. 
Tholfsen says 1 that it is from the Hebrews and 
their religion that Western culture absorbed a profound 
interest in the past. He sees the religion of the Hebrews 
and their historical sense as indissolubly fused. 
Yahweh "was preeminently a god of history, who made a 
covenant with his chosen people, delivered them from 
bondage, presided over their settlement in Canaan, and 
maintained a continuing interest in their affairs." 2 
At every point, he continues, their religion was historic-
ally oriented: "... they defined their relationship with 
Yahweh by recounting a sacred history; their sacred 
literature took the form of historical narrative." 3 
The Hebrews broke sharply, he says, with the 
prevailing conceptions of time and history. In the great 
civilizations of the ancient Near East man's past was 
"an insignificant element in a vast cosmic whole." 4 
Human events were seen to follow regular recurring patterns 
as man was seen as part of the order of nature like the 
behaviour of the sun and the seasons. 
Instead of recurring events, the Hebrews, claims 
Tholfsen, saw a series of distinct episodes, each involv-
ing a unique intervention by Yahweh, unrepeatable and 
irreversible. Instead of circular patterns, they saw 
history moving in a straight line toward the fulfilment 
of divine purpose. Instead of concerning historical 
events as subordinate elements in a cosmic order, they 
saw history as an autonomous realm, of supreme signific-
ance to Yahweh. The de,ity's chief interest was not the 
world of nature, but the historical world of his chosen 
people. References  
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(iii) Christianity and St. Augustine (354-430)  
Tholfsen claims that from Christianity western 
culture "absorbed an abiding interest in history as an 
object of the highest religious significance." 1 He 
quotes the description by Arnaldo Momigliano of the 
situation that prevailed in the second and third 
centuries: 
People learnt a new history because they 
acquired a new religion. Conversion meant 
literally the discovery of a new history from Adam 
and Eve to contemporary events 	The convert, 
in abandoning paganism, was compelled to enlarge 
his historical horizon: he was likely to think for 
the first time in terms of universal history. 2 
In the fourth century pagan writers were blaming 
Christianity for the barbarian invasions and the fall of 
Rome. To defend Christianity against these charges, St. 
Augustine wrote The City of God (A.D. 413-426). The 
result was, says Tholfsen, a statement of Christian 
philosophy of history that dominated the historical 
consciousness of medieval Europe. 
He says that St. Augustine took the leading 
ideas implicitin the Hebrew and early Christian concept-
ions of history and applied them to a broad segment of 
the past. A sequence of providentially ordained events 
was depicted. The coming of Christ was presented as the 
decisive event in the history of mankind. Earlier events 
took on a new significance as a preparation for the 
coming of Christ. And events since then were seen to be 
moving in a straight line toward the new goal revealed 
in the life of Christ - the salvation of mankind. 
The belief in recurring cycles still enjoyed 
great prestige in the early Christian centuries. Pagan 
critics, says Tholfsen, argued that Christianity was 
foolishly attributing absolute importance to a unique 
event although educated men knew very well that since all 
events tended to recur, no single event could (effect a 
radical change in human existence. St. Augustine, claims 
Tholfsen, refused to compromise with the notion that 
history moves in cycles. He quotes him as saying: 9. 
Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the 
first man was created, there never had been a man at 
all, neither this same man himself recurring by I 
know not what cycles, and having made I know not 
how many revolutions, nor any other of similar 
nature. From this belief I am not frightened by 
philosophical arguments, ... Even though reason 
could not refute, faith would smile at these 
argumentations, with which the godless endeavour to 
turn our simple piety from the right way, that we 
may walk with them 'in a circle'. 3 
It is interesting to note that cyclical theories 
have been revived in modern astronomy. Discussing the 
problem of the creation of the universe Stephen Toulmin 
and June Goodfield cite the point of view that the "cosmos 
has neither had an initial Creation, nor displayed an 
eternal changelessness: instead, it has passed through 
a recurring cycle of similar changes, oscillating between 
two extremes, with an overall period of perhaps 100,000 
million years". 4 To this point of view, they say, the 
Big-Bang theory is acceptable. But this view goes back 
beyond the moment at which the matter of the universe 
was at its greatest concentration, and denies that the 
present phase represents the totality, either of time, or 
of cosmic existence. 
The concentration of galaxies into an exploding 
'grenade' some 10,000 million years ago represents 
only one of two extreme conditions, between which the 
universe is continually oscillating. The current 
expansion will go on until it loses all momentum and 
the cosmos approaches the opposite extreme of maximum 
rarefaction. Once that extreme has been reached, 
the process will be reversed, the galaxies will 
• 
	
	begin to collapse together once more, and eventually they will reform the intensely hot grenade. This 
will again be unstable and explode 	and so ad 
infinitum .5 
Tholfsen sees Western culture as receiving from 
Christianity a number of ideas and beliefs that were to 
enter into the development of the modern historical 
intelligence. The linear view expounded by St. Augustine 
encouraged, he says, a sequential arrangement of historical 
phenomena, and spurred inquiry into the connection between 
one event and another in the sequence. In addition, 
10. 
Tholfsen sees St. Augustine as fostering the emergence 
of a progressive interpretation of history in what he 
terms the "distinctly progressive view" 6 taken by St. 
Augustine of the spiritual advances that had prepared the 
way for the triumph of Christianity. 
The need for Christianity to define its relation-
ship to Judaism posed, says Tholfsen, the problem of 
continuity and change. And this problem was thereby 
brought into the foreground. In handling such a problem 
it was necessary, he says, to move beyond mere chronicle 
and grapple with a fundamental problem of historical 
analysis. 
The tendency to envision history as moving in a 
straight line was conducive to a recognition of the 
uniqueness of events, whereas, he claims, cyclicalism 
reduced them to typical elements in a cycle that would 
recur. The cyclical theory of history found among the 
Greeks and Romans is seen by Nash also as tending to 
depreciate history: "If history goes round and round, 
never getting anywhere, forever repeating itself, there 
can be no goal either for man as an individual or for the 
species."7 
But Nash begs the question concerning justifica-
tion of the existence of goals for man. It can probably 
be said, quite safely, that millions of men have lived 
their lives without the kinds of psychological or philoso-
phical end-points denoted by the term "goals". And 
whether such goals are an essential part of the 
Weltanschauung of an individual in a highly sophisticated 
society is far from a settled question. His point bears 
out the influence on him of either Christianity or the 
idea of progress or some philosophy for which the concept 
of goals is significant. 
Tholfsen notes also that the straight line view 
of history encouraged periodization and the birth of Christ 
provided one fundamental dividing line. 
In his Confessions, St. Augustine focused 
attention, he says, on the subjective dimension in human 
1 1. 
life and held that events are real only in the conscious-
ness of the individual. Implicit in St. Augustine's 
preoccupation with the subjective, he says, is a new mode 
of understanding man and his history which seeks to 
penetrate to the inner life underlying an action, and to 
recreate ideas, motives and emotions. 
A common objection to Augustine's philosophy 
of history is that he derives it, not from history itself, 
but rather from the Christian Scriptures. In this regard 
he is not unlike other speculative philosophers of 
history who impose their theories on historical data. 
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(iv) The Renaissance. 
Tholfsen discerns 1 in the Renaissance many new 
strands that were to be woven into the fabric of modern 
historical thought. First he sees the development of 
historical writing as an important and independent 
literary genre. Secondly, he says, the Renaissance 
intensified the impulse to write history by assigning 
to it the highest didactic value as a source of useful 
examples for moral and political instruction. Thirdly, 
the creation of a body of scholarship devoted to the 
study of the writings of antiquity made an invaluable 
contribution, he says to the technique of historical 
research. Fourthly, he discerns a "proto-historicist 
insight into diversity, change and anachronism," 2 
emerging from the humanist experience of a tension 
between the culture of the Middle Ages and antiquity. 
.Two other historiographical developments also 
had their origin in the Renaissance, according to Tholfsen - 
the publication of source materials and the construction 
of a critical method for handling them. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EARLY IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND ITS MODES  
OF THOUGHT. 
(i) Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and Reaction to  
Cartesianism. 
Nash says that "Vico 	made the first attempt 
to justify history as an autonomous body of knowledge 
separate from science." 1 Much of Vico's thinking was in 
reaction to Descartes and his followers who glorified 
the mathematical and physical sciences at the expense 
of history. According to Nash: "Descartes had observed 
that too much time spent in studying history usurps time 
that might otherwise be spent on the present. He 
objected to the general unreliability of historical 
accounts of the past and to the relative uselessness of 
history for present-day living." 2 
Vico countered, says Nash, that history was 
eminently capable of being understood by man. This claim 
was based on the principle of verum factum: the true and 
the created are identical. He quotes Robert Flint on 
what truth and knowledge were for Vico: "The truth is 
what is known; to be known it must be made; the knowing 
and the making of truth are inseparable." 3 
The Cartesians, says Nash, "had exhausted their 
efforts in trying to know the world which they had not 
made; at the same time they ignored history which man 
has authored. Since God is the creator of the world, 
only He can know it with certainty; but since man is the 
author of history, it follows that history is one thing 
that man can know."4 
In Vico's major work Scienza Nuova the two main 
aims are (1) to discover if there is a universal law of 
history that governs the past, and (2) to see how this 
law is reflected in the history of particular peoples. 
Vico found a pattern in history, a spiral-like movement 
in which there is both repetition and progress. He 
distinguished three stages in the development of any 
period of history - the age of gods, the age of heroes and 
14. 
the age of men. Corresponding to these three ages there 
were three types of human nature, three kinds of custom, 
law and religion. 
Nash says that according to Vico, the course of 
man is a movement from a primitive mentality to a 
religious way of life and ultimately to an age of 
reflective rationality. Each period of human history 
eventually dissolves into a time of decline, decadence 
and barbarism which makes the beginning of a new cycle 
possible. 
That which makes history move is the providence 
of God which operates indirectly, realizing its purposes 
in a natural way. Some critics have pointed out that 
Vico's position implies a form of pantheism. 
Nash quotes Alan Donagan as saying; 
Vico's principle that what men have made, men 
can hope to know, is the foundation of modern 
scientific historiography. First, it defines what 
historians study: namely, whatever survives from 
past human actions. Secondly, it implicitly specifies their aim: to recover the human thinking, 
however different from our own it may have beep, 
by which what survives from the past was made .. .j 
Another important contribution to historiography, 
says Nash, was his pointing out of the value of linguistics, 
mythology, and tradition for a reconstruction of the past. 
Hannah Arendt also sees 6 the impact of Cartesian 
thought as significant for the development of thinking 
about history and as issuing in thinking in line with 
Vico's principle of verum factum. She describes as the 
most fundamental expression of world-alienation ever found, 
Descartes' rule "de omnibus dubitandum est." Descartes 
became convinced "that man in his search for truth and 
knowledge can trust neither the given evidence of the 
senses, nor the "innate truth" of the mind, nor the inner 
light of reason."7 The fundamental experience underlying 
Cartesian doubt, she says, was the discovery that the 
earth, contrary to all direct sense experience, revolves 
around the sun. Man "learned that his senses were not 
fitted for the universe, that his everyday experience, far 
from being able to constitute the model for the reception 
of truth and the acquisition of knowledge, was a constant 
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source of error and delusion." 8 
Emerging from this predicament Arendt recognises 
a "positive version of subjectivismn9 of consequence for 
our concept of history. "Although it seems that man is 
unable to recognize the given world which he has not 
made himself, he nevertheless must be capable of knowing 
at least what he made himself." 10  
According to Sir Isaiah Berlin, 11  Vico concedes 
that mathematical knowledge is wholly valid and its 
propositions are certain. But the reason for this is that 
they are the creations of our own minds. He emphasized 
that mathematical knowledge is not identical with 
knowledge of the real world; not even with knowledge of 
physics, the science most susceptible to mathematical 
treatment. For we cannot literally manufacture the 
physical world, says Berlin, as Vico supposes that we 
can that of algebra and geometry. 
There come, according to Vico, in order of 
decreasing certainty of knowledge, physics, psychology 
and history. Certainty increases, Berlin notes, in 
inverse proportion as the proportion of matter not freely 
created by us, the "brute" matter of the external world 
which is merely found by us; the smaller the element of 
free manipulation imported by ourselves, the less certain 
our knowledge. 
The Cartesian criterion of truth is, says 
Berlin, that the judgments claiming to be true must be seen 
to consist of ultimate atomic entities of thought which 
are not further analysable. These are conceived as being 
connected with one another by necessary logical links. 
And what cannot in principle be stated in such terms is 
defined as less or more delusive. 
This would rule out the greater part of our most 
common experience. "Such knowledge may not be of verum - 
of what can be logically demonstrated - but it is 
knowledge nevertheless, of certum, based on direct 
experience of the world, what is common to all men, 
everywhere, at all times - on which all empirical knowledge 
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is based. Such "certainty" may not be incorrigible, 
but it is what men necessarily live by; to relegate it to 
the sphere of mere opinion, as Descartes appears to do, 
is to imply that ideally men could live by true knowledge - 
verum - alone". 12 
Vico perceives, says Berlin, that if his view 
of a priori knowledge, that the only objects we can 
know through and through are those we have wholly created, 
is correct, then this cannot possibly be so. If the only 
true knowledge is knowledge of necessary connections the 
entire world of men and nature is excluded. But as it 
constitutes the basic data of all human experience we 
cannot begin to do without it. But it cannot be verum 
for us. "Only the Creator looking at, or rather "within", 
himself, that is, at the Universe which is identical with 
his own self, can be said to have knowledge in this sense. 
Being author of all, he contemplates only the fruit of 
his own creative activity. 1,13 
As men are made in the image of God and are, 
consequently, creative within limits, they can fully 
know only what they in turn have made. But they must 
begin with material not made by themselves, and so not 
fully knowable by them. 
Another thesis proposed lyy Vico that was of 
significance for history was his thesis that, in addition 
to the traditional division of knowledge into three kinds - 
the metaphysical or theological, the deductive, and the 
perceptual.- there existed a species of self-knowledge. 
This is "knowledge of actiaties of which we, the knowing 
subjects, are ourselves the authors, endowed with motives, 
purposes and a continuous social life, which we under-
stand, as it were, from inside." 14 This form of knowledge 
tells us not only what occurs but also "why what is, or 
occurs, as it is" 15 
In the case of the natural world, says Berlin, 
we can know what the senses report of what stands in what 
spatial relation to what, or what follows, or is simultan-
eous with what. But to say that this is all we can know 
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about human beings would be, he says, a grave under-
statement, a denial of what we know to be true. We judge 
human activity in terms of purposes, decisions, doubts, 
thoughts, hopes, fears, and so forth and say why people 
behave in a given fashion. Understanding other men's 
motives or acts is a state of mind or activity in 
principle different from learning about the external 
world. We cannot tell what it is like to be a tree or 
an ant in the sense that we know what it is like to be 
a human being. 
Berlin says that it was Vico's momentous step 
to apply the notion of man as an autonomous being, a 
creator and moulder of himself and the world, not only 
to the works of man in general such as houses and towns, 
but "to his history conceived as a collective, social 
experience extended through time ... as a perpetual 
"intentional" activity, a ceaseless employment of 
historically changing conceptions, categories, interpretat-
ions, mythical,symbolic, metaphysical, logical, empirical, 
an endless probing, questioning, ordering and moulding 
and goal-seeking, which characterize the restless human 
mind." 16 
• Berlin points out that Vico nowhere exactly 
explains the way in which Men understand other men. 
"He rests his case on his conviction that what men have 
made, other men, because their minds are those of men, 
can always, in principle, "enter into":17 
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(ii) The Enlightenment and The Idea of Progress. 
The historians of the Enlightenment drew 
inspiration from science, says Tholfsenl . They were not 
content with mere narrative but were determined to 
penetrate beneath the surface of events to fundamental 
patterns and connections. They assumed the orderliness 
of human behaviour and were confident of their ability 
to gain coherent and systematic knowledge of the past. 
The idea of progress also acted as a powerful 
leaven in eighteenth-century historical thought. Tholfsen 
says that it was not until the end of the eighteenth 
century that doctrinaire formulations of the idea of 
progress appeared. It was not as a theory but as a 
cultural conviction, he says, that the idea exerted its 
influence on eighteenth-century thought. 
Didactic motives actuated much of the historio-
graphical activity of the Enlightenment. History could 
be written to expose the follies of the past and to 
inculcate truths and values that would enable men to 
avoid those follies. 
The idea of progress reinforced the interest 
in change, for the "philosophes" had to explain the long 
series of improvements that had raised man from his 
primitive beginnings to what was deemed his exalted state. 
Tholfsen says that in the development of a conception of 
the historical process the new concept of civilization 
was utilized and the broadened subject matter associated 
with it. Historians began to see historical change as 
the consequence of the interaction between the various 
forces within a culture. 
While advances were made, Tholfsen does see 
limitation in the Enlightenment outlook. Human nature w a s 
conceived of as a relatively fixed entity and this, in 
his view, made it difficult for the "philosophes" to do 
justice to the multifarious forms of historical life. 
The didacticism of the Enlightenment also interfered with 
a sympathetic understanding of diversity, often leading 
20. 
to unhistorical extremes. The anti-clerical and anti-
religious attitudes of many writers made it virtually 
impossible for them to understand the Middle Ages. This 
period was seen to fall short of the enlightened standards 
of their age and was more often than not caricatured. 
Indeed, the very term Middle Ages can be said 
to have encapsulated in it a pejorative connotation or 
at least a suggestion of diminished significance in the 
course of the ages of man delineated by historians. 
Tholfsen describes the idea of progress in the 
Enlightenment as a "double-edged weapon in the historio-
graphical arsenal." 2 While, he says, it stimulated 
investigation of change through time, it also imposed a 
crude and superficial conception of the process. Progress 
was conceived as a negative process, an emancipation from 
restrictions imposed by the past, from error and 
superstition. This oversimplified conception was connected, 
he adds, with the rigid view of human nature characteristic 
of the period. Given the nature of man, it was considered 
possible to deduce absolute norms of perfection which were 
universally valid in all times and places. Progress 
meant achieving these particular standards. 
Tholfsen concludes: "This procrustean attitude 
was hardly conducive to an understanding of the actual 
complexity of historical development." 3 
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Nash described Kant's essays on the philosophy 
of history as "typical of the Enlightenment." 1 
For Kant history is teleological and although 
this cannot be proved he believes that the historian must 
nonetheless presuppose it. In his Idea of a Universal  
History he states: "The history of the human race viewed 
as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of a 
hidden plan of nature to bring about a political 
constitution, internally, and for this purpose, also 
externally perfect as the only state in which all the 
capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully 
developed." 2 
Kant believed that if there is no plan to 
history, we are no longer justified in believing in 
providence; and without trust in providence there is no 
longer any basis for living a moral life. 
That which causes history to move, the 
mechanism, are antagonisms in society. The fourth pro-
position o f his Idea of a Universal Histo states: 
"The means which nature employs to bring about the 
development of all the capacities implanted in men is 
their mutual antagonism in society, but only so far as 
this antagonism becomes at length the cause of an order 
among them that is regulated by law." 3 
Nash says that the major defect seen in Kant's 
view of history is that he proposed to work out the 
plan of world history a priori and not by means of 
historical research. 
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(iv) araluj_t1743-.11. 
Gardinerl discerns a reformist passion in 
Condorcet's view of history as progress towards such 
goals as universal suffrage and education, freedom of 
expression and thought, legal equality and the redistribut-
ion of wealth. It was in the light of their relevance 
to fixed ideals and aspirations such as these that 
historical events were to be judged and appraised. 
His view of history as the story of man's 
gradual emergence from barbarism and superstition is to 
be contrasted with the view of Herder who saw in history 
the embodiment of cultural forms and achievements to be 
understood and respected in themselves. 
His ideas on history appear in his Sketch for  
a Historical Picture of the Pro ress of the Human Mind. 
Indicative of the philosophical underpinnings of 
Condorcet's approach is the passage below: 
The sole foundation for belief in the natural 
sciences is this idea, that the general laws 
directing the phenomena of the universe, known or 
unknown, are necessary and constant. Why should 
this principle be any less true for the development 
of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than 
for the other operations of nature? Since beliefs 
founded on past experience of like conditions 
provide the only rule of conduct for the wisest of 
men, why should the philosopher be forbidden to 
base his conjectures on these same foundations, 
so long as he does not attribute to them a certainty 
superior to that warranted by the number, the constancy, and the accuracy of his observations?0 2 
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CHAPTER 3: TO MARCH WITH SCIENCE, OR NOT? THE DEBATE  
INTENSIFIES. 
(i) Introduction. 
Maurice Mandelbaum sees1 as the dominant and 
continuing movements in nineteenth-century philosophy, 
metaphysical idealism and positivism. 
He gives this characterization of metaphysical 
idealism - "metaphysical idealism holds that within 
natural human experience one can find the clue to an 
understanding of the ultimate nature of reality and this 
clue is revealed through those traits which distinguish 
man as a spiritual being." 2 
On the other hand: "... positivism rejects 
metaphysics on the ground that the questions with which 
metaphysics is concerned presuppose a mistaken belief that 
we can discover principles of explanation or interpreta-
tion which are more ultimate than those which are directly 
derived from observation and from generalizations 
concerning observations." 3 
A further distinguishing characteristic of the 
positivists was the belief that the adequacy of our 
knowledge increases as it approximates the forms of 
explanation which have been achieved by the most advanced 
sciences. The positivist conception of facts was of 
things, entities lying around waiting to be discovered. 
This was the basis of the theory of scientific history. 
J. B. Bury in 1902 stated: "history is a 
science, no less and no more." 4 The facts of history 
were to be gathered like the facts of geology or astronomy. 
Historical truth was to be attained through the classifica-
tion and interpretation of facts. Equipped with 
"historical method" the historian would systematically 
analyze his sources and banish subjectivity. 
Saint-Simon (1760-1825), says Mandelbaum, was 
an adherent of Newtonianism and he believed that man was 
a machine, like all other parts of nature: "a mechanistic 
microcosm within the great mechanical macrocosm." 5 
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He insisted that there must be laws controlling the 
direction of human development. Mandelbaum sees 
his form of "necessitarianism° as standing in close 
relation to historicism. 
Comte (1798-1857), says 6 Mandelbaum, accepted 
the view that a proper evaluation of any institution or 
doctrine consists in seeing its necessity at a given time. 
Comte says7  that each branch of our knowledge 
passes successively through three different theoretical 
conditions: the Theological or fictitious; the 
metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or 
positive. In the theological state, the human mind supposes 
all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of 
supernatural beings. In the metaphysical state the mind 
supposes abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, 
personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and 
capable of producing all phenomena. 
In the final, the positive state, the mind 
has given over the vain search after Absolute 
notions, the origin and destination of the 
universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies 
itself to the study of their laws - that is their 
invariable relations of succession and resemblance. 
Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are 
the means of this knowledge. What is now understood 
when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply 
the establishment of a connection between single 
phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of 
science. 8 
Comte sees the four principal categories of 
phenomena, the astronomical, physical, chemical, and 
physiological as having reached the positivist stage 
of understanding. Social phenomena form the missing 
category. 
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(ii) Historicism. 
Prominent in nineteenth century historio-
graphy were the concepts and approaches to historical 
material encompassed by the term "historicism." 
Mandelbaum defined it thus - "Historicism is the belief 
that an adequate understanding of the nature of any 
phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are 
to be gained through considering it in terms of the place 
which it occupied and the role which it played within 
a process of development.° 
This thesis rejects the view that historical 
events have an individual character which can be grasped 
apart from viewing them as embedded within a pattern of 
development. This position is not to be identified, 
insists Mandelbaum, with the so called "historical sense" 
or capacity to view past events free of the prejudices of 
the present and in terms of conditions under which they 
actually occurred. 
He examines the philosophic assumptions usually 
associated with the use of the concept of development. 
He notes that whenever we speak of a development we must 
always have in mind the idea of something which develops. 
the comprehension of any 'genuine' 
development must be more than a matter of tracing a 
succession of changes; 	on the contrary the historian 
is concerned with a developmental process in which some 
subject manifests itself in successive forms, each of 
these forms expressing a tendency which is characteristic 
of the whole." 2 
Mandelbaum identifies two sources of the 
fundamental aspect of historicism, that the category of 
development provided the basic means of understanding 
reality and human history. One source, he says, can be 
identified with the Romantic rebellion against the 
Enlightenment and is characterized by the tendency to view 
historical development on the analogy of the growth of 
living things. The other source was a continuation of 
the Enlightenment tradition of seeking to establish laws 
27. 
of developMento Those who continued this tradition, says 
Mandelbaum, differed from some of their predecessors in 
that they "assumed that the laws which mould serve to 
explain social organization and change were not to be 
derived from a consideration of the psychological 
dispositions of men, but referred directly to the 
course of history." 3 Further, they believed that such 
laws defined the direction in which change necessarily 
proceeds. 
The assumption, says Mandelbaum, that there are 
laws which control the direction of historical change, 
leads directly to historicism. For any event to be 
"significant" and not merely "accidental" it mould have 
to be an ... "exemplification of the overriding forces 
inherent in the developmental law." 4 
As mentioned above 9 5 writers on history have 
found the term "historicism" troublesome in view of the 
differing conceptions and shifting emphases encompassed 
by it. 
Berlin refers to historicism as "a doctrine 
that in its empirical form has stimulated and enriched, 
and in its dogmatic, metaphysical form, inhibited and 
distorted, the historical imagination." 6 And when 
commenting on historicism as found in Vico's writings, 
he defined it as "belief in the unique character and 
indispensability, and above all, validity at its own stage 
of development, of each of the phases through which 
mankind has passed and will pass; belief in an 
immaterial soul, with its own immanent laws of growth, 
modified by external factors but not subject to mechanical 
causation; belief that men understand themselves and 
their own works in a different, and superior, sense to 
that in which they know the external world; the view that 
history is a humane study in some sense in which physics 
is not; finally, that the goals of men are set by 
Providence, and that their past and future are strictly 
governed by it ..."7 
Mandelbaum's emphasis on the "process" or 
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"pattern of development" and the idea of "something" 
which develops would appear to be somewhat in conflict 
with the idea of the "uniqueness" of the "phases" through 
which "mankind passes". There is discernible in 
Mandelbaum's definition a hint of the determinism 
condemned by Popper. 8 Berlin's reference to the goals 
of men as being "set by Providence" bears some similarity 
to Maritain's9 Christian conception of man's freedom 
within a framework, the direction of which is determined. 
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(iii) Herder (1744-1803). 
Herder is widely regarded as typifying and 
giving the greatest impetus to the "Romantic rebellion 
against the Enlightenment" and his writings laid the 
ground work for the "historicist" theses. 
Tholfsen says 1 Herder saw the view of the 
"philosophes" of the past as monochromatic and static and 
out of touch with the diversity and flux of human life. 
Herder insisted that the historian concentrate on 
unique historical forms and not judge the past by the 
standards of his own age. He should strive for an 
empathetic understanding of every epoch. 
Herder was influenced by the metaphysical system 
of Leibniz and by Pietism. Leibniz's universe was 
composed of monads, "immaterial substances, forces without 
extension." 2 Each monad was qualitatively different from 
every other and was in a state of constant development. 
Tholfsen sees the Pietistic awareness of the uniqueness 
of every human soul as fostering in Herder a sense of 
the individuality of historical forms. 
Tholfsen cites Herder as stating in 1774 that 
in the world "no two moments are the same" 3 and sees this 
affirmation as signifying the break with the fundamental 
assumptions of Enlightenment historiography. 
Herder - denounced, says Tholfsen, the absurdity 
of any attempt to depict the quintessence of all times 
and peoples. Noting how difficult it is to understand 
the individual human being, he was scornful of attempts 
to portray mankind in general. In contrast with 
Enlightenment attempts to explain historical phenomena as 
expressions of the unchanging characteristics of man 
in general, Herder emphasized the plasticity of human 
nature and the formative power of historical circumstances. 
No arbitrary faith in the uniformity of human nature 
should be permitted, he believed, to obscure the 
uniqueness of a people. 
Herder, says Tholfsen, possessed an acute sense 
of the distinctive characteristics of the various historical 
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periods. He rebuked the "philosophes" for measuring 
periods against absolute standards or those of the 
writer's own age and condemning or praising accordingly. 
Every phenomenon must be understood in its own terms. 
Tholfsen sees underlying Herder's sense of 
individuality a new conception of man and the subject 
matter of history. "Man must be understood not primarily 
in terms of reason, but as a totality of diverse elements, 
embracing the will and the feelings as well as reason. 
Events are but the outer expression of the inner life of 
the soul, and the historian must penetrate to that inner 
reality."4 
The methodological implications of this view of 
the subject matter of history are that the past as a 
spiritual reality cannot be understood through the methods 
of the natural sciences. Reason by itself is insufficient. 
The spiritual reality of the past must be felt; it 
cannot be known through abstraction. Herder coined a 
new word, says Tholfsen, to describe the new mode of 
understanding that was necessary to understand the history 
of the human soul - "Einfilhlung". (This may be 
translated as the process of feeling one's way into the 
spirit of an age or the mind of an historical figure). 
Auch eine Philoso hie (1774) contains, says 
Berlin, the most eloquent description of the newly 
discovered sense of history - 
How unspeakably difficult it is to convey the 
particular quality (Eigenheit) of an individual 
human being and how impossible it is to say precisely what distinguishes an individual, his way of feeling 
and living; how different and how individual Landers 
und eigenj everything becomes once his eyes see it, 
once his soul grasps, his heart feels, it. How much 
depth there is in the character of a single people, 
which, no matter how often observed 	nevertheless 
escapes the word which attempts to catch it, and, even with the word to catch it, is seldom so 
recognizable as to be universally understood and felt. 
If this is so, what happens when one tries to master an entire ocean of peoples, times, cultures, 
countries, with one glance, one sentiment, by means 
of one single word! Words, pale shadow-play! An 
entire living picture of ways of life, or habits, 
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wants, characteristics of land and sky, must be added, 
or provided in advance; one must start by feeling sympathy with a nation if one is to feel a single 
one of its inclinations or acts, or all of them 
together. 
An important element of Herder's view of the past 
was the idea of development. He saw new historical forms 
constantly emerging out of the old. He had, says' 
Tholfsen,' a profound sense of the continuity between one 
period and another which was obscured by the Enlighten-
ment's conception of progress. For example, the 
"philosophes" saw in the Middle Ages obstacles that had to 
be overcome before enlightenment could be achieved and 
depicted the relationship between the thirteenth century 
and their own age in negative terms. Herder, on the other 
hand, saw the Middle Ages as constituting a necessary 
prerequisite to the subsequent development of Western 
civilization. He saw a steady continuity between the 
Middle Ages and the Enlightenment. 
By way of a summary of his historicist view of 
the past Tholfsen quotes Herder as saying: "I cannot 
persuade myself that anything in the whole kingdom of God 
is merely a means; all is at once means and end - and 
that is certainly true of this period." the Middle Agesd 6  
For Herder, Tholfsen points out further,- the 
continuity of history constituted another objection to the 
practice of making invidious comparisons between one 
period and another. It is pointless to praise the 
Enlightenment at the expense of earlier epochs each of 
which was a prerequisite to what came later. 
Although Herder disagreed with the Enlightenment 
idea of progress,' he did see progress in history.' To him 
it. was "an overall upward movement, in which each succeed-
ing age made advances by utilizing the legacy' it had 
inherited9  
To extend one's own ideal of virtue and happiness 
to distant nations or remote ages in history was a dangerous 
delusion and based on a misconception of what progress is. 
As Berlin interprets Herder's thought, it lies in a 
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variety of cultures, incommensurable with each other and 
incapable of being arranged on some single scale of 
progress or retrogression. What Herder calls "Fortgang" 
(advance) is, Berlin says, the internal development of a 
culture in its own habitat towards its own goals, the 
development of human beings as integrated wholes ... 
"as groups - tribes, cultures, and communities determined 
by language and custom, creating out of the "totality of 
their collective experience," and expressing themselves in 
works of art 	and in sciences and crafts and forms of 
social and political and cultural life that fulfil the 
cravings (conscious and unconscious) and develop the 
faculties of a given society, in its interplay with its 
alterable, 	natural environment." 8 
He quotes Herder as saying: "Each age is 
different, and each has the centre of its happiness within 
itself. The youth is not happier than the innocent, 
contented child; nor is the peaceful old man less happy 
than the vigorous man in the prime of life." 9 
Berlin describesWas the most revolutionary of 
the implications of Herder's ideas his pluralism, his 
rejection of absolute values. If Herder's notion of the 
equal validity of incommensurable cultures is accepted, he 
says, the concepts of an ideal state or of an ideal man 
become incoherent. A theme to which he constantly returned 
is that one must not judge one culture by the criteria of 
another. Differing civilizations are different growths, 
pursue different goals, embody different ways of living 
and are dominated by different attitudes to life. To 
understand them one must perform an imaginative act of 
empathy into their essence. Such questions as which of 
them is best, Berlin points out, or which one would judge 
to be nearer to the universal human ideal, are meaningless. 
Since there is no common standard in terms of which to 
grade them, there can be no final solution to the problem 
of what men as such should aim at. 
If it is the case that the notion of the perfect 
civilization in which the ideal human being realizes his 
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full potentialities is patently absurd, then, Berlin 
concludes, Herder's pluralism "is perhaps the sharpest 
blow ever delivered against the classical philosophy of 
the West, to which the notion of perfection - the 
possibility, at least in principle, of universal, timeless 
solutions of problems of value - is essential." 11 
Mandelbaum assigns an important role to the 
conception of "divine immanence" in the world which he 
sees propounded by Herder. This conception fostered, 
he claims, an acceptance of the presuppositions basic 
to historicism. 
• So far as understanding the nature of anything 
was concerned, the doctrine of divine immanence 
made it imperative that one should consider all 
phenomena as being internally related ... related in 
essence, since all were manifestations of one 
Divine Being. It therefore also led to the view that 
there were two ways of knowing that which was 
contained within the historical process: an outer, 
superficial mode, and a mode by means of which man 
could penetrate into the hidden innerAprings of 
power from which all things followed. 
With Hegel, says Mandelbaum, historicism is 
made the foundation of a complete view of the world and 
is no longer just a "corollary of the doctrine of divine 
immanence." 13 
He claims that Hegel's predecessors had believed 
that by an "empathic act" one could understand individual 
cultures and appreciate their natures by grasping them as 
individual manifestations of the Divine. But Hegel 
insisted, he says, that one must not only view them in 
their relations to the Absolute, but in their relations to 
one another as logically sequential manifestations of 
the Absolute. 
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(iv) Henry Thomas Buckle: (1821-1862). 
Gardiner says 1 that Buckle had been profoundly 
impressed by Comte's demand that society should be studied 
through the application of scientific procedures and that 
for Buckle this meant the discovery by inductive inquiry, 
of causal uniformities governing social life and develop-
ment. He says that in his discussion of the sources of 
the resistance to the scientific study of history Buckle 
lays the blame on two "dogmas" - the dogma of "Free Will" 
and the dogma of "Predestination". These have inhibited 
men from undertaking an examination of history in a 
scientific spirit. 
Buckle claims that the failure of historians to 
reduce facts to order and to discover the regularity in 
the midst of confusion that was a familiar expectation of 
scientific man could be ascribed partly to "their being 
of inferior ability to the investigators of nature and 
partly to the greater complexity of those social phenomena 
with which their studies are concerned." 2 
He supposed that when man lived by hunting he 
might well have considered that the appearance of food was 
the result of some accident which admitted of no explanat-
ion. In the case of agricultural man there arose through 
the experience of planting and eventual harvesting the 
idea of the stability of events and the expectation of 
certain uniformities. The generalization of observations 
led to the belief that every event is linked to its 
antecedent by an inevitable connection, that such 
antecedent is connected with a preceding fact and that 
thus the whole world forms a necessary chain. 
"Thus it is that, in the ordinary march of society, 
an increasing perception of the regularity of nature 
destroys the doctrine of chance and replaces it by that of 
Necessary Connection. And it is, I think, highly probable 
that out of these two doctrines of chance and necessity 
there have respectively arisen the subsequent dogmas of 
Free Will and Predestination • • •" 3 
The latter, founded on a theological hypothesis 
"must, in a scientific investigation, be regarded as 
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a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond the province 
of our knowledge we have no means of ascertaining either 
its truth or its falsehood." 4 
The former rests on the metaphysical dogma of 
the supremacy of human consciousness and the conscious-
ness of possessing a free will. But as in different ages 
there were different standards of truth, it is clear, 
Buckle holds, that the testimony of a man's consciousness 
is no proof of an opinion being true. 
He rejects the dogmas of free will and of 
predestined events and asks the believer in the possibility 
of a science of history to concede "that when we perform 
an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive 
or motives; that those motives are the results of some 
antecedents; and that, therefore, if we were acquainted 
with the whole of the antecedents, and with all the laws 
of their movements, we could with unerring certainty 
predict the whole of their immediate results." 5 
He concludes: "... that the actions of men 
being determined solely by their antecedents must have a 
character . of uniformity,, that is to say,. must,, under 
precisely the same circumstances, always issue in pre-
cisely the same results. And as all antecedents are 
either in the mind or out of it, we clearly see that all 
the variations in the results, in other words, all the 
changes of which history is full, all the vicissitudes 
of the human race, their progress, or their decay ... 
must be the fruit of a double action; an action of 
external phenomena upon the mind, and another action of 
the mind upon the phenomena ..." 6 
The physical agents by which the human race is 
most powerfully influenced can be classed under the heads 
of Climate, Food, Soil and the General Aspect of Nature. 
The latter through the medium of the senses has directed 
the association of ideas and given rise to different 
habits of national thought. He claims that an examination 
of the history of the world would show that "the tendency 
has been, in Europe, to subordinate nature to man; out of 
Europe, to subordinate man to nature."7 
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The great division, therefore, between European civilization and non-European civilization, is the 
basis of the philosophy of history since it suggests 
the important consideration that if we would under-
stand, for instance, the history of India, we must, 
make the external world our first study, because it has influenced man more than man has influenced it. 
If on the other hand we would understand the history 
of a country like France or England, we must make 
man our principal study, because nature being 
comparatively, weak, every step in the great progress has increased the dominion of the human 
mind over the agencies of the external world. 8 
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(v) Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889). 
Tholfsen says 1 that Fustel de Coulanges took 
science as his guiding ideal. "History is and should be 
a science," 2 he quotes him as declaring. To be 
"scientific," however, did not mean searching for the 
laws of history. It meant following the new standards 
of critical scholarship. By a science of history he 
meant, says Tholfsen, "a disciplined and systematic 
'approach that would do justice to man as he is, not to 
man conceived by analogy to the rest of nature. 
He claims that it was this sense of man as he 
actually is which saved Fustel from the errors of 
positivism. He emphasized diversity and change as the 
salient characteristics of the past and rejected any 
rigid conception of human nature as fixed and in terms 
of which historical phenomena could be explained. 
Fustel made plain the methodolOgical 
implications of the changeableness of human nature: 
The science which studies man cannot therefore 
apply the same operations as does botany or 
physiology. The botanist takes a plant, and when 
he has carefully observed it he is sure to see it 
the same as it always has been; ... But man is not today what he was three thousand years ago; 
he does not think what he thought then, he does 
not live as he then lived. Therefore, to know 
fully that variable and perfectible being one 
must study it in all the stages of its existence; 
other beings can be studied by simple Oservations; 
man can be known only through history. 
Tholfsen points out that while Fustel denied 
that man has a fixed nature, this was to emphasize that 
variability was man's most conspicuous characterstic. 
He was not arguing that men have no characteristics in 
common. Like every historian he had a distinct conception 
of "human nature" which appears both explicitly and 
implicitly in his work. 
Tholfsen says that Fustel steered clear of the 
major weakness of the positivist position - the tendency . 
to single out those features which history shares with 
the natural sciences and to identify these as the essence 
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of "the historical method.' Fustel saw history as a 
different science. Crucial in this difference was the 
matter of diversity. He noted, Tholfsen says, that 
science is based on the analysis of regularities and 
uniformities. Yet this kind of analysis must be resisted 
in history. What must be grasped are just those 
qualities which distinguish an epoch in the past from our 
own. "The ability to grasp diversity, so foreign to 
reason' and science, is precisely the 'tour particulier 
d'esprit , which makes the historian. 0 
Another extreme version of the positivist theory 
of history was that the primary task of "the historical 
method" was the accurate determination of facts, which, 
once determined, fit automatically into the structure of 
knowledge. Fustel protested against this view, says 
Tholfsen, and emphasized the interconnectedness of facts. 
Tholfsen quotes him as saying: "History is composed of 
a multitude of small facts;but the little fact, in itself, 
is not history." 6 
According to Tholfsen, Fustel felt that fear of 
the excesses of generalization had led to the opposite 
excess - a rejection of every attempt to view the totality. 
Fustel stated: "History proceeds by detail, but it is not 
limited to detail. To erect into an absolute rule that 
it must forbid itself research into general laws is to go 
against the true aim of science." 7 Tholfsen points out 
that the context makes clear that by "general laws" Fustel 
did not have in mind scientific laws, but connections 
between facts. 
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(vi) Marx (1816-1883) and Engels  
The writings of Marx and Engels exemplify many 
aspects of the historicist thesis, and, many would claim, 
the thesis that history can be written in a scientific way. 
Engels and Marx propounded in their writings 
their belief in the existence of an inexorable law of 
development embracing all of human history. In Ludwig  
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 
Engels makes perfectly explicit his acceptance of what 
Mandelbaum calls the "evaluative thesis of historicism". 
VI  ... all successive historical systems are only 
transitory stages in the endless course of development of 
human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage 
is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and 
conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the face 
of new, higher conditions, which gradually develop in 
its own womb, it loses its validity and justification. 
It must give way to a higher stage, which will also in 
•its turn decay and perish." 1 
In a penetrating analysis 2 of the writings of 
Marx and Engels, Bertrand Russell separates clearly the 
Marxist metaphysic (of dialectical materialism) from 
the historical thesis (the economic interpretation of 
history), evidence in verification of which may be sought 
in scientific fashion (according to some conceptions of 
"scientific"). Likewise, evidence can be found contrary 
to his thesis and in support of alternative theses. 
His metaphysic is, however, as much tainted by 
a priorism as other metaphysical systems and, as little 
susceptible of scientific verification. The materialism 
of dialectical materialism, as far as human affairs are 
concerned, is translated, says Russell, into the doctrine 
that the prime cause of all social phenomena is the 
method of production and exchange prevailing at any given 
period. 
... it was seen that all past history, with the 
exception of its primitive stages, was the history of class struggle; that these warring classes of 
society are always the products of the modes of 
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production and of exchange - in a word, of the 
economic conditions of their time; that the economic 
structure of society always furnishes the real basis, 
starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate 
explanation of the whole superstructure of juridical' 
and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical,and other ideas of a 
given historical period.j 
Russell sees similarity between Marx's materialism 
and Dewey's pragmatism or instrumentalism. He says that, 
in opposition to the Greek tradition that knowledge is 
obtained by means of passive contemplation, Marx maintains 
that we are always active; we are never merely apprehend-
ing our environment but always at the same time altering it. 
This is why the test of all truth is practical. Further, 
since the object is changed when it is acted upon, truth 
ceases to be static and becomes something which is 
continually changing and developing. Russell says that this 
is why Marx calls his materialism "dialectical", because 
it contains within itself, like Hegel's dialectic, an 
essential principle of progressive change. 
Russell states that materialism may, in some 
sense, be true though it cannot be known to be so. The 
propositions of materialism belong to the realm of 
metaphysics and are, consequently, not susceptible of 
empirical verification. In the introduction to fin Inquiry  
into Meaning and Truth he outlines 4 briefly the question 
of the relation between truth and knowledge. He says 
that attempts have been made to define "truth" in terms of 
"knowledge", or of concepts, such as "verifiability", 
which involve "knowledge". These attempts, if carried out 
logically lead, he says, to paradoxes which there is no 
reason to accept ,. He concludes that "truth" is the funda-
mental concept, and that "knowledge" must be defined in 
terms of "truth", not vice versa. This entails the 
consequences that a proposition may be true although no way 
is seen of obtaining evidence either for or against it. 
Concerning the dialectic in history, Russell 
points out that for Hegel the historical development of 
the world in time was merely an objectification of the 
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dialectical process of thought. He says that this view 
appeared possible to Hegel because for him mind was the 
ultimate reality, while for Marx, on the contrary, matter 
is the ultimate reality. Nevertheless', Russell continues, 
Marx believed the world developed according to a logical 
formula. 
When discussing the causes of social changes 
and the seeking of these in changes in the modes of 
production and exchange Engels says that "the means of 
getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought 
to light [in the social order) must also be present in a 
more or less developed condition, within the changed 
modes of production themselves." 5 Russell describes the 
"must" as betraying a relic of the Hegelian belief that 
logic rules the world and claims that in innumerable 
instances the outcome of a conflict in politics is not the 
establishment of some more developed economic system. 
Russell holds that: "... the elements of dialectic which 
Marx took over from Hegel madetim regard history as a more 
rational process than it has in fact been, convincing 
him that all changes must be in some sense progressive, 
and giving him a feeling of certainty in regard to the 
future, for which there is no scientific warrant." 6 
According to Russell the truth or falsity of 
Marx's theory ofcconomic development has nothing to do 
with the truth or falsity of his metaphysic. "Whenever 
metaphysics is really useful in reaching a conclusion, 
that is because the conclusion cannot be reached by 
scientific means, I. e. because there is no good reason 
to suppose it true. What can be known, can be known 
without metaphysics, and whatever needs metaphysics for 
its proof cannot be proved." 7 
He suggested that a metaphysic may be helpful in 
a battle: "early Mohammedan conquests were much facilitated 
by the belief that the faithful who died in battle went 
straight to Paradise, and similarly the efforts of 
Communists may be stimulated by the belief that there is 
a God called Dialectical Materialism who is fighting on 
their side, and will, in His own good time, give them " the victory." 8  But, while metaphysics may be helpful in 
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the "battle" to make Communism universal, the questions 
whether it has become, or is likely to become, universal 
are empirical questions to be settled by adducing appropriate 
verifiable evidence and not by an appeal to metaphysics. 
With regard to Marx's historical thesis, his 
economic interpretation of history, Russell accepts it 
as very largely true, but makes some important qualifica-
tions. He dims firstly, that Marx does not allow enough 
for the time-lag. He concedes that new doctrines in 
politics, art and morals that have any success must bear 
some relation to the economic circumstances of their age, 
but old doctrines can persist for many centuries without 
any such relation of any vital kind. 
Further, he thinks that Marx's theory of history 
is too definite in that he does not allow for the fact that 
a small force may tip the balance when two great forces are 
in approximate equilibrium. Admitting, he says, that the 
great forces are generated by economic causes, it often 
depends upon quite trivial and fortuitous events which of 
the great forces gets the victory. He cites the case of 
the German government, allowing Lenin to get to Russia. 
If the Minister concerned had happened to have dyspepsia 
on the morning of the decision he might have said "no". 
Russell does not think that it can be rationally maintained 
that without Lenin the Russian Revolution would have 
achieved what it did. 
Marx regards economic conflicts as always 
between classes, whereas, Russell points out, the majority 
of them have been between races or nations. Another set 
of causes which may be called medical are not without 
considerable importance in history, e.g. The Black Death. 
But the most necessary correction in Marx's 
theory, according to Russell, 'concerns the causes of 
changes in methods of production. For Marx methods 
of production are prime causes but the reasons for which 
they change are left unexplained. Russell claims that they 
change, in the main, owing to intellectual causes, that 
is to say, owing to scientific discoveries and inventions. 
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It was the growth of science after the Renaissance, he 
says, that led to modern industry. This intellectual 
causation of economic processes is not adequately 
recognized by Marx he says. 
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(vii) Historicism appraised. 
If history is a science, it would appear, if 
Mandelbaum's appraisal of historicism is correct, that 
it is not a science founded upon a single all embracing 
developmental law under which all historical events may 
be subsumed. 
Despite the spectacular growth in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries of empirical historiography 
Mandelbaum notes 1 the persistence of the assumption that 
there had been one single dominant line of development in 
human history. To explain the persistence of this 
assumption he takes into account what he describes as 
the prevalent human error of "retrospective fallacy". 
This fallacy, he says, "consists in looking at a series 
of events in terms of its ultimate outcome interpreting 
1 each of the earlier events with reference to that outcome1. 2  
. If, however, we examine, he says, each of these 
events as it was related to the occasion of its occurrence 
rather than looking at the events in terms of that in 
which the series eventuated, the series will present an 
entirely different aspect. At each step in the series, 
alternative possibilities may be seen to have been open. 
The retrospective fallacy is a fallacy, he says, "because 
it rests on the fact that, when we have learned the actual 
outcome of a series of events, we tend to forget that 
other conclusions might have been possible: we ascribe a 
privileged position to that outcome and we view all 
earlier events as if they had been controlled by it." 3 
He points out that the acceptance of determinism 
in history is characteristic of those who adopt a purely , 
retrospective point of view and it does not depend on an 
inappropriate application of scientifically oriented forms 
of explanation to human actions. He asserts that the 
proper interpretation of deliberation and choice in human 
history is obscured if we look upon the past solely in 
terms of what did eventuate, without tracing each step 
in the series of events as it happened, seeking out what 
possibilities had originally been present. 
He concludes that, if his view of the retrospective 
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fallacy is true, the explanatory thesis of historicism 
is without justification. "Once one recognizes the 
difference between tracing the connections of a series 
of historical events in the order in which they developed, 
and viewing them retrospectively only, it is not possible 
to regard long-term changes as providing a basis on which 
to understand the specific events which occurred: the 
whole with respect to which these specific events are 
supposedly to be interpreted actually, exists only because 
of the successive parts which it is alleged to explain."4 
Mandelbaum claims that if his arguments above 
are correct, the foundations which the evaluative thesis 
of historicism presupposes are removed. The evaluative 
thesis "asserts that an evaluation of any phenomenon 
demands that we view it in relation to what ii contributed, 
or failed to contribute, to the larger processes of 
development of which it was a part."5 Events are not 
judged he says, in terms of what, at the time, were the 
actual alternatives, or what actions other than those 
taken might have been preferred to them. 
the retrospective point of view actually leads to a form of anachronism: it leads us to look at actions and at institutions, not in terms of their own contexts, but in relation to what they inherited from the past and what they bequeathed to the future. Consequently, our evaluations of them are not, strictly speaking, evaluations of them.' these evaluations derive from our attitude TE7grd that process in which we see them as embedded. 6 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IDEALISTS. 
(i) Introduction.  
As characterized by Mandelbaum (in ch. 3), the 
idealist is marked by his belief that an understanding 
of the ultimate nature of reality can be obtained' through 
those traits which distinguish man as a spiritual being. 
The idealists claim that explanation in history 
is quite different from explanation in the natural sciences. 
Nash says1 that Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Heinrich 
Rickert (1863-1936), influenced by Kant's noumena-phenomena 
distinction and by Hegel's distinction between Nature and 
Spirit, maintained that there were two kinds of science, 
the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). The natural sciences 
approach their subject matter from "the outside"; they 
describe regularities in nature through the observation of 
natural phenomena. In the human sciences, however, the 
subject matter is accessible to the social scientist in a 
way not possible for the natural scientist. For example, 
because the historian is a man studying the actions of 
other men, he can know their actions from "the inside", 
as it were. 
A further distinction between the natural and 
human sciences is that while the natural scientist searches 
for regularities in nature and for generalizations that 
he can make about these regularities, the historian 
studies something unique, individual and unrepeatable. 
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(ii) Hegel9 1 
Hegel takes it as demonstrated by logic that 
reason is at work in history. The philosophical 
historian's task is to apply the principle showing that 
an account of the facts can be given consistently with it. 
The results of empirical history are data to be illuminated 
by bringing the knowledge of the Idea, the formal 
articulation of reason, to bear upon it and to elevate 
empirical contents to the rank of necessary truth. 
In Hegel's view the clue to history is to be 
found in the idea of freedom. This principle, he claimed, 
was capable of both abstract logical proof and of 
empirical confirmation as a glance at the course of 
historical events would show. In the old civilizations 
of China, Babylonia and Egypt slavery was the rule. Only 
the monarch had freedom. The Greco-Roman world extended 
the area of freedom. The process was completed by the 
Germanic nations of modern Europe, who accepted the 
Christian principle of the infinite worth of individual 
men as such, and so have explicitly adopted the Ilea of 
liberty. 
He believed philosophical history must concern 
itself with a larger unit than individual men - the nation 
and each nation has its hour of destiny as the chosen 
vehicle of the world spirit. There were four main stages 
of the historical process - Oriental, Greek, Russian and 
Germanic. 
Hegel contended that for reason's design to be 
carried out the actions of great men were needed who would 
be the chosen instruments of destiny. Ideas are impotent 
until will-power stands behind them. The actions of these 
great men were not to be judged by ordinary moral standards. 
In criticism of Hegel, Walsh says that profess-
ional historians regard as imprudent, attempts to seek 
intelligibility by imposing a preconceived pattern on the 
actual course of events. It is to be sought rather by 
the colligating of events in the historical process by 
means of appropriate conceptions, •by the tracing of the 
working of general laws of psychology, sociology or common 
sense. The historical process will be explained when the 
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historian thinks himself in a position to construct what he 
calls a significant narrative of the events in question. 
Hegel lays himself open to the charge of a 
priorism which he sought to repudiate. He says history 
must be the gradual realization of freedom and this process 
must complete itself in four distinct .stages. If this 
is not determining the course of history apart from 
experience, says Walsh, it is hard to know what is. 
One of the most trenchant critics of Hegel has 
been Sir Karl Popper who avows his inability to see any 
greatness in Hegel and condemns his philosophy of history 
as historicism, to believe in which, he says, "reveals 
neither historical understanding nor historical sense." 2 
He maintains that he has found that historians tend to 
value Hegel as a philosopher and that philosophers tend to 
believe that his contributions, if any, he adds 
parenthetically, were to the understanding of history: 
One of Popper's main objections to historicist 
metaphysics is that they are apt to relieve men from the 
strain of their responsibilities. "If you know that things 
are bound to happen whatever you do, then you may feel 
free to give up the fight against them. You may, more 
especially, give up the attempt to control those things 
which most people agree to be social evils, such as 
war ... 3 He sees nearly all the more important ideas 
of modern totalitarianism as directly inherited from 
Hegel. He cites "nationalism, in the form of the 
historicist idea that the state is the incarnation of the 
Spirit ... of the state-creating nation (or race); one 
4 chosen nation 	is destined for world domination;" 
"the state is exempt from any kind of moral obligation; 
history, that is, historical success, is the sole judge; 
collective utility is the sole principle of personal 
conduct; propagandist lying and distortion of the truth 
is permissible;" 5 "the creative role of the Great Man, 
the world-historical personality, the man of deep 
knowledge and great passion (now, the principle of leader-
ship)."6 
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Isaiah Berlin sees7 as unacceptable to the serious 
historian the idea of one unique historical scheme as 
being the truth and into which alone all facts will be 
found to fit. Historians must keep distinct, he says, 
the level of facts on the one hand, from the level of 
theories and cosmic patterns whether empirical, metaphysical 
or theological. He eschews as invalid the attempt "to 
shuffle off responsibility, which, at an empirical level, 
seems to rest upon this or that historical individual or 
society ... on to some metaphysical machinery ..." 8 
Like Popper, he objects to the impersonality of 
"metaphysical machinery" which excludes the very idea of 
moral responsibility. 
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(iii) R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943). 
Collingwood believed that history is properly 
concerned with human thoughts and experiences. An 
historical event could be known because the act of thought 
behind the event was intrinsically capable of revival and 
rethought by the historian. 
For him the historian's approach to his subject 
matter was fundamentally different from the scientist's 
approach to nature. Collingwood says 1 that the evolution-
ary conception of nature might seem at first sight to 
have abolished the difference between natural process and 
historical process, and to have resolved nature into 
history. But the techniques of the historian are in-
applicable to the study of natural processes. 
There is a certain analogy between the 
archaeologist's interpretation of a stratified site 
and the geologist's interpretation of rock horizons 
with their associated fossils; but the difference is no less clear than the similarity. The archaeologist's 
use of his stratified relics depends on his conceiv-
ing them as artifacts serving human purposes and thus 
expressing a particular way in which men have thought 
about their own life, and from his point of view the 
palaeontologist arranging his fossils in a time 
series, is not working as a historian, but only as a 
scientist thinking in a way which can at most be 
described as quasi-historical. 2 
Collingwood says that it is not enough just to 
consider the characteristics of method. What must be asked 
is the general nature of the problems which the method is 
designed to solve. When this is done, he says, it appears 
that the special problem of the historian is one which 
does not arise in the case of natural science. "The 
historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a 
distinction between what may be called the outside and thle 
inside of an event." 3 
By the outside of an event he means "... every-
thing belonging to it which can be described in terms of 
bodies and their movements." 4 By the inside of an event 
he means 	"that in it which can only be described in 
terms of thought. 115  The historian's work may begin by 
52. 
discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end 
there. He must always remember, Collingwood says, that the 
event was an action and that his main task is to think 
himself into this action, to discern the thought of its 
agent. 
In the case of nature, he says, this distinction 
between the outside and the inside of an event does not 
arise. The scientist goes beyond the event to observe its 
relation to others and thus bring it under a general 
formula or law of nature. The event is not conceived of 
as an action with a thought of an agent which can be 
discovered. 
To the scientist, nature is always and merely a 
'phenomenon', not in the sense of being defective 
in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle 
presented to his intelligent observation; whereas 
the events of history are never mere phenomena, 
never mere spectacles for contemplation, but 
things which the historian loo0 not at, but through, 
to discern the thought within. 0 
The historian need not., he says, and cannot 
(without ceasing to be a historian) emulate the scientist 
in searching for the causes, or laws of events. When 
the historian has discovered the thought expressed in an 
event, he understands it. "When he knows what happened, 
he already knows why it happened." 7 
The processes of nature can ... be properly 
described as sequences of mere events, but those of 
history cannot. They are not processes of mere 
events but processes of actions, which have an inner 
side, consisting of processes of thought; and what 
the historian is looking for is these processes of n 
thought. All history is the history of thought. ° 
The idea of natural process cannot be identified 
with that of historical process. Collingwood deprecates 
as the result of confused thinking and a source of further 
confusions the use of the word "evolution" in historical 
context such as in talk of the "evolutioncf parliament". 
He sees the use of such terms as a consequence of the 
tendency to regard the science of nature as the only true 
form of knowledge and of the desire of other forms of 
knowledge to assimilate themselves to the scientific model. 
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The idealist in Collingwood emerges quite 
clearly in his conception of history as knowledge of 
mind. History is not a story of successive events or an 
account of change. The historian is concerned with events 
only insofar as they reveal to him the thoughts of which 
he is in search. 
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what 
mind has done in the past, and at the same time it 
is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past 
acts in the present. Its object is therefore not 
a mere object, something outside the mind which 
knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can 
be known only insofar as the knowing mind re-
enacts it and knows itself as so doing. 9 
If historians find certain periods of history 
unintelligible and call them dark ages, this means that 
the historians have discovered the limitations of their 
own minds. They are unable to rethink the thoughts which 
were fundamental to the life of those periods. 
Collingwood was critical of the positivistic 
conception of history, describing it "as the study of 
successive events lying in a dead past, events to be 
understood as the scientist understands natural events by 
classifying them and establishing relations between the 
classes thus defined." 10 
Tholfsen sees11 Collingwood's argument as 
valuable in clearing away positivist misconceptions but 
it contains, he claims serious limitations which preclude 
its acceptance. His conception of "thought", he says, is 
much too narrow to do justice to the actual subject matter 
of history. For any particular act of thought to become 
subject-matter for history it must be an act of 
"reflective thought", one "performed in the consciousness 
that it is being performed." 12 
Central to Collingwood's analysis of history as 
re-enactment of past experience is his contention that an 
act of thought "can sustain itself through a change of 
context and revive in a different one." 13 This contention 
obliterates, says Tholfsen, one of the essential character-
istics of historical thinking. 
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In the very process of becoming known to the 
historian the "past" necessarily becomes something 
different from the present. The historian knows what 
happened since, and must make use of this knowledge in 
order to understand the past in a broader perspective 
than was possible when the past was a "lived reality". 
Tholfsen sees it as the historian's task to narrow the 
gap between the past and his present and asserts that 
if he is under the illusion that he can leap the gap, he 
is in danger of destroying the very "difference" that 
it is his task to grasp. 
... if he thinks that he can recreate past 
thought by some form of direct apprehension, he is 
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(iv) Croce (1866-1952). 
Like Collingwood, Croce presupposed a fundamental 
distinction between historical and scientific knowledge. 
Among the grounds upon which Gardiner sees Croce as making 
this distinction are the following. The historian "lives 
again in imagination individuals and events." 1 His 
material is seen as the expression of human thought and 
feeling which he must reconstruct and re-think for himself. 
In thus emphasizing the essential "inwardness" of history, 
Gardiner explains, Croce believed that he was laying bare 
the conditions which make historical description and inter-
pretation possible. It is in virtue of the mental life 
the historian is capable of sharing with those whom he 
studies that the concepts he applies to them have meaning 
and intelligibility. 
Two cornerstones of Croce's idealist conception 
of history were his conception of true history as con-
temporary history and his distinction between history and 
chronicle. 
"True history is contemporary history" 2 says 
Croce. The condition of its existence is, he says, that 
the deed of which the history is told must vibrate in the 
soul of the historian. The documents before the historian 
must be intelligible and the motivation for the investiga-
tion of past fact can only be an interest in the life of 
the present. A further aspect of the contemporaneity 
of history is that it is not the characteristic of a class 
of histories, but an intrinsic characteristic of every 
history. As a result of this he says "... we must conceive 
the relation of history to life as that of unity; certainly 
not in the sense of abstract identity, but of synthetic 
unity ..." 3 
Once the indissoluble link he discerns between 
life and thought has been effected the doubts about the 
certainty and utility of history disappear he claims. 
"How could that which is a present producing of our spirit 
ever be uncertain? How could that knowledge be useless 
which solves a problem that has come forth from the bosom 
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of life?" 4 
Essential for history are documents. If these 
are lost or they "are no longer alive in the human spirit" 5 
the link between life and history is broken says Croce. 
What remains can "only be called history in the sense that 
we call a man the corpse of a man." 6 Croce cites the 
example of the history of Hellenic painting as, in great 
part, a history without documents for us and which 
resolves itself into little more than a series of names 
and biographical anecdotes. 
"History is prior to chronicle." 7 Prior dis-
tinction between history and chronicle had been sought in 
vain, he claims. It had been sought before in the quality 
of the facts - "the record of individual facts has been 
attributed to chronicle, to history that of antral facts; 
to chronicle the record of private, to history that of 
public facts ... 	"Or else the record of important  
facts 	has been attributed to history, to chronicle 
that of the unimportant ..."9 
The truth for Croce is that history and chronicle 
are not distinguishable as two forms of history but as 
two different spiritual attitudes. "History is living 
chronicle, chronicle is dead history; history is 
contemporary history, chronicle is past history; history 
is principally an. act of thought, chronicle an act of will. 
Every history becomes chroricle when it is no longer 
thought, but only recorded in abstract words, which were 
once upon a time concrete and expressive." 10  
The discovery of the real distinction between 
history and chronicle leads in Croce's view to a rejection 
of the common presupposition of the priority of chronicle 
in respect to history. Precisely the opposite of this is 
the case: "first comes history, then chronicle. First 
comes the living being, then the corpse; and to make 
history the child of chronicle is the Same thing as to 
make the living be born from the corpse, which is the " residue of life, as chronicle is the residue of history...- 11  
"The Spirit Itself is History". 12 The human 
spirit, he says, preserves the mortal remains of histor4 57. 
empty narratives and chronicles in preparation for the 
moment when "they will serve to reproduce past history, 
enriched and made present to our spirit." 13 "And it will 
be impossible ever to understand anything of the effective 
process of historical thought unless we start from the 
principle that the spirit itself is history, maker of 
history at every moment of its existence, and also the 
result of all anterior history." 14 
An interesting point of contrast between Hegel 
and Croce is Croce's rejection of determinism and any 
attempt to portray history as proceeding according to 
plan towards a particular goal. According to Gardiner 15 
the reason for Croce's rejection of causal or deterministic 
theories was that theories of these kinds make the 
fundamental mistake of treating the facts of history in a 
"naturalistic" fashion. That is to say, they failed to 
interpret historical events as expressive of human 
attitudes, purposes and interests which can only be 
grasped by the insight and understanding of the historian. 
Instead they were regarded, Gardiner says, as if they could 
be assimilated to mere "events of nature" to be classified, 
arranged and subsumed under laws in a purely external way. 
For Croce the deterministic conceptioncf the way 
the historian works is exemplified by Taine's maxim 
"AprZs la collection des faits, la recherche des causes." 16 
In accordance with this formula, says Croce, facts are brute, 
not intellectualised. They are made intelligible by 
means of a search for causes. But this has the problem of 
inaugurating an infinite regression and the cause, to which 
the chain thus formed can be attached, is never found. 17 
The search for causes, undertaken by history, is 
not in any way different from the procedure of 
naturalism, ... which abstractly analyzes and 
classifies reality. And to illustrate abstractly 
and to classify implies at the same time to judge in 
classifying - that is to say, to treat facts, not as 
acts of the spirit, conscious in the spiri t  
thinks them, but as external brute facts. ' 8 
The true point of departure in history for Croce 
is not the facts already disorganized and naturalized but 
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the mind that thinks and constructs the fact. 
Let us raise up the debased countenances of the calumniated 'brute facts' and we shall see the light of thought resplendent upon their foreheads. And that true point of departure will reveal itself not merely as a point of departure, but both as a point of arrival and of departure, not as the first step in historical construction, but the whole of history in its Construction, which is also its self-construction. 1 9 The fact historically thought has no cause and no end outside itself, but only in itself, co-incident with its real qualities and with its qualitative reality. 20 
Elsewhere, 21 Croce condemns the "false idea of 
historical necessity" 22 as being "enervating for moral 
activity" 23 and as a breeder of "deleterious sophism 
which is most often pronounced in times of political up-
heaval."24 It is seized upon he says, by those who 
hypocritically bow to the will of God, using it as "a 
cloak to cover their own private convenience and 
advantage." 25 "But the only sort of historical necessity 
is the necessity which impels the historian, the logical 
necessity which bids him to understand the past as it was, 
neither praising it nor blaming it where praise and blame 
are out of place." 26  
References  
1. P. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 226. 
2. B. Croce, "History and Chronicle" from Chapter I and 
Chapter IX of "History - Its Theory and Practice" in 
Gardiner, op. cit., p. 226. 
3. ibid., p. 228. 
4. ibid., p. 229. 
5. ibid. 
6. ibid. 









13 	ibid., p. 232. 
14. ibid. 
15. P. Gardiner, Theories of Histor 9 P• 233. 
16. B. Croce, "Historical Determinism and the Philosophy 
of History", from Ch. IV of "History - Its Theory and 
Practice" in Gardiner, op. cit., p. 234. 
17. c.f. the view of Ortega y Gasset P.113. 
18. B. Croce, op. cit., p. 239. 
19. ibid., p. 240. 
20. ibid. 
21. B. Croce "The Theory of History" in Philosophy  
Poetry History, Trans. C. Sprigge„ (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1966) p. 497 ff. " 
22. ibid., p. 514. 
23. ibid. 
24. ibid. 
23. ibid., p. 514-513. 
260 ibid., p. 515. 
60. 
CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL DETERMINISM, PROPHECY AND THE  
CONCEPT OF ULTIMATE MEINING.  
(i) Introduction.  
'Nash says 1 that almost without exception the 
classical philosophers of history have advanced forms of 
historical determinism or the notion of the inevitability 
of historical processes. He says that St. Augustine 
repudiated the impersonal fatalism of the Greeks but still 
maintained that God predetermines all that comes to pass. 
In Vico, Kant, Herder and Hegel, he says, the thettic 
element in historical determinism becomes progressively 
more difficult to locate as the god of these philosophers 
came to resemble less and less the personal God of 
Augustine. 
Marx and Spengler (1880-1936) also regarded'alan 
as a pawn in the grasp of inexorable laws governing not 
only his fate but the fate of classes, states and ctidtures. 
For Spengler the basic units of history are cultures and 
he tried to apply the biologist's concept of living forms 
to the cultures. "Cultures are organisms, and world-
history is their collective biography. Morphologically, 
the immense history of the Chinese or of the Classical 
Culture is the exact equivalent of the petty history of 
the individual man, or of the animal, or the tree, or the 
flower." 2 
A Culture is born, blooms and then dies when its 
soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in 
the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states 
and sciences. Every Culture, says Spengler, passes through 
the age-phases of the individual man. "Each has its 
childhood, youth, manhood and old age.t) 3 The cycle through 
which a Culture passes in similar fashion to a living 
organism is predetermined. "Every culture, every adolescence 
and maturing and decay of a Culture, every one of its 
intrinsically necessary stages and periods, has a definite 
duration, always the same, always recurring with the 
emphasis of a symbol." 4 
Spengler borrows from biology the term "homology" 
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of organs to signify morphological equivalence.. He then 
applies to historical phenomena the principle of homology 
and arrives at a new connotation for the word "contemporary". 
"I designate as contemporary two historical facts that 
occur in exactly the same - relative - positions in their 
respective Cultures, and therefore possess exactly 
equivalent importance." 5 
It is his aim to show that "without exception 
all great creations and forms in religion, art, politics, 
social life; economy and science appear, fulfil them-
selves and die down contemporaneously in all the Cultures; 
that the inner structure of one corresponds strictly 
with that of all the others; that there is not a single 
phenomenon of deep physiognomic importance in the record 
of one for which we could not find a counterpart in the 
record of every other; and that this counterpart is to 
be found under a characteristic form and in a perfectly 
definite chronological position. it6 
Spengler proceeds to the ultimate position of 
the determinist lying beyond the pedestrian ambitions of 
previous research "which has contented itself in the main 
with arranging the facts of the past so far as these were 
known ..." 7 He sees history as offering possibilities of 
"Overpassing the present as a research-limit, and pre-
determining the spiritual form, duration, rhythm, meaning 
and product of the till unaccomplished stages of our 
western history; and Reconstructing long-vanished and un-
known epochs, even whole Cultures of the past, by means of 
morphological connexions, in much the same way as modern 
palaeontology deduces far reaching and trustworthy 
conclusions as to skeletal structure and species from a 
single unearthed skull-fragment." 8 
Toynbee considers the dominant factor in history 
to be the laws of historical development which govern the 
, general course of history. 
Berlin's basic position is that determinism is 
incompatible with a cardinal postulate of moral theory, 
viz., people can be held responsible for their deeds only 
when they were not coerced, only when they could have done 
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otherwise. If a historian is a determinist, he must, 
Berlin maintains, eliminate all moral judgments from 
his account of the past. He sees as one common 
characteristic of all deterministic outlooks, whether 
they be theological, metaphysical, mechanistic, religious 
or scientific, the implication that "... we can, if we 
seek to be rational, praise and condemn, warn and 
encourage, advocate justice or self-interest, forgive, 
condone, make resolutions, issue orders, feel justified 
remorse, only to the degree to which we remain ignorant 
of the true nature of the world. The more we know, the 
farther the area of human freedom, and consequently of 
responsibility, is Oarrowed." 9 Wisdom consists typically 
in understanding " ... the direction in which the world 
is inexorably moving ... 10 and in identifying ... " 
oneself with the rising power which ushers in the new 
world. 11 
Berlin does not say that determinism is 
necessarily false and agrees that it remains a genuine 
problem for theologians and philosophers. The language 
and thoughts of the majority of human beings, including 
historians, do not, however, reflect an acceptance of 
determinism. We constantly use, he says, a class of 
expressions which "... plainly involve the notion of more 
than the merely logical possibility of the realization 
of alternatives other than those which were in fact 
realized, namely of differences between situations in 
which individuals can be reasonably regarded as being 
responsible for their acts, and those in which they can 
not." 12 
If the belief in freedom is a necessary illusion, 
he asserts, it is so deep and so pervasive that it is not 
felt as such. Radical changes could be made in our moral 
and psychological categories and modes of thought and 
speech to adapt to the hypothesis of determinism. But, 
he submits, to do so would be a fearful task and to think 
out what the universe of the genuine determinist would be 
like is not much easier than to think out "... what it 
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would be like to be in a timeless world, or one with a 
seventeen-dimensional space. " 13 "For practising historians", 
he concludes, "determinism is not, and need not be, a 
serious issue." 14 
The term "historicism" is applied by different 
writers with varying emphases and different senses. Nash 
describeS "historicism" as the belief that there is some 
ultimate meaning in history which can be explained in 
terms of some historical law. The belief is usually linked 
with some form of historical inevitability (either 
theistic or naturalistic): It is this conception of 
"historicism" (embodied in various speculative philosophies 
of history) that is attacked by Popper. 
The phrase "the ultimate meaning of history" 
includes as a part of its meaning the ultimate destiny of 
human existence. The historian who searches for the 
meaning of history in this sense is not looking only at 
what has happened in the past, says Nash, but also at 
what will or must happen in the future. This is not the 
legitimate work of historians. ty Danto16 agrees with Lowithts claim17 that to seek 
to say what the meaning of a part of history (the 
historical past) is in the light of the whole structure 
(which includes the historical future) which has been 
projected is an essentially theological exercise. In 
order to elucidate the use of the word "meaning" in this 
context Danto compares it with the "meaning" that may be 
ascribed to a particular episode in a novel. It is only 
after the entire novel has been read that one may judge 
whether the episode had "meaning" or no "meaning". 
... we might think of philosophers of history 
as trying to see events as having meaning in the 
context of an historical whole which resembles an 
artistic whole, but, in this case, the whole in 
question is the whole of history, compassing past, 
present and future. Unlike those of us who have 
the whole novel before us, and are able to say with 
some authority what is the significance of this event or that, the philosopher of history does not 
have before him the whole of history. 18 
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(ii) Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975). 
For Toynbee 1 the proper units of historical 
study are not nation-states or periods but whole societies. 
He identifies twenty-one civilizations and propounded 
the doctrine of Challenge-and4tesponse as the explanation 
for the rise and decline of these civilizations. The 
Challenge could have been posed by physical environment 
or threats of invasion or oppression. He observed that 
challenges that are too easy do not invoke sufficient 
response, whereas challenges that are too harsh stifle 
effective response. 
Every civilization, Toynieee claims, rises to a 
Universal State in which there exists a unity of law, 
purpose, belief and government. The civilization starts 
to break up when the Creative Minority which has led the 
society degenerates into a mere Dominant Minority which 
attempts to retain by force a position which it has, 
ceased to merit. This situation leads to the creation 
of a Proletariat which no longer spontaneously admires or 
freely imitates the ruling element, and which asserts itself, 
leading to a class war within the body social of a , 
society and the breakdown of the civilization. The break-
downs in civilizations spring from inherent defects in 
man himself - the breakdown of creative leadership and 
the inability of the society to respond to further 
challenges. In the first six volumes of &MEV of Historx 
a cyclical or spiral pattern of history emerges. In 
later volumes this seems to be replaced by a linear view, 
according to Nash, as Toynbee suggests that if modern man 
returned to God, Western Civilization might be saved. 
Pitirim Sorokin identifies 2 two fundamental 
defects in TCynbee's work concerning first, "the 
civilization", taken by him as a unit of historical study, 
and, second, the conceptual scheme of genesis, growth and 
decline of civilizations. 
Toynbee claims that "... civilizations are wholes 
whose parts all cohere with one another and all affect one 
another reciprocally ..." 3 'Sorokin contends that this 
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assumption is not valid and that ... "his civilizations 
are not united systems but mere conglomerations of various 
civilizational objects and phenomena (congeries of systems 
and singular cultural traits) united only by special 
adjacency but not by causal or meaningful bonds. For this 
reason, they are not real "species of society"; therefore 
they can hardly be treated as unities and can hardly have 
any uniformities in their genesis, growth and decline." 4 
Further, says Sorokin, congeries cannot grow or decline. 
"Like the components of a dumping place, they can only be 
5 rearranged, added to, or subtracted from • • •" 
Sorokin says that Toynbee's acceptance of the 
conceptual scheme of "genesis - growth - decline" is a 
fatal mistake. He claims that this scheme is "... purely 
analogical and represents not a theory of how sociocultural 
phenomena change but an evaluative theory of sociocultural 
progress; how they should change." 6 From these two 
fundamental defects, claims Sorokin, follow many factual 
and logical incongruities of Toynbee's philosophy of 
history. 
A common criticism of Toynbee's work is that his 
method of inquiry is not empirical. Toynbee, however, 
contests7 this and explains what he means by the term 
"empirical method of inquiry". His approach to history is 
not, he admits, without preconceptions and he agrees with 
critics that his guiding ideas are not derived from the 
observation of history, and that the theories in his work 
are not deduced from the facts. He claims, in fact, that 
neither his, nor anyone else's theories are, or ever have 
been, or ever will be generated in this way. "If being 
"empirical" meant this, the word would have no counterpart 
in reality, and had better be struck out of the dictionary." 8 
He cites in support Popper's rejection in The 
Poverty of Historicism of 
... the view that science begins with observat-
ions from which it derives its theories by some 
process of generalization or induction. I do not 
believe that we ever make inductive generalizations 
in the sense that we start from observations and try 
to derive our theories from them. Before we can 67. 
collect data, our interest in data of a certain 
kind muirE; aroused: the problem always comes first. Theories are prior to observations as well 
as to experiments, in the sense that the latter are 
significant only in relation to theoretical 
problems. 9 
Toynbee agrees that it is a legitimate require-
ment for theories to be tested by the facts and that they 
can be validated only if they are confronted with 
relevant facts and confirmed by them. In addition, he 
says, "... the whole purpose of formulating a theory or 
a hypothesis is the heuristic one of trying to increase 
our knowledge and understanding by applying the theory 
or hypothesis to the phenomena." 10 He maintains his claim 
to be empirical in this sense. 
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(iii) The Christian Understanding of History. 
Jacques Maritain (born 1882) says l that in 
opposition to the oriental conception of the eternally 
recurrent phases of destruction and regeneration of the 
cosmos Christianity has taught that history works in a 
determined direction. History is not an eternal return. 
Time is linear not cyclical. 
He sees the advance of history as a "double and 
antagonistic movement of ascent and descent. In other 
words, the advance of history is a two-fold simultaneous 
progress in good and evil." 2 He sees this as an inductive 
law drawn from observation. But induction must be stabiliz-
ed and strengthened, he says, by philosophical reflection 
founded in human nature. 
He rejects the idea of a merely aprioristic 
philosophy of history "... founded either on purely 
philosophical insights or on dialectical exigencies." 3 
The proper objective content of the philosophy of history 
consists of "... intelligible data and connections which 
have been drawn from facts by induction, but which are 
checked and verified by a rational analysis." 4 
Many critics would dispute contentions like that 
of Maritain and deny that the Christian theory of history 
can be raised to the status of "law", let alone be derived 
by induction from observation. Nash says that speculative 
theories of history (and the Christian theory of history 
must be included here) suffer from the major defect that 
man occupies a particular place in the course of human 
history and is thus unable to "ground his view of 
history upon an absolute historical perspective." 5 And 
Maurice Mandelbaum has argued that it is impossible to 
establish a speculative system of history on empirical 
grounds. 
... every philosopher stands in the midst of 
the historical process itself. It is impossible 
to hold that history represents a teleological 
development unless one knows (or believes that one 
knows) what the end of that process will be. But 
no empirical survey of the past can demonstrate the 
future to the philosopher of history. It therefore 
becomes impossible to ground historical monism upon 
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an empirical appeal to the apparent teleology of 
past periods of history. In order to establish 
historical monism upon a teleological view of the 
period of history it is therefore necessary to 
transcend one's temporal standpoint. In this, 
Augustine and the entire Christian philosophy of 
history again represent a sounder approach to the 
problem of historical monism. For in Augustine and 
his followers we find an appeal to the nontempor.al 
realm of God as the basis of historical monism. 0 
Christian philosophers of history would claim 
that these problems can be obviated if one assumes the 
truth of the Christian view of history. In essence this 
is that God cLilitered human life in the form of Jesus 
Christ and "revealed to men the origin and goal of, the 
historical drama, the criteria for significance and value 
in the process, the true nature of the human participants 
in the drama and the ethical values appropriate to the 
process, ..." 
Reinhold Niebuhr says that the interpretation of 
history in the light of the Christian belief in the 
significance of the life, death and resurrection of Christ 
... creates a structure of meaning in which the history 
of a particular nation, as the center of the whole of 
history is unequivocally transcended."8 Further, he says 
that the conception of a divine sovereignty over history 
establishes a dimension in which there can be meaning but 
which does not demand that the facts of history be related 
to each other in terms of natural or logical necessity. 
Maritain, in his criticism of Hegel, reveals 
a similar viewpoint. He recognizes that it was Hegel who 
had the place and importance of the philosophy of history 
definitely recognized among the intellectual disciplines. 
But he claims also, that "he warped and spoiled the 
philosophy of history in a pernicious way." 9 This he did, 
partly by refusing to recognize that the philosophy of 
history is an inductive discipline. Maritain claims that 
he tried to have experience and induction appear as a mere 
illustration of a logical a priori necessity which he had 
discovered by merely logical means. 
He further criticizes Hegeliah metaphysics and 
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the Hegelian philosophy of history as a modern version of 
pure gnosticism. "Trying to re-engender the whole of reality 
by means of dialectics, he engulfed the world of experience 
in logical entities - entia rationis - in mutual conflict, 
which composed for hilgi an immense polymorphous and moving 
idol, as vast as the world, whose name was first Nature, and 
then History, when man emerges from nature, and when the 
anthropo-theistic process of self-realization is thus 
revealed." 10 
Both Maritain and Niebuhr deny that man is the 
object of inexorable deterministic forces and insist on 
the existence of human free will. "The freedom of God over 
and beyond the structures of life makes room for the free-
dom of man. All forms of naturalistic or spiritualistic 
determinism are broken." 11 
Maritain cannot accept the place accorded by 
Hegel to the individual person and human freedom in 
history. Hegel, says Maritain, explains how "the genius 
of history - the cunning of Reason - uses the interests and 
passions, even the most egoistic passions of the great 
men of history: they are in reality the puppets of the 
Weltgeist, of the spirit of the world." 12 
Maritain acknowledges that there are some changes 
in human history which are necessary; but the manner or 
mode in which these changes occur is not necessary: it 
depends on human will and human freedom. He quotes the 
expression by Pierre VendrOs of the notion that there are 
in human history necessary trends and, at the same time, 
no inevitability. 
Jamais lea engrenages de l'histoire n'ont un 
caractere fatal. Les cycles n'ont pas une dvolution 
d6terminee. Chacun d'eux peut se trouver ouvert ou 
ferm6 ... Tout en etant entralids par elle, les 
hommes font leur histoire. Entre les ev4nements il 
reste toujours quelque intervalle libre dans lequel 
la volonti humaine puisse d6velopper ses propres 
chances. 1 3 
Maritain's view of man and his freedom diverge 
also from the role assigned by Marx to man. Marx insisted 
that men make their own history, but they do not make it 
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freely. There is no capacity in man for modifying and 
orientating the movement of history. The great man in 
history, the revolutionary thinker merely discviers the 
preordained direction of history's movement. 
For the Christian, Maritain says, history has a 
direction "determined with regard to certain fundamental 
characteristics by the immense dynamic mass of the past 
pushing if forward, but undetermined with regard to specific 
orientations and with regard to the spirit or the manner 
in which a change, necessary in other respects, will be 
carried into existence." 14 In the undetermined area 
man's freedom comes into play. 
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(iv) Popper's 1 Critique of Historicist Prophecies. 
Sir Karl Popper terms "historicism" the doctrine 
that it is the task of the social sciences to propound 
historical prophecies and that these are needed for the 
conduct of politics in a rational way. 
He recognizes the tenets of historicism as form-
ing a very important part of Marxism or Scientific 
Socialism and acknowledges his analysis of the role of 
prediction and prophecy as a criticism of the historical 
method of Marxism. He claims that the kind of prophecies 
Marxism offers are in their logical character more akin 
to those of the Old Testament than to those of modern 
physics. 
He brings the central ideas of the historicist 
method into focus by identifying the historicist doctrine 
of the social sciences and the historicist doctrine of 
politics. The former is the claim that it is the task 
of the social sciences to make historical predictions such 
as of social revolutions. The latter is the idea that 
it is the task of politics to lessen the birth pangs of 
impending political developments. The ideas inherent in 
these doctrines "express one of the oldest dreams of man-
kind - the dream of prophecy, the idea that we can know 
what• the future has in store for us, and that we can profit 
from such knowledge by adjusting our policy to 
' Popper admits that all theoretical sciences are 
predicting sciences and that there are social sciences which 
are theoretical. But this does not mean that the task of 
the social sciences iS historical prophecy and the 
impression that it may do so disappears he says, if a 
distinctioniS made between what he calls on the one side 
"scientific prediction" and "unconditional historical 
prophecies" on the other. 
Ordinary predictions in science are conditional, 
he says, and unconditional scientific predictions can 
sometimes be derived from these conditional scientific 
predictions together with historical statements which assert 
that the conditions in question are fulfilled. Popper 
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contends that the historicist does not and cannot possibly 
derive his historical prophecies from conditional scientific 
predictions. 
... long term prophecies can be derived from 
scientific conditional predictions only if they qpply to systems which can be described as well as isolated, 
stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very 
rare in nature ; 	modern society is surely not 
one of them. 3 ' 
In the field of biology, he points out that the 
life cycles of organisms are part of a semi-stationary or 
very slowly changing biological chain of events. Further, 
scientific predictions about these life cycles can be made 
in so far as the biological system in question is treated 
as stationary and in so far as we abstract from the slow 
evolutionary changes. He asserts, however, that no basis 
can be found in the biological example for the contention 
that the method of long-term unconditional prophecy can be 
applied to human history. "Society is changing, 
developing. Its development is not, in the main, a 
repetitive one."4  "The fact that we can prophesy eclipses 
does not •.. provide a valid reason for expecting that we 
may predict revolutions." 5 
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PART TWO 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COGNITIVE STATUS 
AND METHODOLOGY OF HISTORY 
75. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Analytical philosophy of history encompasses a 
form of inquiry distinct from speculative, or what Danto 
calls substantive, philosophy of history viz0 the attempts 
to discover a theory concerned with the whole of history 
where the term "whole of history" includes not only the 
historical past, but the present and future as well. 
Analytical philosophy of history is concerned with 
the conceptual and methodological problems which arise out 
of the practice of history and out of the writing of 
speculative philosophy of history. 
It is concerned, for example, with such matters 
	
as (i) 	the status of history in the field of human 
knowledge. Is history a science, an art or is it sui 
generis? 
(ii) the nature and logical structure of historical 
explanation; the narrative style as explanatory mode and 
the part played (if any) by general laws in explanation; 
(iii) scepticism about the possibility of historical 
knowledge; the objectivity of historical conclusions; 
historical relativism and the part played by the historian's 
value judgments in the selection of evidence and arrival 
at conclusions; and the nature of historical interpretat-
ion; 
(iv) the concept of cause in history; 
(v) the nature of the historical individual and the 
relation between the historian's statements about the 
actions of individual human beings and the careers of 
nations, classes, movements or institutions. 
It is very difficult to give simple, cut-and-
dried answers to questions arising out of these matters. 
Gardiner sees 1 dangers emanating from a tendency to view 
such questions as: "Is history a science?" as like the 
question: "Is a whale a mammal?" which can be settled by 
appealing to certain accepted criteria. The question: 
"What is the nature of historical explanation?" is 
dangerous, he says, in that it implies that 9 provided a 
careful enough search is conducted, a clear and distinct 
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idea of what historical explanation really is may be 
found. 
There has been the implication that if the search 
were conducted with scientific rigour and precision there 
would be found by inductive method sufficient specific 
instances of historical explanations with uniform 
characteristics to warrant the basing thereon of a universal 
general statement in answer to the question. As Magee has 
pointed out2 , in the matter of producing useful results, 
science delivers the goods and continues to do so by way 
of inductive method. Yet philosophers have found un-
satisfying the discoveries that have come to light as a 
result of their searches for answers to questions such 
as that under consideration. 
If Popper's analysis of induction is correct they 
have been deluded by assuming inductive methods to be 
the basis of the logic of scientific discovery. In The 
Logic of Scientific Discoverz he outlines his reasons for 
rejecting inductive logic. The principle of induction 
can neither be a. purely logical truth like a tautology 
or an analytic statement s nor can its truth be known from 
experience as this would mean employing inductive inferences 
leading to an infinite regress. Nothing is gained, more-
over, he says, if the principle of induction is taken not 
as true but only as probable. "In short, like every other 
form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference, 
or "probability logic, 	leads either to an infinite 
regress, or to the doctrine of apriorism." 3 
Induction is a dispensable concept, a myth. 
Popper recognizes that it may be said that his rejection 
of inductionebprives empirical science of what appears to 
be its most important characteristic. But his reply is 
that his "main reason for rejecting inductive logic is 
precisely thEt it does not provide a suitable distinguish-
ing mark of the empirical, non-metaphysical, character of 
a theoretical system; or in other words, that it does not 
rovide a suitable 'criterion of demarcationg. 4" 
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It would appear that philosophers considering 
the question: "What is the nature of historical explanation?" 
would find linguistic analysis, psychology or metaphysics 
to be more fruitful fields for their endeavours. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE STATUS OF HISTORY - IS IT A SCIENCE, OR 
AN AUTONOMOUS DISCIPLINE? 
Is history a so_ience? 
Cohen sees the quarrel engendered by the question 
as having been largely verbal, "more concerned with main-
taining or rejecting the prestige that the word "science" 
carries nowadays than with the precise meaning of the 
question." 1 If "science" means, he says, knowledge based 
on the most careful examination of all the available 
evidence, the scientific historian certainly aims at such 
knowledge and his work can be ljudged by the extent to which 
he attains his aim. He sees the procedure of scientific 
history as not differing significantly from that of a 
rationally developed legal system. 
To those who deny that history is axience the 
latter term denotes those investigations which aim at the 
discovery of laws, i.e. of universal relations between 
r*peatable elements. History is concerned with establish-
ing specific events that occurred at a definite time and 
place whereas the facts or laws which general physical 
science seeks to establish deal with repeatable elements 
and assert that wherever and whenever A, then B. 
Cohen's analysis here is supported by that of 
Ernest Nagel whose perspective is that of the distinction 
between two allegedly different types of sciences: "... 
the nomothetic, which seek to establish abstract general 
laws for indefinitely repeatable processes; and the 
ideographic, which aim to understand the unique and non- 
recurrent,
Nagel shows that it is false to hold that the 
natural sciences can be regarded as exclusively nomothetic. 
No conclusions, he says, concerning the actual character 
of specific things and processes can be derived from 
general statements alone. Furthermore, geophysics and 
animal ecology "... are concerned with the spatiotemporal 
distribution and development of individual systems." 3 
Neither can history be held to be a purely 
ideographic discipline. The historian, in his discourse 
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about what is individual and singular, requires general 
descriptive terms and his recognition of various kinds or 
types of things, Nagel says, contains implicit acknow-
ledgement of numerous empirical regularities. In addition, 
the attempt to explain actions in terms of their causes 
and consequences assumes supposedly well-established laws 
of causal dependence. 
Cohen sees an unmistakable difference between 
history and general science in respect of the significance 
of laws on the one hand and the importance of establish-
ing specific events on the other. But it is obscured by 
two considerations, viz., the presence of historical 
elements in all sciences (except pure mathematics) and 
the impossibility of eliminating laws from history. The 
historical element in all natural sciences can be seen, 
he says, in the records of observations or experiments 
which always report what happened at a given time or place. 
Some sciences are about individual objects, celestial or 
terrestrial, about the sun, the moon, or the earth. 
History, he says, in trying to establish the occurrence 
of individual events on the basis of evidence must assume 
causal laws according to which the phenomena of human life 
are connected. 
It is obvious that whenever the historian gives a full account of any event or explains it in terms of certain motives or as conditioned by certain physical or social circumstances, he assumes psychologic, economic and other social as well as physical laws. The assumption of such invariant uniformities is necessary not only to what has been called the process of historical interpretation but to make possible any inference from the brute data in the present - the documents or remains Wore him - to what must have happened in the past. 4 
Assumptions of the kind noted above he sees as 
necessary in order to appraise the weight to be given to 
diverse accounts of the same events, and in hypotheses of 
this character, he says the historian finds the clues that 
lead from known facts to antecedent and consequent cond-
itions and thus pusti3Oorward the frontiers of knowledge. 
In these respects he sees history as applied 
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science as is geology, medicine or engineering. There is 
a difference, however. The engineer or geologist knows 
explicitly and precisely what laws he is applying in order 
to explain phenomena and the laws have been or can be 
verified. The historian seldom explicitly states the laws 
of human events that he assumes and they are not always 
capable of being formulated with any precision. 
Cohen sees another sense in which history is 
often claimed to be a science and that is in the sense 
that there are laws peculiar to human history. He refers 
here to the views found in the works of Vico, Comte and 
Spengler supposing the existence of laws manifested in 
the development of every nation or culture. According 
to these writers every nation or civilization must go 
through the same series of stages, e.g., the ages of gods, 
heroes and men according to Vico; theology, metaphysics 
and positive sciences according to Comte; or the four 
stages of Spengler - "Every Culture passes through the 
age-phase of the individual man. Each has its childhood, 
youth, manhood and old age." 5 
But if such sociologic laws could be definitely 
established and "nations were as plentiful as fruit flies 
or cabbageso6 such laws wwld be like the biologic 
formulation of the life cycles of animals or plants. But 
would that establish history as a science? 
Cohen lists some historical objections to the 
theory that all peoples or civilizations must go through 
the same stages. Firstly, no two nations have been known 
to go through exactly the same career. No two nations 
are exactly alike:An their composition and environment. 
Perfect repetition is impossible for the further reason 
that every nation learns more or less from the experience 
of those that preceded it. 
The fact remains, Cohen insists, that even if all 
the known sequences of historic events could be subsumed 
under general laws of development such laws would not 
constitute history. History deals with unique events. 
The historian is concerned only with determining what 
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happened and, if possible, why it happened as it did and 
when it did.. History. uses laws to explain facts but 
its primary business is not the establishment of laws. 
... any science of social phenomena must, if 
it is to be alike in form to physical science be 
expressible in differential equations, that is, in 
. microscopic rather than in macroscopic cycles."7 
He quotes Berr and Febvre as saying "If every 
thing in the realm of the real were subject to immutable 
law there would be no history." 8 But, he counters, "with 
equal force it may be said that if all knowledge were of 
the past, history would be the only kind of knowledge." 9 
The distinctive character of history as an 
organization of knowledge is highlighted says Cohen, by 
a comparison with mathematics. The difference between the 
two he characterizes as one of degree of abstractness or 
degree of individuality. Mathematics, he says, uses 
concrete material as a spring-board from which to jump 
into the realm of abstract relations. History utilizes all 
abstracknowledge or its tacit assumptions to illumine 
the individual event in time and place. He points out that 
history and mathematics are alike in one respect: they 
are applicable to every field of empirical knowledge. 
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(ii) Is history sui generic? 
Gardiner discerns 1 two forms of arguments, a 
weaker and a stronger, claiming that it is impossible to 
analyse historical explanation in terms of regularity. 
The weaker, he says, admits the importance of causality 
as a category of historical thought but denies that it 
has the function in history that it has elsewhere. The 
stronger questions the place of causality in history 
altogether, suggesting that historical explanation has 
its own categories. According to the stronger argument, 
in order to understand history, the scientific conception 
of knowledge must be discarded and a distinct type of 
knowledge recognized. This type of knowledge says Gardiner, 
has been termed "insight", "intuition", "empathy" or 
"recreating past experience H (Collingwood). 
He quotes Collingwood as saying: "Historical 
knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the 
past, and at the same time it is the redoing of this, the 
perpetuation of past acts in the present. Its object is 
therefore not a mere object, something outside the mind 
which knows it; it is an activity of thought which can be 
known only in so far as the knowing mind re-enacts it and 
knows itself as so doing. To the historian, the activities 
whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be 
watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own 
mind." 2 In line with this approach, Gardiner recognizes 
the difficulty of assimilating historical explanation to 
scientific explanation. But he questions the existence of 
a "clear-cut and unbridgeable cleavage between history and 
other forms off:)knowledge." 3 
He examines what is meant by saying that "history 
is autonomous." If it is affirmed as an a priori self-
evident truth he sees this as introducing an undesirable 
subjectivity into the matter. Alternatively, he says, it 
appears sometimes to be suggested that the autonomous nature 
of history follows from the impossibility of assimilating 
historical explanation to ordinary causal explanation. 
But, he points out, when it is asked why this is impossible 
the answer seems frequently to be that this must be so in 
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virtu ofthe nature of historical knowledge. He 
concludes that this argument cannot be used without 
circularity to justify the theory that history is sui 
generis. 
Gardiner sees the philosophy of history as tend-
ing to fall between two extremes. At one extreme lies 
the view that history is a branch of knowledge which is 
sui generis. At the other, there is the claim that history 
is a science. He sees both views, taken in isolation, as 
leading to difficulties' yet suggests there is truth in 
both the contending views. 
He argues that an examination of features of 
historical writing and thinking precludes the possibility 
of a wholesale assimilation of historical explanation to 
explanation as it occurs in the sciences. Nevertheless,' 
he argues, such an examination does not necessitate 
drawing the inference that the historian's field of study 
is in a mysterious way distinct from the world of the 
scientist or of the ordinary person." 4 Gardiner's aim 
is "to try to show that the differences between history and 
other branches of inquiry may be accounted for, not on 
grounds that necessitate the postulation of such worlds, 
but on other grounds connected with the purposes of 
historial research, and with the methods and the conceptual 
frameworks appropriate to those purposes." 5 
Gardiner identifies four propositions often put 
forward in support of the theory that history is an autonom-
ous branch of study. 
A. Historical events are past events and hence 
cannot be known in the manner in which present events are 
known. 
B. Historical events are unique and unclassifiable. 
C. History describos the actions, statements, and 
thoughts of human beings not the behaviour of "dead matter" 
with which science is concerned. 
D. Historical events have an irreducible richness and 
complexity. 
A. Is there a problem about the Past? The 
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difficulty about past events stems, he says, from the 
belief that one can only correctly be said to know an 
event when one is actually observing it: true knowledge 
is knowledge by acquaintance. The net result of this 
belief, says Gardiner, is that some philosophers have 
assumed that there is something radically wrong or suspect 
about statements referring to the past. 
He quotes solutions to this dilemma about the 
past proposed by Oakeshott: "If the historical past be 
knowable, it must belong to the present world of 
experience..."6 The past "varies with the present rests 
upon the present, is the present." 7 In support of this 
last proposition Gardiner says that Oakeshott claims that 
the expression, "what really happened," must be replaced 
by the expression "what the evidence obliges us to believe". 
Gardiner says that it is not legitimate to 
confuse( the evidence for a past event, which is admittedly 
present, with the event for which it is evidence, when this 
is past. In part this confusion stems from the use of 
'criteria of tense for deciding the reality or otherwise 
of an event. Gardiner says that the sense of speaking 
of events as "real" or "unreal" is quite separate from the 
present - past distinction. The tendency to assimilate 
past events to dream events, to deny their reality on 
account of their pastness is unwarranted. Evidence can be 
produced to justify the use of the word "real" with regard 
to events and we do not require, he says, that the event 
in question be observable here and now. 
B. Can uniqueness be claimed for history? The 
claim for uniqueness in history rests on the claim that 
history is about what happened on particular occasions; 
not about what usually happens or what always happens under 
certain circumstances. The historian, Gardiner says, 
concentrates upon the event in its unique individuality, 
regarding it, not as an instance of a type, not as a member 
of a class, but as something which is to be viewed for 
and in itself. 
Gardiner does not agree with the belief, often 
inferred from the contention above, that the uniqueness of 
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the events studied by the historian excludes the possibility 
of their being classified or generalized about in any way. 
Nor, in his view, does the historian's interest in events 
in their unique individuality in any way entail the view 
that the description or explanation of the events in question 
is of a peculiar kind. Gardiner points out that engineers 
and architects, while concerned with building particular 
bridges and houses, are not free to ignore the laws of 
mechanics. In similar fashion, he argues, the historian 
for all his attention to the individual and the unique 
is not free to disregard general laws in his work of 
construction. 
C. Gardiner examines the "inside-outside" theory 
of historical events which fails to elucidate in any 
definitive way the status of history. He quotes Coiling-
wood to present the outline of the "inside-outside" theory 
of historical events: 
The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the out-side of an event I mean anything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their move-ments ... By the inside of an event I mean that in it which can only be described in terms of thought The historian is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is investi-gating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and the inside of an event ... he must always - remember that ... his main task is to think himself 0, into this action to discover the thought of its agent."' 
The processes of nature can therefore be properly described as sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They are not processes of mere events but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought; and what the historian is looking for is these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought. 9 
Gardiner believes Collingwood's formulation above 
is misleading, "because the introduction of a spatial 
metaphor gives the impression that what are called the 
"insides" of events are queer objects, invisible engines 
that make the wheels go round." 10 It is then only too 
easy, he says, to move from this to the supposition that, 
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in order to know the insides of historical events some 
peculiar technique is required. A picture is built up of', 
the historian as a man who examines recalcitrant entities 
thoughts and intentions, plans and mental processes - by 	\ 
means of "intuition" or "re-enactment of past experience." 
D. May a clue to the status of history be found 
in the language of historical description? Gardiner 
examines the difference between the language of scientific 
description and that of historical description. The language 
in which the discoveries of any particular branch of 
scientific, inquiry are expressed is adapted, he points out, 
to the systematically organized body of laws or yiyvotheses 
which constitutes that branch of inquiry. As a consequence, 
the concepts employed by a particular science have a more 
or less precise definition. 
"Scientific concepts are introduced when a part-
icular empirical correlation has become analytic within the 
scientific system in question: such concepts are useful in 
order conveniently to refer to an indefinite number of 
observed correlations of a certain type. They are shorthand 
deviCes." 11 Gardiner points out that, in historical 
writing, on the other hand, "the reference to a system of 
interrelated and interdependent statements, embodying 
precise correlations between selected features of experience, 
is lacking; and in consequence we find also absent the 
usage of concepts whose meanings can be expressed in exact 
terms."12 
He denies that there is thereby anything "wrong" 
with history. He emphasizes that the kind of language we 
use is related to our purposes and interests. Language 
used for certain purposes requires a conceptual apparatus 
different from that required by language used for other 
purposes. Historical concepts like "revolution" were not 
evolved, he says, to meet the descriptive needs of an 
expanding scientific system. They are not used for the 
formulation of general hypotheses or laws or in making 
predictions, Concepts like "revolution" were developed, 
he says, to meet the requirements of those who wanted a 
short means of referring to a fairly common instance of the 
behaviour of human beings in society. 	87. 
He sees the crux of the distinction between the 
historian and the scientist as follows: "The scientist 
frames hypotheses of precision and wide generality by a 
continual refining away of irrelevant factors. Things 
are otherwise with the historian. His aim is to talk 
about whf7,t happened on particular occasions in all its 
variety, oll its richness, and his terminology is adapted 
to this object." 13 This is the reason, he says, why terms 
like ,, revolution u are left so vague and open. They we 
accommodating terms, able to cover a vast number of events 
falling within an indefinitely circumscribed range. The 
spread of the historian's concepts involves a complementary 
limitation upon the generalizations in which they mey occur. 
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(iii) Conclusion.  
The questions are raised and elucidated, but, 
it appears, one would seek in vain for conclusive answers. 
It would seem that some of the questions about the status 
of history are indeed, as Gardiner suggests, spurious. 
Perhaps the very source of the questions is the delusion 
hinted at by Dewey when he said that: "There is something 
both ridiculous and disconcerting in the way in which men 
have let themselves be imposed upon, so as to infer that 
scientific ways of thinking of objects give the inner 
reality of things, and that they put a mark of spurious-
ness upon all other ways of thinking of then, and 
perceiving and enjoying them." / 
Many would claim that the most satisfactory way 
of looking at the status of history is in the light of the 
pragmatist theory of knowledge that knowledge and its 
verification must come to us through action. This theory 
is espoused by G. J. Renier: 
The practical action which provides knowledge 
and the verification ,Of knowledge, is experimentation, 
in the case of the scientific worker, and in that of 
the historian it is the telling of the story. It is 
only as he tells his story that the historian finally 
weighs his evidence, pronounces on the quality and 
reliabi41ty of his traces, and exercises his critical 
function to the fullest extent. 2 
In judging the practical activity, the story, 
scientific criteria of certitude are irrelevant, and yield 
to practical and ethical criteria. What is important is 
that the story must not violate the conception of honesty 
of the historian or his colleagues. "The story must pass 
muster before the intellectual integrity of the men of the 
craft, and this is the equivalent of the experiment in 
science." 3 
W. B. Gallie also favoured the view that the kind 
of understanding achieved by history is akin to that which 
emerges from a story. Gallie proposed two theses 4 that 
the crucial developments in any story are essentially 
contingent and that the act of following such developments 
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depends upon their human interest, their power to enlist 
certain peculiarly human feelings. Ideally, a story is 
self explanatory as one follows it. The more skilful 
the story-teller, the rarer will be the intrusion of 
explicit explanations. 
The sense of "following" - following to a 
conclusion - that applies to stories is of an altogether 
different kind, he claims, from the sense of following an 
argument so that we see that its conclusion follows. 
... The conclusion of a story is essentially a 
different kind of conclusion from that which is 
synonymous with "statement proved" or "result 
deduced or predicted." The conclusion of any worth-
while story is not something that can be deduced or 
predicted, nor even something that can be seen at a 
• later stage to have been theoretically or ideally predictable on the basis of what had been revealed 
at some earlier stage.,5 . 
The familiar and unquestionable'facts of the 
experience of following a story are, he says, that we 
follow a story through or across contingencies - accidents, 
coincidences, unpredictable events of all kinds. Yet the 
story's general direction and continuous advance towards 
its final conclusion somehow succeed in rendering these 
contingencies acceptable. But to traditional philosophical 
ways of thinking, he points out, there is something 
paradoxical about the juxtaposition of the terms: 
"contingent" and "acceptable". 
By definition, what is contingent is not under 
our intellectual command: it is the unexpected blow 
that gets under our intellectual defences. But only 
that which is, or which can be brought under our 
intellectual command, so that it conforms to our 
anticipatory (or in some cases, timelegs) classificatory 
systems is intellectually acceptable. 
The view, Gallie says, that we must transform the 
appearance of "acceptable contingencies" into something 
more intellectually respectable, "has the effect of ham-
stringing any attempt to describe what is peculiar to 
historical thinking: its attempt to understand, and its 
success in understanding, particular actions." 7 In the case 
of a story he claims that there are no definite rules to 
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decide what contingencies can be accepted into it. 
It is up to the writer to vindicate his acceptance of a 
given contingency in terms of the subsequent sufficiently 
continuous development of his story. 
Gallie comes to the conclusion that the kind of 
understanding history aims at is quite different from 
that which is characteristic of the natural sciences. The 
claim can be supported, he says, that history is a species 
of the genus Story. 
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CHAPTER 7: EXPLANATION IN HISTORY. 
(0 Introduction.  
The question of the nature of explanation in 
history is closely related to the foregoing examination of 
the cognitive status of history. If the positivist, who 
claims that methodologically there are no basic differences 
between history and the natural sciences, is correct, then 
it would appear that all genuine explanations must conform 
to the same deductive model, called by Dray the "Covering 
Law Model." 
This model of historical explanation was pro-
pounded by Carl G. Hempel and, according to it, a genuine 
explanation must satisfy three conditions: 
"(1) the explanans (the set of premises that 
make up the explanation) must contain a set of statements 
asserting the occurrence of certain events; (2) all of the 
statements in the explanans must be reasonably well con-
firmed; and (3) the explanandum (that which is being 
explained) must follow deductively from the explanans." 1 
Those who claim autonomy for history as a 
cognitive discipline would reject the idea that genuine 
explanations must follow the deductive model and claim for 
historical explanations a logic of their own. The claim 
may also be made, by Walsh, 2 for example, that explanation 
emerges through the process of colligation, which involves 
the tracing of the intrinsic relations of an event to other 
events and locating it in its historical context. The 
idea of the narrative style as explanatory mode would 
appear to be supported by Gallie. 
Considerable divergence of opinion exists also 
on the role of generalizations and laws in historical 
explanations. 
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(ii) The view that there is little difference between 
explanation in science and explanation in history. 
Frankel claims1 that it is misleading to believe 
that explanation in history is radically different from 
explanation in other fields as a result of the fact that 
the historian is primarily concerned with making singular 
.statements. He cites the fact that geology is predominantly 
concerned with discovering individual occurrences that 
have taken place at some particular place and time. On 
the other hand, beliefs that are general in character have 
to be taken into account in history. For example, general 
beliefs about the physical world, human nature, social 
structure and about the ways in which types of events are 
generally related to one another have to be invoked, he 
claims, to justify the inferences drawn about the past 
from traces left in the present. 
He does concede that special problems arise in 
historical inquiry leading in part to the view that "...an 
incorrigibly subjective element of interpretation creeps 
into all historical explanations." 2 It is questionable, 
however, he claims, that these problems justify the view 
that historical explanation is something whose logic is 
discontinuous from the logic of disciplined inquiry else-
where. 
Frankel considers the problem that it is the case 
that historical explanations neither offer nor clearly 
presuppose precise, finished generalizations from which 
the actual events recorded can in fact be inferred. In 
addition, the proofs which historians provide are of a 
"comparatively low order." 3 
He discounts the significance of these matters 
by pointing out that what these features of historical 
explanation point to is a contingent fact about the state 
of the historian's knowledge - our present poverty with 
respect to firm and reliable generalizations about human 
affairs and difficulty of getting at past facts. "... with 
respect to any specific historical occurrence, these are 
empirical and contingent states of affairs; they are not 
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unalterable logical necessities.° 4 
The alleged problems that historical explanations 
do not have a predictive (or retrodictive) value, that 
they state essential conditions for the occurrence of an 
event, but not the sufficient conditions, do not necessarily 
mean that an ideal of full explanation cannot be met. 
Frankel points out that a request for explanation is often 
satisfied by "..• an account of the stages of a process, 
the last stage of which is the phenomenon in the shape 
in which it exhibits those traits about which we have 
asked our question."5 
However, this form of explanation is not distinct-
ively "historical" as it occurs in other domains such as 
embryology. In addition, Frankel points out H OOO the 
statement of the stages of a process, or of essential 
conditions for the occurrence of an event rest as much as 
does a fully predictive explanation on tacit or expressed 
generalizations."6 "Otherwise we could not distinguish 
between a mere succession of events and a 'series of 
connected events."7 
The criticism is often raised against the 
generalizations used by historians that they are specious. 
When all the restrictions and qualifications are listed 
the generalization appears to be, in reality, a disguised 
singular statement. Frankel points out that in the face 
of counterinstances the historian tends to defend his 
generalization, not by showing that it derives from a 
more embracing scheme of generalizations, but by telling 
more about the actual story and by supplying hitherto 
missing restrictive claims, so that the apparent counter-
instances are shown not really to apply to the events in 
question. Consequently, the difficulty of refuting the 
historian's generalization appears to be a problem of 
refuting a disguised singular statement. Further, it is 
argued, nothing is presupposed about invariant or 
statistically frequent relations between events of given 
types in the causal relations asserted by historians. 
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Frankel claims in counter-argument to this 
interpretation that " ... most historical generalizations 
do not seem attempts to state invariant relations, but 
only correlations of a significant frequency. Hence the 
historian feels free to cling to his generalization even 
though counter-instances may be produced. The difficulty 
in refuting such generalizations does not lie in the fact 
that they are disguised singular statements. It lies in 
the fact that the imputed frequency of the relation in 
question is left highly indeterminate." 8 
A further aspect of the generalizations that 
historians employ is that some seem to have the status of 
methodological rules for organizing specific materials 
under inquiry. He cites as examples those generalizations 
involving expressions like "the Puritan mind", "the 
Prussian officer" and "the Victorian businessman." Such 
rules are not peculiar to history but exist in other domains, 
he says, when inquiry has reached a certain stage of 
development. 
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(iii) The anti-Hempelian argument. 
Michael Scriven argues 1 that the deductive model 
of explanation is wrong. His first objection to the 
deductive model of historical explanation is "that it can 
be formulated only by ignoring the distinction between an 
explanation and its justification." 2 
He challenges the view that an historical 
explanation is inadequate if it is bereft of laws from which 
the alleged consequence can be deduced, if it is merely 
what Hempel calls an "explanation sketch". This "... consists 
of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial 
conditions considered as relevant, and it ne6ds 'filling 
out' in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation. This 
filling out requires further empirical research, for which 
the sketch suggests the direction ..." 3 
Scriven proposes an alternative description of 
"explanation sketches". He regards them as explanations 
as they stand, not incomplete in any sense in which they 
should be complete. What is not included in the statement 
of explanation are the grounds which could be given in 
support of it, if pressed. 
He avers that it is more profitable to employ 
a tripartite division of the deficiencies of explanations 
as "inaccurate", "inadequate" or "irrelevant" rather than 
to describe them in the single blanket terms "incorrect" 
or "incomplete" or "improper". He claims that the kinds 
of grounds which are required for defense against -lthe 
errors of inaccuracy,inadequacy, and irrelevance are 
radically different. He refers to grounds against inaccuracy 
as "truth-justifying grounds." 4 "Role-justifying grounds" 5 
are grounds for thinking that a statement is adequate for 
the task of explaining whatever it is to be explained. The 
third group of grounds, he says, support interpretation of 
the practical requirements of the person or public to whom 
the explanation is addressed. He cites as an example the 
need for an(xplanation of someone's behaviour in terms of 
his intentions rather than his muscular operations. The 
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grounds involved here he calls "type-justifying grounds". 6 
Inappositeness is the only error in giving the 
wrong type of explanation, not inaccuracy or inadequacy. 
"There is no such thing as the explanation of something 
unless a decision is made about 1221.n7 Scriven asserts 
that it would be absurd to include considerations of the 
kind involved in selecting the type of explanation, as 
part of the explanation itself. Yet, he points out, 
there is no essential difference between doing that and 
including role •- or truth-justifying grounds in the 
explanation. 
The procedure of justifying assertions in history 
does not necessarily end at any particular point says 
Scriven. There can be further grounds, which he calls 
second-level grounds, to defend the first-level grounds. 
The regress involved here can be dealt with analogously, 
he says, to the puzzle about complete explanations in which 
the question is asked: how can anything ever be completely 
explained, when, in order to explain anything we must 
appeal to something else which we have not explained? His 
answer to this puzzle is to show that if an explanation 
is viewed as a linkage between what we do not understand 
and what we do understand, and there can be no such link-
age if we understand nothing, then the idea of a complete 
explanation is the idea of a linkage of two things when 
there is only one thing to link. The idea of a complete 
explanation is thus, "like the sound of one hand clapping, 
... a logical echo, a thing of no substance whose loss is 
no loss."8 
Similarly, says Scriven, a "complete" justifica-
tion of a statement can never be given. But to use "complete" 
in this sense means abandoning the possibility of ever 
applying it. It is therefore better not to use it. in the 
above sense but to use it, as one normally does, in the 
perfectly good sense of "providing enough evidence to make 
doubt unreasonable." 9 "Exactly how much this is, will 
depend upon the context, upon what kind of doubts are 
being considered and what kind of assertion is being made 
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(singular, universal, statistical, theoretical, 
, observational, etc.): 910  
Scriven points out that in the Hempelian notion 
of a complete explanation a natural stopping point appears 
in that an explanation will be said to be complete when 
it enables the deduction of the fact to be explained from 
at least one law plus antecedent conditions. He says that 
if mere dedUction were required any statement of fact could 
be deduced from a logically trivial inflation of it, such 
as its double negation and, thereby be "completely explained". 
He argues that this kind of "complete explanation" will 
in some contexts provide too much, and in some too little, 
and in others the wrong type of explanation or even no 
explanation at all. 
He reiterates his belief in the illegitimacy 
of claiming, as he believes Hempel does, that for complete-
ness' sake the evidence for judgments of explanation-type 
should be included in the explanation. "It should be seen 
from the beginning that the completeness or correctness 
of an explanation is a notion without meaning except in a 
given context from which the type can be inferred and in 
which the required facts are known." 11 Given details of 
the context, he says, there can be produced in history 
facts and not laws as a perfectly adequate explanation. 
He rejects the claim that completeness of explanation 
requires more grounds while conceding that justification 
may require more role-, truth-, or type-justifying grounds. 
In certain contexts, such as with a political joke, we 
can assume that the audience has no need to be reminded 
of the relevant laws or given the entire background. 
Explanations are practical, context-bound affairs, 
and they are merely converted into something else 
when set out in full deductive array. Just as the 
joke becomes, when all the context is laboriously 
presented, a sociological explanation of a joke (and usually no longer funny), so the explanation 
when dressed in its deductive robes becomes a proof 
or a justification of an explanation (and usually no longer explains but demonstrates). 12 
•Scriven rejects the claim that anExplanation needs 
laws. He recognizes the difficulty of giving any enlighten- 
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ing short characterization of an explanation but points 
the way thus - "If it is any help to say. that explanations 
must produce understanding and not simply knowledge, this 
can be 	To be more specific about explanations than 
this is to restrict the concept, says Scriven, and he claims 
that the apparent ,attractions of so doing have proved to 
be largely illusory. 
The difference between understanding and knowing 
is brought about, he says, by saying that understanding 
(and hence explanation) involves knowing all about something 
with respect to a certain category of questions. Thus to 
understand an action involves, in some contexts, knowing 
about the motives for it, the character of the actor and 
the circumstances of the action. Scriven cites as an 
example the understanding of the rules of Hanoverian 
succession. No laws, he says, are deductively invoked 
in the explanation of these: "... explanation here 
consists in.exegetical clarification and.examination of the 
relations between the rules, e.g., with respect to consist-
ency, redundancy,. function, etc. 1114 Another example of 
explanation in which. no laws of nature are involved would 
be the explanation of the symbolism of the Imperial 
regalia at a coronation. 
These examples, says Scriven, have value also 
in their contradiction of the assumption that only the 
causal explanation of events concerns historians. In 
addition they throw light, he says,. on other types of 
explanation, such as explaining the significance of a 
certain action. "In explaining the significance of an 
event (or trend, or condition) - and there are few more 
common types of explanation in history - we are not 
trying to show why, given its antecedent conditions, it 
was to be expected, but rather to show that, given that 
it happened, it was of a certain importance." 15 
Scriven examines the plausibility of Hempel's 
analysis of explanation with an example whereby an ink 
bottle is knocked off a table and ruins the carpet. He 
says that if one is asked subsequently to explain how the 
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carpet was damaged, there is a complete explanation. It 
was damaged by knocking over the ink. , He concedes that 
the truth of this explanation is empirical and in this 
sense, it depends on the laws of nature. But the certainty 
of the explanation has nothing to do with ability to quote 
the laws. 
If there were a request to produce the role-
justifying grounds for the explanation, he says; there 
could not be produced any true universal hypothesis in which 
the antecedent avoids such terms as "knock hard enough." 
The word "probably" would most likely appear too, and one 
would be left with a truism which could not be denied, 
but he asks, who would bother to say it? "The simple fact 
must be faced that certain evidence is adequate to 
guarantee certain explanations without the benefit of 
deduction from laws." 16 
Scriven emphasizes the importance in explanation 
of judgments, the basis of which is the acquired capacity 
for identifying causes. "The physicist judges, inductively, 
and from his knowledge and experience, what the explanat-
ion is; and the judgment cannot be converted into a 
deduction. The historian does no less and it would surely 
be unfair to ask him to do more." 17 (Scriven's view of 
the importance of judgment in physics is in accord with 
Toulmin's view of judgment as "part of the art of the 
sciences, which has to be picked up in the course of the 
scientist's training.") 18  
Scriven poses the question as to whether the 
deductive model could be saved by the substitutioncf 
probability - statements for universal hypotheses. He 
concludes that it cannot, for the criterion of deduction 
must be abandoned if the criterion of universal hypotheses 
is abandoned. H... and what is then left of the deductive 
model? We have instead an inductive model of explanation, 
where for laws we have probability truisms, and for 
deduction probability inference." 19 
Scriven denies that thereby an improved or more 
complete kind of explanation, or an ideal model of 
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explanation is provided. What is to be gained, he 
asks, by quoting truisms rather than particular and relevant 
'causal 'judgments? The importance of truisms is that they 
often form the basis of the historian's principles of 
judgment and are valuable in the role-justifying dimension;,' 
of support for an explanation. "The truism tells us 
nothing new at all; but it says soMething and it says some-
thing true, even if vague and dull. It ill fits into a 
deductive Proof; but it has no need to do so, since the 
justification of an explanation is a context-dependent 
inductive procedure (and not necessarily a predictively  
useful procedure )." 2° 
And, as Popper has pointed out, the inductive 
procedure is not a suitable criterion of demarcation of 
scientifically, objective truth. But, as Scriven stated 
above, the point of an explanation is to produce under-
standing, not just knowledge and the feeling of 
certainty accompanying one's understanding, of an explanat-
ion has nothing to do with the laws involved in the 
empirical truth of the explanation. As Popper said, 
"from the epistemological point of view, it is quite 
irrelevant whether my feeling of conviction was strong 
or weak; whether it came from a strong or even irresistible 
impression of indubitable certainty •.. or merely from a 
doubtful surmise. None of this has any bearing on the 
question of how scientific statements can be justified." 21 
Finally, Scriven denies that his "explanations" 
may be construed simply as Hempel's "explanation sketches" 
and his truisms as loose forms of Hempel's laws. The 
Important distinction, he emphasizes, between explanations 
of any kind is their certainty; and this, he argues, is 
quite unconnected with the availability of universal 
hypotheses, which constitutes Hempel's criterion for 
judging "explanation-sketches." "If an higtorical explanat-
ion were found which did involve a universal hypothesis, 
it would not, in the eyes of historians, be any better for 
that." 22 
The third objection Scriven has to the deductive 
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model of historical explanation is that laws are not 
available even in the physical sciences, and, if they were, 
would not provide explanations, of much interest. 
Explanations in the physicalsciences are by no means 
examples of the deductive-model. . The laws of physics, he 
says, are not truisms but informative laws which can be 
formulated.with some precision and enable one to explain 
hitherto obscure phenomena, but they too require judgment 
in their.application. The laws of nature, he says, are 
remarkably imperfect instruments . and never better than 
approximations. "Consequently, deduction of the exact 
values to be explained from such laws is a matter of 
chance." 23 To say that the explanations in the deductive 
model are true enough is fatal for Hempel's analysis as 
the word "enough" immediately lets in the element of judg-
ment, the absence of which had appeared to distinguish 
physical explanations. 
AS a more useful distinction than that between 
explanations in history and those in physical sciences, 
Scriven proposes a distinction between what he calls 
"derivation-explanations" and "selection-explanations". 
This is a distinction between kinds of (xplanation rather 
than subject matter. In calling for a derivation-
explanation we know the facts and laws, he says, but can't 
see how they explain. A demonstration of this is required. 
In the selection-explanation case, on the other hand we know 
how each of possible sets of circumstances could explain, 
but we don't know which set applies. The concern is with 
selecting from the sets the appropriate explanation. 
In.physics, understanding: a phenomenon often 
requires understanding exactly how its properties can be 
mathematically derived from certain mathematically expressed 
physical laws. Physics has a monopoly on derivation-
explanations he asserts. But there are also to be found 
in physics selection-explanations, he claims and scientists 
judge they have the right one; just as the historian 
does: and the historian's judgment, like the physicist's, 
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unformalizable, is aided by "empathy". 24 
To sum up: "There is no greater virtue in the 
explanations in physics than selection-explanations. For 
the only surplus value of the physical law over the truism 
, lies in the field of prediction of simple quantitative 
phenomena and not in that of explanation, where the only 
requirement to be met is attainment of that level of 
certainty and accuracy which the context requires. And 
step for step, level for level, the explanations based 
on truisms can match those based on laws; the extra 
precision of the latter isn't a working part in the 
machinery of selection-explanations. "25 
A further objection Scriven has to the deductive 
model of historical explanation is "... that the logical 
argument for correlation of good predictions with good 
explanations is not formally sound and has a limited range 
of application and little practical significance even in that 
range; that good predictions are impossible in large areas 
of the natural and applied sciences where simple quantitative 
laws and measuring techniques are not available; but that 
in such areas, as in history, good explanations of the poorly 
predictable events are commonly available."26 
Scriven details a cogent rebuttal of the idea that 
explanations and predictions are complementary in the 
sense argued by Hempel. ("... an explanation ... is not 
complete unless it might as well have functioned as a 
prediction •••9)27 His first point in rebuttal is that 
no prediction follows at all from non-causal explanations 
involving explanations of significance or symbolism. 
Secondly, he says, there are cases where we have a 
universal hypothesis which can be used for highly reliable 
prediction, e.g., that the appearance of sunspots is 
followed by wide-spread radio disturbance. But an explanat-
ion of what is predicted does not necessarily follow from 
our ability to make the prediction. Thirdly, he points out, 
there are cases such as the occurrence of a severe earth-
quake, where our inability to predict the event in no way 
counts against the certainty with which we can explain some 
of the consequences thereof in terms of the event. 
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As a fourth serious drawback for the complementar-
-ity view, Scriven cites the case where a man has murdered 
his wife. Only after the deed do we know something about 
him, he claims, without which we Could not Make a reliable 
prediction of the murder: we know he is capable of murder. 
Thus we have more data for explaining than we had for pre-
dicting. Hence, he concludes, the former may be certain 
and the latter not: but not vice versa. This possibility 
is easily overlooked in physics, ie says, because the 
increment of information arising from the eVent's 
occurrence is usually negligible in comparison with that 
on which,laws are based. 
Finally, , Scriven reminds us that a'prediction is 
by definition such that it could be given before the event. 
But if a prediction requires data from the event it could 
not,' logically, be given before it. In this point Scriven 
discerns a crucial advantage of history constituting a 
rebuttal of the suggestion that history is incomplete 
until it has predictively useful laws. 
A final objection to the deductive model of 
historical explanation offered by Scriven is his claim that 
more illuminating analogues for historical explanation can 
be found elsewhere than in subsumption under physical laws. 
Procedures such as "explaining the way," "explaining how 
something works," and notions such as "dramatic inevitab-
ility ,' are closer to the historian's craft. 
The main point of the criterion of dramatic 
inevitability is, says Scriven,'the'necessity for 
"plausibility in depth". 28 In the play, he says, there must 
not be an inconsistency between an earlier act by a 
character and a later that cannot be accounted for by the 
intervening development. In addition, the play must b& 
consistent with what we know or discover of human behaviour. 
'So, too, must historical explanation be plausible in ■depth, 
must survive analysis and further discoveries. But no more 
than the playwright must the historian be able to give the 
laws of behaviour in order to give a plausible account." 29 
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(iv) The literary analogue more closely examined. 
Gallie asserts 1 that explanations are not the 
main goal and the main hall-marks of achievements in history. 
He claims that before considering standards of efficacy of 
historical explanation it is necessary to . see.clearly 
the characteristic functions of explanations in history. 
He maintains that the peculiar and all-important role of 
explanations in history is that they are essentially aids 
to the basic capacity or attitudes of following and only 
in relation to this capacity can they be correctly assessed 
and construed. 	 S. 
He, too, is critical of the tendency in philoso-
phical literature for historical explanations to be pre-
sented as weakened versions of the kind of explanation that 
is characteristic of the natural sciences.. These versions 
show a persistent neglect of the pragmatic aspect of 
explanations in history, he claims, - a neglect of the 
characteristic context within which they occur and the 
characteristic functions which they are intended to fulfil. 
The characteristic function of explanations in history is, 
he says, an ancillary one. 
It is, ... to enable us to follow a narrative 
when we have got stuck, or to follow again more 
confidently when we had begun to be confused or 
bewildered. Hence explanations in history, like the 
explanations we ask for or volunteer to fellow 
"spectators at a game, are in the nature of intrusions: they are not what we prim arily came for - the play, that is the basic thing.  
He points out further, that this view implies 
that every historical narrative is, in a sense, self-
explanatory, "until it needs to be 'righted' - as -well as 
logically endorsed - by a helpful explanation." 3 'If, 
in reading a work of history, we follow and consider together 
a sequence of incidents, each of which severally or all of 
which conjointly amount to an obviously important necessary 
condition of some further incident or result, is it not 
natural to say, he asks, that the resulting incident has 
been explained - and explained by the very process or build- 
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up of the narrative itself? 
This notion of the historical narrative being 
self-explanatory is not adequate in Gallie's view as, he 
claims, no historical narrative is entirely self-explanatory. 
They all need to be "righted", "to be got back on to the 
rails again". 4 If a causal sequence or set of necessary 
conditions falling within an explanation evidently intrude 
into the course of the narrative with the kind of corrective 
purpose mentioned above, then, he says, this may be taken 
as a rule for deciding whether they play an explanatory 
role in history. 
Gallie comments on the disclosures of the ration-
ality of some action which are taken by Dray5 to be the 
most important and characteristic of all the kinds of 
explanation found in history. In his view these disclosures 
of rationality should not be regarded as explanations at 
all. 
They simply describe or refer to the fact, which 
may be perfectly intelligible or self-explanatory in the context, that certain actions are the fulfilments 
or expressions of already known intentions, plans or 
policies. Very often we "see" from the context the 
evident intentionality of an action, or appreciate the 
sagacity or firmness of some choice or policy, quite 
as directly as we "feelnethe fear or anger of a 
character in fiction ...° 
In further support for his argument for the prag-
matic nature of historical explanation, Gallie claims that 
such words as "hence", "thus", "therefore", and "because" 
when occurring in historical narrative "lack the clarity 
and fixity of meaning which they possess in formal logic 
and in the natural sciences." 7', Very often in an historical 
narrative a 'therefore' or a 'because' serves simply as an 
aid to the reader, urging or reminding him to hold together 
under his attention a succession of incidents which, in fact, 
need no explanation at all." 8 
The concept of explanation in history as that which 
ensures that the progress of the narrative is not blocked 
contrasts with explanations in the sciences. Theymark, says 
Gallie, the "... vital growing points ..." 9 in the sciences. 
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It is they that express the, kinds of increase of knowledge that we look for from the sciences and they 
do this because they are in essence answers to problems 
which challenge scientific men to expand and refine 
and unify the existing corpus of their laws and 
theories. But, by contrast, no one expects an 
historian to be an originator or unifier of the laws 
and theories which are exemplified in his work. u 
To replace the deductivist model he proposes that 
of the philologist's gloss which, he believes, will lead to 
a positive account of the characteristically historical 
function of explanations. In the philologist's work, the 
need to explain arises when there is departure in some 
marked and important way from the received text and from 
the interpretation which has traditionally been placed on 
it. "Similarly with the historian, whenever he departs 
from the commonly received account of certain famous - events, 
or whenever his interpretation or assessment of events that 
he is presenting for the first time runs counter to our 
natural custom-born expectations and habits of judgment." 11 
Gallie answers criticisms of his account of the 
nature of historical explanation. One objection is that he 
has trivialised the issue. This objection, he says, is 
based on the assumption that "any intellectual activity in 
which scientific or logically complete explanations are - accorded a secondary or ancillary role cannot be serious.- 12  
His answer is to point out that to de-limit the 
sphere of relevance of any kind or style of explanation is 
not to bdlittle it. "Certainly I would say, we do no 
dishonour to the genius of scientific explanation by with-
drawing the very dubious claims that have been made for 
it in the field of history." 13 
. 	A second objection points to the claimed inapposite 
contrast by Gallie of historical explanations in their 
pragmatic aspect (by stressing the function that they 
fulfil in historical thinking) with scientific explanations 
considered in their logical aspect (by stressing, or presuming, 
their conformity to the dedix;Iivist model.) Gallie answers 
the objection by pointing to a parallelism between scientific 
and historical explanation from the pragmatic side. He 
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says that we 'do find in scientific, treatises explanations 
which have the effect of a gloss. 	scientists do from 
time to time explain their theories in a sense which, as 
with historians, comes very close to justifying their 
continued use after certain adjustments,zhave been made and 
certain causes of confusion have been cleared away." 14 
From the logical side, he says, there are at 
least parallel 'questions in the two cases, in that it can 
be asked of scientific and historical explanations alike, 
whether, or to what extent, they conform to the ideal of 
a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions Of a 
given result. 
. Further, he says, that the objection under 
discussion is not . really to the purpose in that it .springs 
from a misunderstanding of his thesis. His thesis "is 
not simply that explanations in. history have a pragmatic 
aspect in. respect of .which they obviously look very 
different from scientific explanations considered , in their 
logical aspect: it is that, unless their peculiarity from 
the pragmatic standpoint is recognised, assessments of the 
strength of historical explanations from the logical 
standpoint are liable to involve gross misunderstanding. 
A proper understanding of the function of explanations in 
history is a necessary pre-condition of a correct assess-
ment of their adequacy." 15 
But how, a further objection goes, can it be 
decided whether any explanation in history is logically 
acceptable or the most logically acceptable of all those 
that might have been considered in any particular case? 
This must be answered, he says, via the acceptability of 
the narrative which the explanation enables the historian 
to reconstruct or resume. "If the narrative has now been 
made consistent, plausible, and in accordance with all the 
evidence, if it is the best narrative that we can get, then 
the axplanatioh that haped us to get ,to it is the best 
explanation as yet available." 16 'Unlike scientific 
explanations, the kind of explanation in history described 
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by Gallie can neither be tested nor confirmed by its 
successes with other parallel cases. 
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(v) conclusion. 
It appears that the moSt telling point that can 
be advanced against the Hempeliandeductivist model of 
explanation is the point that.one is most unlikely to find 
in history books explanations conforming to this pattern. 
And, indeed, it should be pointed out that Hempel himself 
is aware of the gap between his model and the explanations 
historians actually provide. In his revised version, all 
that the historian provides is an "explanation sketch" 
(described above). 
A further issue emerging from the discussion of 
Hempel's model is that of the role of the philosopher vis-
l-vis history. Should the philosopher approach history 
with theories to apply? Or should he simply examine what. 
historians do in fact do when they explain? On this issue, 
Weingartner is quite clear. "The primary role of philosophy 
is descriptive and not prescriptive. 
It could be claimed that the proponents of 
different Views on the nature of historical explanation are 
further from the topic of their , disputes , than it at first 
appears. Weingartner claims that in the matter of the 
dispute between Hempelians and anti-Hempelians what appears 
to be a dispute about the precise nature of historical 
explanation is in fact the product of a disagreement about 
the nature of philosophic method. 	. 
He emphasizes that the Hempelians make:no,attempt 
to survey historical explanations as they are actually 
proffered. He says that the starting point of philosophic 
reflection.in their case is an insight into what an 
'explanation is and "all that follows constitutes . a 
reconstruction and elaboration of that insight in terms of 
a philosophic position that does not directly depend upon 
an understanding of the particular thing (historical 
explanation) being exaMined, but is grounded in philosbphic 
considerations of a much broader sort. 
The Hempelian will not rest with psychological 
satisfaction achieved by an explanation - the reduction of 
curiosity to understanding, the resolution of a kind Of 
tension signaled often by an exclamation such as "Aha!" 
A philosophic demand is put, says Weingartner, upon 
explanations - "a demand that the Cohesion of its components 
should not depend upon the background of the person who 
asks for the explanation, nor upon the context in which it 
is given, but upon relations which are, so to speak, 
intrinsic to the explanation." 3 The crucial relationship 
is, of course, the deducibility of the explanandum from 
the explanans. The explanation's coherence is then 
independent of the speaker, the hearer, and the context 
and meets thereby the criteria, long dominant in 
philosophy, which any claim to knowledge must meet. The 
philosopher's model serves as a measure of the historian's 
success, says Weingartner,and if historical explanations 
do not live up to the model, it is not the model that 
is given up as this would mean giving up the philosophic 
position in which it is gtounded. 
The basic point of the anti-Hempelians is that 
the philosopher should not go beyond his data and bring 
theories of his own. The philosopher's job is to reveal 
how the term "explanation" is used when used by historians. 
The anti-Hempelians' stance, says Weingartner, is empirical. 
And the outcome of his empiricism is confirmation of the 
fact that the interest, expectations and knowledge of 
the audience and the intentions of the speaker are part 
of the context of historical explanations. 
The horns of the dilemma would appear to be, 
on the one hand, a tendency to discredited a priorism 
and, on the other, a mere reporting developing to a 
taxonomy. And neither would be deemed the proper business 
of the philosopher. Weingartner concludes that: 
There is no doubt that the method of the Hempelians 
involves dangers. When one comes to a problem with 
theories, the possibility always exists that the 
analysandum is lost sight of in a network of concepts 
and principles. Reconstruction, if one does not take 
heed, may become construction. There is no magic 
formula for gauging the "distance" the philosopher 
must stand from the problem of his concern. When that 
interval shrinks to the vanishing point, philosophy, 
we have seen, becomes a mere reporting. When, through 
the interposition of too high a stack of theories, 
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the "distance" becomes too great, philosophy relapses 
• into the idle a priorism of ages hopefully gone by. Neither alternative is acceptable. The Anti-
Hempelians; however, come close to embracing the former, while the Hempelians are still trying to maintgn 
distance without losing sight of their object."' 
As the language of history is the language of 
•every-day-use it would seem appropriate, finally, to turn 
to the dictionary to explain "explain". The Pocket Oxford  
Dictionary (fifth edition) .gives the following as meanings 
of "explain": "Make known in detail (facts, situation, 
that, Aix)", "make intelligible", "account for (conduct 
etc...)". To the extent that historical explanations 
carry out any of these practical tasks they can truly be 
said to explain. An examinationcf history books will find 
not one model or logic of explanation, but a miscellany 
thereof. 
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CHAPTER 8: CAUSAL ANALYSIS AND THE ROLE OF GENERALIZAT-
IONS IN HISTORY. 
(i) Introduction.  
Probably the most important explanatory notion 
in history is that of causation. But most historians would, 
no doubt, agree with Renier when he cautions that causation 
is a methodological tool for the historian and must 
"moderate the claims it dare make upon the historian's 
exclusive attention. It can no longer be argued that the 
historian must make it his primary task to acquire a 
knowledge of the causes of events or of things. Instead of 
wondering all the time why events did happen, he can give 
his attention to the question "what did actually happen?" 
and this will greatly improve the quality of the story he 
has to tell." 1 
Nash says that many philosophers doubt whether 
the notion of cause is applicable in history. Bertrand 
Russell, he says, felt that the concept of cause is so 
misleading that the search for causes in science should be 
abandoned. And one would be inclined to eschew all notion 
of cause in history as well, if the search for causes 
necessarily entailed the absurd infinite regress suggested 
by Jose Ortega y Gasset: 
... we can only throw light on yesterday by invoking the day before yesterday; and so with all yesterdays. History is a system, the system of human experiences linked in a single, inexorable chain. Hence nothing can be truly clear in history until everything is clear. We cannot properly understand what this "rationalist" European is unless we know exactly what it was to be a Christian, nor what it was to be a Stoic: and so the process goes on. 2 
In addition, since Hume, Nash points out, 
philosophers and scientists tend to think of causes only 
in the sense of "efficient cause" or "invariant succession", 
and many historians are loath to think of causation in 
history in this narrow sense. It would be very difficult, 
however, to avoid the notion of cause when writing history 
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because, as Michael Scriven has pointed out, "... causal 
concepts are buried very deep in our language, indeed 
in our perception. 0 And the search for non-causal language 
• is, he says, reminiscent of the difficult (some would claim 
impossible) search for pure sense data. The word "cause" 
may not appear frequently in an historical account but 
the notion is often embedded in other terms such as, 
"resulted partly from," "forced", "entailed", "led to," 
"made possible by", etc. 
Nash cites4 Aristotle as distinguishing four types 
of cause (material, formal, efficient, and final). He 
says that the last three may be relevant to history. 
He defines an efficient cause in history thus: 
" 'C was the efficient cause of E' means that 'C 
was the set of events and conditions prior to the occurrence 
of E sufficient for the occurrence of E'." 5 
He defines a formal cause thus: that " 'C was the 
formal cause of E' means that 'C was a dispositional 
property or ' -tof dispositional properties necessary for 
the occurrence of  
He defines a final cause thus: 
" 'G was the final cause of E' means that 'The 
agent who did C desired end or goal G and believed that 
doing C would help him attain  
With reference to Lincoln's murder, a bullet in 
the head is an example of the first-mentioned type of cause; 
the hatred of Southerners for Lincoln, is an example of 
the second; and the desire of Southerners to obtain better 
treatment for the defeated Confederacy and the belief 
that this could be brought, about by his murder is an 
example of the third. 
Positivist philosophers like Hempel who accept the 
"covering law model" believe that only one of these senses 
of cause, that of efficient cause, is applicable in history. 
An objection to Hempel's view of cause is that it may 
explain what happens in kinds of circumstances but it 
cannot explain what happens in particular instances. 
Nash says that many idealists have suggested that 
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instead of trying to impose some philosophical theory of 
causation on history, philosophers ought to pay more 
attention to how historians actually employ the concept 
of cause. 
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(ii) Gardiner's Analysis of Cause in History. 
Gardiner points out l that "cause" and "effect" 
as used in daily life do not possess the precision that 
some may attempt to apply in other fields. He insists 
that the II... analysis of the causal concept must be 
appropriate to the level of language upon which we are 
speaking. The idea of causality is a function of a 
given language, requiring adjustment according to the 
particular level of language upon which it is used." 2 
He agrees that on certain levels the nature of 
the correlations involved make the use of causality 
practically impossible. He quotes Russell as saying 
that "... the reason why physics has ceased to look for 
causes is that, in fact, there are no such things." 3 
He disagrees with Russell, however, because "... not all 
empirical inquiries have attained to the structure of 
physics, and not all terminologies exclude the possibility 
of speaking causally. "4 
What is to be called the "cause" of an event in 
a given instance is,  he says, a question to be decided in 
terms of the field of inquiry involved, and of the 
interests and purposes of the speaker. There is no 
conflict between the common sense view that an attack of 
pneumonia was caused by standing too long in the cold and 
the medical scientists' view that it was caused by the 
presence of'pneumococci and the factor of the physical 
condition of the patient. The word "cause" he says, is 
merely being used differently in the two cases. 
For common sense, he points out further, the cause 
of an event is frequently conceived of as being a kind of 
handle, an instrument for achieving an end that we desire. 
The condition chosen as the "cause" of an event may only 
be one among many conditions that were also relevant. 
What we choose to regard as the cause of an event is 
largely, he says, dependent upon its practical value. 
The metaphorical conception of cause as a kind 
of handle could lead, however, to the kind of confusion 
Gardiner claims is inherent in Taine's maxim: "Apres la 
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collection des faits, la recherche des causes." 
This suggests, 5 says Gardiner, that the finding out what 
happened and the finding out why it happened are two 
distinct procedures. He claims that this is not the case. 
"It is incorrect to speak of 'finding out the facts' 
as if it were a process separate from, and prior to, the 
discovery, of causal relations: there is what may be called 
a procedural interconnexion between the two.!'6  Taine, 
he asserts, made a confusion between facts and evidence. 
In examining the role of generalizations in the 
causal connexions asserted by historians relating one 
event to another, Gardiner insists that our knowledge of 
causal connexions is dependent upon our having observed a 
regularity in the concurrence of two events. The analysis 
of causal connexions in history in terms of regularity is 
a feature shared in common with scientific and common-
sense types of explanation. He agrees with Karl Popper 
whom he quotes as saying: 
we can never speak of cause and effect in 
an absolute way, but 	an event is a cause of 
another event ... relative to some universal law. 
However these universal laws are very often so trivial 
... that as a rule we take them for granted, instead 
of making conscious use of them '... If we explain, 
for example, the first division of Poland in 1772 
by pointing out that it could not possibly resist 
the combined power of Russia, Prussia and Austria, 
then we are tacitly using some trivial universal 
law such as: "If of two armies which are about 
equally well-armed and led, one has a tremendous 
superiority in men, then the other never wins." 
Such a law might be described as a law of the 
sociology of military power; but it is too trivial 
ever to raise a serious problem for students of 
sociology or to arouse their attention. 7 
• Gardiner feels, however, that "there is a 
'scientific tone' about his treatment of the problem that 
is open to qualification on the grounds that, as it stands, 
it may (suggest an artificial picture of what the historian 
is doing, an over-simplified, too tidy account." 8 
In the case of a desire to explain why Louis XIV 
died unpopular it might be proposed that Louis XIV 
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represented a case of the law. "Rulers are unpopular 
whenever their policies prove detrimental to the fortunes 
of their countries," and that the explanation in question 
was deduced from the law taken together with circumstances 
of the case. 
Gardiner conceives of the historian objecting to 
this interpretation in terms such as the following. 
Historians do not 	with repeatable cases and the 
assumption that the case of Louis XIV is a case of a 
certain specified type is unconvincing. The generaliza-
tions used by historians are not scientific laws. The 
unpopularity of Louis XIV is not a confirmatory instance 
of an historical. law or of any general hypothesis at all 
but the outcome of a particular complex of factors. 
The historian, says Gardiner, may believe that a 
generalization, such as "economic changes are 
accompanied by religious changes," has a bearing upon the 
problem of the Protestant Reformation. But he would not 
regard it as applicable in the way the chemist might see 
the law of chemical change as applicable. The chemist 
has definite procedures to determine the applicability 
or nonapplicability of the law to a particular case. 
It can be decided with confidence whether the chemical 
is of a given type and whether the experiment is conducted 
under "normal" conditions. 
Generalizations in so far as they are enunciated 
by historians he sees as being of an essentially loose, 
"porous" nature. They do not expect them to be interpreted 
with any degree of strictness. They may be descried, 
he continues, as "throwing light upon" a particular 
problem, as providing bearings or markers. There is a wide 
and indefinite ceteris paribus clause presupposed by their 
formulation and it is not implied that they always hold. 
As stated above, Gardiner considers that it is 
important to consider the context of the interests and 
-purposes of the person ascribing causal properties to 
an event; and especially so, if "cause" is modified by an 
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adjective. He examines what is meant when something is 
said to be the "root" or "real" or "most important" 
cause of an event. One of the purposes of qualification 
of causes thus is to contrast one of the conditions deemed 
a cause with other conditions for some particular reason. 
Gardiner believes it is an incorrect interpretation of 
historical explanations of the "root cause" type to 
hold that somehow real causes have some mysterious property 
of "realness" stamped on them. Analysis of "real" 
causes reveal not special properties but the point of view 
of the historian and the level of generality upon which 
he is speaking. 
The journalist may see the origin of World War I 
as lying in the Sarajevo assassination because his view-
point is limited to the period of intense diplomatic 
activity that led up to the outbreak of hostilities. 
The "real" cause of the War may be seen variously on the 
level of individual human purposes, national policies 
and traditions, political alignments and treaties or on 
the level of economic trends, social organization or 
ideology. 
Gardiner asks whether the question: "what were the 
real causes of the World War I?" is to be interpreted 
as a request for information concerning why it broke out 
on August the fourth, 1914 or whether it is to be inter-
preted as a request for information on the conditions 
that made it likely a war would break out early in the 
twentieth century. "It is part of the function of 
expressions like "real cause" to make it clear upon what 
level the question is being answered and how, for example, 
the words "the First World War" are being interpreted." 9 
He points out that apparently insoluble problems 
may arise because of the indefiniteness of the questions 
asked,because they occur without reference to any 
particular context or to any rules according to which an 
answer may be provided. Gardiner claims that philosophers 
have been misled by ambiguities hidden in the word "cause" 
which have led them to believe that somewhere in every 
historical situation there is present a factor of a 119. 
certain type and that once this factor is pin-pointed, 
everything else can be seen to follow from it. This 
belief he says is an illusion. "The historical process is 
not like a machine that has to be kept in motion by a 
metaphysical dynamo behind the scenes. And there are 
no absolute Real Causes waiting to be discovered by 
historians with sufficiently powerful magnifying glasses." 1° 
It is interesting to note here Nagel's claim 11 
that the qualification of causes derives from the 
historian's difficulty in achieving the explanatory ideal 
of ascertaining the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the occurrence of phenomena. This ideal is rarely 
achieved, and he claims that even in the best-developed 
sciences it is often an open question whether the 
conditions mentioned in an explanation are, indeed, 
sufficient. 
Historical inquiry is further removed from the 
ideal, he says, since the full circumstances are often 
quite complex and numerous and usually not known. For 
this reason historians usually describe causal factors as 
the "main", "primary", "principal", "chief", or "most 
important". Their ignorance, he says, can be covered 
by the convenient phrase, "other things being equal." 
The historical practice of "weighting" causal 
factors in respect to their "degree of importance" 
differs from practice in the natural sciences, which, he 
says, do not appear to require the imputation of relative 
Importance to the causal variables that occur in their 
explanations. Indeed, the practice of "weighting" 
causal factors is often dismissed as arbitrary and 
meaningless because no verifiable sense can be attached 
to such characterizations as "chief" or "most important" 
in connection with causal factors. Nagel admits that 
most historians do not appear to associate any definite 
meaning with their statements of relative importance and 
that these statements often have only a rhetorical intent. 
He believes, however, that it is desirable to make 
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explicit what it is that these statements are intended to 
convey. 
J. H. Hexter, when adumbrating12 in a broad way 
what history is, characterized firstly the human past as 
whatever happened to happen to people; whatever they 
intended; and whatever they have happened to do up to 
now. History, he says, is an attempt to render a 
coherent, intelligible and true account of some of these 
events, intentions and happenings. He points out that 
this means the exclusion of all the past and all natural 
history before the coming of man on earth. The main 
reason for this is that the human past has certain traits 
wholly absent from the past of pre-human nature, such as 
the fact that man alone leaves records that he intends 
as records. 
Emphasis in history is on what human beings have 
done. It is only natural, then, that historians, in many 
of their explanations, make reference to the desires, 
thoughts, plans and policies of the people in whom they 
are interested. It makes nonsense to speak of natural 
phenomena being motivated or having desires. The desires, 
motives, plans, policies, intentions and thoughts of human 
beings comprise the subject of Gardiner's examination 
of the problem of "mentalcausation". 
A crucial distinction between history and natural 
science was stated thus by Collingwood: 
When a scientist asks "Why did that piece of litfilus paper turn pink?" he means "On what kinds of occasions do pieces of litmus paper turn pink?" • When an historian asks "Why did Brutus stab Caesar?" he means "What did Brutus think which made him decide to stab Caesar?" The cause of the event, for him, means the thought in the mind of th9 person by whose agency , the event came about ••. 1 3 
Given that this distinction is correct, Gardiner 
sees the philosopher of history as presented with a 
twofold problem (a) oT describing in what, precisely, 
consists this special form of causation and (b) of showing 
in what sense the historian can be said to know what in 
a particular case, caused an historical figure to act as 
•he did. 	 121. 
One theory is that to talk about a motive or 
intention is to talk about an entity of a non-physical 
or mental kind which gives an agent the necessary push 
that makes him act. In the case of ordinary cause - 
effect inference one is confronted with events that are 
in principle observable and known in this way. But it 
is nonsense to say that a person's motives can be observed. 
One suggestion is that our knowledge of motives 
can be justified on analogy with our own experience. 
Gardiner says that this is unpalatable to the theorists 
who insist that historical thinking is unlike the 
procedure of natural scientists since it opens the door 
to an interpretation of historical explanation in terms 
of regularities or laws - in this case between "mental 
events" and physical actions. 
The alternative is that knowledge can be obtained 
by having the same thought as another person. Gardiner 
quotes Collingwood in support of this view-point: 
"Yet if I not only read his argument but understand it 
the process of argument which I go through is not a 
process resembling Plato's, it actually is Plato's •• 14 lax somebody did something can be known just as directly 
as what it was that was done. 
Gardiner says that the main force of what has been 
called the "inside-outside theory" of human action is the 
claim that it consists of both the physical movements 
and the thought they express, not certain physical move-
ments from which the motive behind it is inferred. 
According to this definition, he says, it makes nonsense 
to speak of inferring the motive from the action; for 
part of what we mean by the action is the motive. When 
an historian is said to understand an action he is aware 
of two inseparably connected goings-on - the physical 
movements and the thoughts they express. He is made 
aware of the former by his own eyesight either directly 
or through reports; he is made aware of the latter in 
ways variously described as "rethinking them within his 
own mind" or "recreating the experience of the agent." 
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Gardiner recognises that this account contradicts 
the premises from which it started in that mootive6 were 
seen as the causes of a person's actions. If "motives" 
are "insides" in some sense of an event it is difficult, 
he says, to see how a cause could ever be termed the 
"inside" of the event which constitutes its effect. 
Nevertheless an attraction of the account is seen 
in its compromise, on the one hand, between the various 
reasons which incline us to say that'motives are not like 
causes and, on the other, the reasons which incline us 
to say that motives are like causes. In addition, he 
points out, the account appears to be in accordance with 
that ecperience of the historian' where he seeks to enter 
into sympathetic understanding with a personality or 
period. 
Gardiner examines what it means to give an 
explanation of somebody's action in terms of what he 
wants, intends or plans. He sees it as an important 
task of the philosopher to= prevent philosophical confusions 
by underlining metaphors such as those where people are 
said to be "governed by certain desires", "driven by 
certain impulses" "fighting their temptations" and 
"searching their consciences" and by pointing to their 
logical limits. For an historian to examine the claim that 
Napoleon's actions were governed'by a will to power is, 
In fact, says Gardiner, to ask questions of a very 
different kind from the kind of questions that would be 
asked in order to determine whether an engine was driven 
by steam. 
As a second example Gardiner considers the sentence 
"Richelieu's policy was guided throughout by his aim to 
establish a centralized French monarchy". He says that 
there is a temptation to substantialize the aim and to 
assimilate it to cases of physical transactions and suppose 
that an aim guides a man in the same way as dogs guide men. 
Such a supposition, he says, is absurd. 
In seeking a correct analysis of the sentence about 
Richelieu Gardiner says that, even if one discards the 
belief that some kind of continuous mental process is 
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involved shadowing Richelieu through his career, there 
still is a mental act or event involved. This could have 
been a proposition formulated by Richelieu either in his 
head or on paper. But it appears to Gardiner to be far 
from clear that when we refer to a person's having an 
aim or intention we always mean simply and solely that 
the aim or intention in question was, •or might have been, 
stated; still less that the pronouncement caused all the 
subsequent actions. 
In opposition to those who maintain that words 
like "aims" function as names of causal Processes 
Gardiner suggests that to say that a man's actions are 
guided by such-and-such an intention or aim is to make a 
statement of varying degrees of complexity about him 
and not abOut him plus the intentions or aims which 
influence him. He quotes L. S. Stebbing in support of 
this: 
motives are thought to compel me. The duality is strangely persistent in ourthinking. It is responsible for the wholly unwarrantable separation of the self from its acts, of the motive • from the act, of the act from TEe choice, and of • the decision from the thing done ... We speak of ourself as enslaved to our passions and then as constrained by our motives. We go on to ask what compels the motive •.. 1 5 
As Gilbert Ryle has argued in The Concept of Mind  
the doctrine of the ghost in the machine is not true. 
Motives, he says, are neither experiences nor the sorts 
of things which could be among the direct intimations of 
consciousness or among the objects of introspection. There 
are no occult or ghostly causes of actions; "... to 
explain an action as done from a specified motive or 
inclination is not to describe the action as the effect 
of a specified cause. Motives are not happenings and are 
not therefore of the right type to be causes." 16 
In Ryle's view, to explain an action as done from 
a certain motive is to subsume it under a propensity or 
behaviour-trend the evidence for which is the observation 
•or recollection of present and past deeds, thoughts and 
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actions. "The imputationcf a motive for a particular 
action is not a causal inference to an umAltnessed event 
but the subsumption of an episode proposition under 
a law-like proposition." 17 He points out further, that 
it is analogous to the explanation of the fracture of 
glass by reference to its brittleness - the'dispositional 
quality of glass. To describe glass as brittle, he says, 
is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about 
glass. And to explain the breaking of glass in terms of 
its brittleness is to state a law-like proposition. It 
is to be contrasted with the reporting of a cause or of 
an event as would be the case if the breaking of the glass 
were explained by saying that a stone hit it. This 
event would stand to the breaking of the glass as cause 
to effect. 
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CHAPTER 9: HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, 
SELECTION AND INTERPRETATION. 
(i) Introduction. 
To what eXtent'can historians legitimately claim 
the status of objective truth for the conclusions they 
.reach? Is it possible for historians to reconstruct the 
past "wie es eigentlich gewesen", 1 as Ranke urged? Is it 
• the case "that the historian cannot eliminate the. personal 
equation" 2 as Carl Becker put it?' Do selection' and 
interpretation necessarily imply subjectivity and, the 
impossibility of avoiding value judgements? These are 
some of the questions. But it appears that there are no 
clear-cut amswers compelling universal assent. ' 
As Cohen pointed out, 3  scepticism is supported by 
the argument that each age develops new conceptions of 
the essence of history and that even within'any'age 
different authorities give conflicting accounts of what 
happened in a given locality and period:' The historian's 
fragmentary evidence of physical objects and documents 
from the past cannot be conclusive .  Those . who,wrote the 
records cannot be crossexamined as to how muchof what they 
wrote was based on direct and competent observation, 
what part on hearsay, and what was just their guess or 
imaginative construction. It would be too easy and 
(simplistic to build a case for historical relativism , 
along these lines and Cohen stresses the importance of 
getting rid of the hasty and facile dogma that everything 
is relevant to everything else. 
Arendt disptes4 the validity of the frequently 
, cited ideal of scientific objectivity. She • lims that 
the nineteenth century opposition of the natural and 
historical sciences, together with the allegedly absolute 
objectivity and precision of the natural scientists, is 
today a thing of the past. She says that the natural 
sciences now admit that with the experiment and testing 
natural processes under prescribed conditions, the 
Observer, in watching the-experiment, becomes one of its 
conditions, and a "subjective" factor is introduced into 
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theflobjective" processes of nature. 
Using Galileo's words she describes the experiment 
as "being a ciuestion put before nature" 5 and says that 
11 the answers of science will always remain replies 
6 to questions asked by men 	1  The confusion in the 
issue of "objectivity" she says, 	was to assume that 
there Could be answers without questions and results 
independent of a question-asking being." 7 "Physics, we 
know today, is no less a man-centered inquiry into what 
is than historical research. The old quarrel therefore, 
between the 'subjectivity' Of physics has lost much of 
its relevance." 8 , 
She asserts that every selection , of material in 
a sense interferes with history, and all criteria for 
selection put the historical course of events under 
certain man-:made conditions, which are quite similar to • 
the conditions the natural scientist prescribes to natural 
processes in the experiment. 
The problem of scientific objectivity as the 
nineteenth century posed it has led, she claims, to "... 
the real issue at stake, the issue if impartiality ..."9 
becoming difficult to recognize. She says that "... 
Impartiality and with it all true historiography, came 
into the world when Homer decided to sing the deeds of 
the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and 
to praise the glory Of Hector no lest than the greatness 
of Achilles. "10 
She claims that what has obscured the modern 
discussion of objectivity in the historical sciences and 
prevented its ever touching the fundamental issue 
involved seems to be the fact that none of the conditions 
of.Homeric.impartiality are present in the modern age. 
'Homeric impartiality rested upon the assumption, she 
says, that "great things are self-evident, shine by 
themselves; ..." 11 Contrasted with this af-evident 
existence of great things, "... the birth of the modern 
idea of history.... coincides with ... the modern age's 
doubt of the reality of an outer world 'objectively' 
given to human perception as an unchanged and unchangeable 
object." 12 Hallmarks of the modern age are what she terms 
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a "world- alienation of man" 13 and a subjectivization 
where emphasis is on "sensation qua sensation as more 
'real' than the 'sensed' object and, at any rate, the 
only safe ground of experience." 14 
If great things are not self-evident and able to 
shine by themselves, it is certainly not likely to be 
the case that countless historical facts will display 
these attributes. The facts do not speak for themselves. 
If the past is to be known, it must be reconstructed. 
A. I. Melden countered the idea of the fact as a raw 
datum to be apprehended in all its "objectivity" by means 
of passive observation thus: 
Progress in empirical inquiry does not occur when 
minds that are freed of all prepossessions are exposed 
to the stimulus of fact in order that they may 
be led by some homing instinct to the truth. Facts 
do not announce their own existence, and, even if 
they did, they do not come labelled with their vary-
ing degrees of importance. For history, as written, 
is no mere catalogue, arranged in chronological 
order, of past events. Even if such a catalogue 
existed it would not interest us; it would explain 
nothing because it included everything. The 
historian is concerned to explain; he must, if he 
consults the facts, be led to the facts by the 
hypotheses in mind, the information at hand, 
selecting these on the basis of his antecedent 
knowledge for their presumed importance andexploring 
in the limited mann'er possible for him the adequacy 
of his hypotheses. 15 
Critics of the case for historical relativism 
claim that the denial of historical objectivity implies 
that all history may be reduced to the level of mere 
propaganda and the historian transformed into a passive 
instrument of the Zeitgeist. Tholfsen claims 16 for 
relativism, however, a positive and useful function in 
helping in the destruction of the theory of scientific 
history and in preparing for the recognition of some 
degree of relativity and subjectivity of historical 
knowledge. It has become recognized that the "facts" in 
history are different and cannot be established with the 
precision possible in the natural sciences. And they are 
not susceptible of analysis according to fixed and 
universally accepted procedures, as in geology. 
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The word "subjective" no longer holds the same 
terror, says Tholfsen, that it did for the theorists 
of scientific history for wham " 'objectivity' was the 
salient characteristic of knowledge as such; and 
'subjectivity' was the chief obstacle." 17 It is 
recognized today, he says, that "the values and experience 
of the knowing subject are not 'subjective' obstacles to 
be overcome, but indispensable tools for the study of the 
past". 18 The historian must use all the faculties of 
his mind and spirit in order to understand the past. 
This does not mean that the word "objectivity" 
has no place in history. It has, but the "objectivity" 
that obtains in geology is irrelevant to history. Tholfsen 
sees the "limited" "objectivity" attained by the historian 
as a moral and intellectual achievement. The historian 
must not, he says, permit his understanding to be 
coloured by his own moral or political principles or 
"permit his intellectual presuppositions to affect his 
sense of reality; he must not latch on to evidence that 
confirms his theories while scanting evidence to the 
contrary." 19 The historian requires both an ability to 
perceive his presuppositions and values and their effect 
on his thought and the will to criticize his cherished 
ideas and to resist them where necessary. 
Tholfsen claims that precisely because the 
relativists stated the problem of historical knowledge 
so well, the historian has been in a better position ever 
since to achieve knowledge that is "objective" in a sense 
appropriate to the subject matter. That is, he continues, 
the historian can claim that his work is "objectly4 , in 
the sense that it can stand up to criticism; that it can 
compete effectively with alternative accounts; and it 
represents a genuine effort to see the past as it really 
was. 
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(ii) The Problem of Selection. 
The selectivity of history, the historian's 
choice of period or perspective, is sometimes made the 
occasion for wholesale skepticism concerning the 
possibility of"objective" explanations in historical 
matters. Both Dray and Nagel challenge the arguments 
which impugn the possibility of objectivity in history 
on grounds of this kind. Dray says 1 that in some sense 
or other, all enquiries, including physical science, are 
selective. But he claims that it can be shown that the 
historian's problem of selection is significantly different 
from that of the generalizing sciences. 
In considering this he makes a distinction between 
the selectioncf a problem for study and the selection of 
what is offered as its solution. He claims that when it 
is asked whether historical enquiry is value free the 
concern is surely not with the variability arising from 
the asking of different questions. 
For if different histories are written in answer to different questions, the different evaluations of the historian will be ingredient, not in the enquiry 'itself, but in the choice of the enquiry. It is when historians give different answers to the same questions that the problem of objectivity within theenquiry arises. 'And it is only with respect to this that we should seek a , contrast with allegedly "objective" types of enquiry -. '"since they also require us to choose our questions. 
He acknowledges that historians do give different 
answers to the same questions and claims that they do this 
in circumstances where the difference between them is 
attributable to a difference of value judgment. , In support 
of this contention he draws a distinction between two kinds 
of historical writing, the explanatory and the descriptive. 
He draws this distinction because he sees the problem 
of selecting answers or solutions as arising in a different 
way in each. A further reason, he states, for drawing 
the distinction is that, if there is a case for saying that 
historians ought not to allow their value judgments to 
affect the answering of their questions, that case seems 
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to be limited to histories of the explanatory sort, 
•He sees the possibility of a non-evaluative 
criterion Of selection for explanatory histories if 
historians accepted tile positivist theory of explanation 
Whereby the ideal is the outlining of , a set of conditions 
sufficient for explanation. If this theory is accepted, 
he claims that disagreements about what is to be 'included 
in an explanatory account Cannot legitimately have any-
thing to do with the different values or interests of the 
historians concerned. "For the issue will simply be 
whether what each historian includes was really among 
those conditiOns'which together constituted the sufficient 
set. And this, it will be said, is a question to be 
.settled by reference to appropriate general knowledge 
.about the subject matter. 0 
Judgments maybe involved here, but they will not 
be value judgments: He says that a non-evaluative criterion of 
Selection cannot be' provided in similar fashion in the 
case of descriptive histories. In explanatory history, 
despite practical difficulties, the notion of offering 
explanation by outlining sets of jointly sufficient 
conditions does at least offer, he says, an ideal of 
objective selection which could conceivably be realized. 
He claims that in descriptive history there is no 
corresponding ideal short of the notion of a complete 
description, which is, in principle, impossible to give. 
Nagel says4 that some writers see the historian 
as inescapably concerned with "value-impregnated" subject 
matter. He counters that the only basis for this claim 
lies in an arbitrary redefinition of the' word "history" 
so as to conform with the claim. Even when a historian's 
subject matter is admittedly value-impregnated it by no 
means follows he says, that he must himself share or 
judge the passions or. value inherent therein. 
It is an obvious blunder to suppose that only a fat cowherd can drive fat kine. - It is an equally crude error to maintain one cannot inquire into the conditions and consequences of values and evaluations without necessarily engaging in moral or aesthetic . value judgments. 5 132. 
The view that historical inquiry inevitably 
leads to a distorting of the facts because it is addressed 
to limited selected problems does not distinguish the 
historian, in Nagel's opinion, from other scientists. 
The assumption of the aforementioned view is that one 
cannot have competent knowledge of anything unless one 
knows everything, and this is, he says, a corollary 
to the philosophic doctrine of the "internality" of all 
relations. If the doctrine were sound, he says, and every 
historical account deemed necessarily distorted, a 
similar valuation would have to be put on all science and 
analytical discourse. 
A further argument for skepticism concerning the 
possibility of objectively warranted explanations in 
human history is that based on the influence on any 
inquiry of personal and social bias. According to some 
sociologists "... when thinking is directed to human 
affairs, the interpretation of observed facts, the 
selection of problems for inquiry and the methods employed 
for resolving them, and the standards of validity accepted 
are all functions of the thinker's unconscious value 
commitments and world outlook, his social position, and 
his political and class loyalties."6 
Nagel concedes that no inquiry takes place in an 
intellectual vacuum but will not allow that it follows 
from this that acceptance of one conclusion rather than 
another is inevitably influenced by conscious or unconscious 
value commitments associated with social status. It is 
undoubtedly the case that the conclusions one accepts 
are frequently influenced by one's general world per-
spectives. Nagel claims, however, that the very fact 
that biased thinking may be detected and its sources 
investigated shows that the case for objective explanat- 
ions in history is not necessarily hopeless. The assertion 
that bias is exhibited assumes a distinction between 
biased and unbiased thinking and that the bias can be 
identified. The consequence is, says Nagel, that it is 
possible to correct the bias and to obtain conclusions in 
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better agreement with the evidence. 
Nagel considers also the argument "that the social 
perspective of a student of human affairs is not only 
causally influential upon his inquiry, but is logically 
involved both in his standards of validity as well as in 
the meaning of his statements." 7 It is alleged that those 
sharing the same social perspective and employing the 
same conceptual and categorical apparatus will arrive at 
similar conclusions on any problem when the standards 
characteristic of their common perspective are correctly 
applied: 
Nagel asks what is the logical status of this 
very claim. If the claim is meaningful and valid only 
for those occupying a certain social status, its validity 
is narrowly self-limited and must be dismissed as 
irrelevant by cthers with a different social perspective. 
If the claim is exempt from what it asserts, so that its 
meaning and truth are not logically dependent upon the 
'social status of those who assert it then there is at 
least one conclusion about human affairs, he says, that is 
objectively valid: Further, if there is one such conclusion, 
there is no clear reason why there may not beothers. 
References  
1. W. Dray; "The Historian's Problem of Selection" 
in R. Hi Nash, op. cit., p. 217. 
2: ibid.,pp. 2171.2184 
3. ibid. i pp:218-219. 
4. E. Nagel, "Some Issues in the Logic of Historical 
Analysis" in Gardiner, Theories of History, p. 377. 
5. ibid.( 
6. ibid., p. 379. 
7. ibid., p. 380. 
134. 
(iii) The Problem of Interpretation. 
The existence of conflicting historical inter-
pretations which appear to be concerned with the same 
historical period or set of facts is often put forward 
in support of irrefragable relativism. 
In their narratives historians may ascribe to 
a set of events what Danto 1 calls pragmatic, theoretical, 
consequential or revelatory significance. 
A narrative with pragmatic significance is history 
explicitly constructed to serve a moralistic purpose. 
He cites the example of Tacitus who chose to write of 
Germany, stressing the virtuousness of the Germans, in 
order to point an invidious contrast with the behaviour 
of his own countrymen. 
A set of happenings have theoretical significance 
when those happenings are seen by the historian as 
"standing in an evidential or illustrative relationship 
to some genera]Atheory he is concerned to establish or 
disestablish. ,,2  As an example, he cites narratives 
concerning French history written by Marx which serve 
to illustrate a general theory of class struggle. 
Of consequential significance Danto says that 
an "event E may be said to be significant to some historian 
H when E has certain consequences to which H attaches some 
importance." 3 An example of this is the significance 
attributed to the Black Death in that it created a sellers' 
market in labour leading to a rise in wages contribut- 
ing to the break-up of the feudal structure of tied labour. 
A set of events could be said to have revelatory 
significance if, on the basis of them, an historian is 
able to postulate a story leading to the reconstruction 
or the inference of the occurrence of some other set of 
events. 
Frankel examines4 the nature and logic of what 
is called "interpreting" history and its relationship to 
historical explanation. He points out that over ' -and 
above the "explanations" a historian gives, it is held 
that he cannot help providing an "interpretation" of the 
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events which affects the actual "explanations". This 
element of interpretation, governed by the historian's 
values, not only controls the choosing and delimiting of 
the story he tells, but also, it appears, the actual 
imputation of causal connections. 
when causal imputations between an event .0 and another event E are made ... they are [often.' made by tacitly setting aside factors which are 
necessary for the occurrence of that event, but 
which are regarded as fixed or unmanipulable, from another set of factors, which are or were 
allegedly subject to change or control, and which 
are designated as the "causes" of that event. 
Accordingly, the assertion of a causal relation in 
practical affairs or in history frequently rests 
either on an assumption of fact or a stipulation 
of value. Either certain variables are assumed, 
in fact, to have been unmanipulable; or it is tacitly 
stipulated that certain variables should not be 
manipulated. And when this latter sortstipulation 
enters, an element of interpretation seems to be present in the actual ccontent of the historian's causal explanations. ' 
Frankel notes. three characteristic ways in which 
reference is made to an "interpretation of history." 
(1) Some variable such. as economics, geography,. or 
technology May be asserted as the most important causal 
agency in history. (2) The meaning Or purpose of history 
as a whole may be stated in which all historical occurrences 
are shown to subserve some final goal or ideal. (3) The 
"meaning" or "function" of a given historical sequence or 
set of institutions may be given. 
The .first kind of interprePations has Value, 
he says, if the interpretations proposed are seen not as 
attempts to formulate a finished theory but as. guides to 
research. The second kind cannot be supported by evidence 
yielded by ordinary empirical methods. In addition, Frankel 
points out, a law predicting the overall direction in which 
a system as .a whole must move can only apply to an isolated 
system and historical sequences plainly do not fall into 
this class. 
In the third kind of interpretation the historian 
is telling a story of a sequene of causally related events 
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leading to what Frankel calls "terminal consequences," to 
state which, is to state the "meaning" of an historical 
process. The question of the choice of terminal 
consequences, is the one, he claims that raises most of 
the issues concerning the possibility of objectivity in 
history. 
Two historians may legitimately choose different 
terminal consequences in interpreting the same general 
period of history and the interpretations may not be 
offering two accounts of the same facts but accounts of 
different facts. Both interpretations can be equally 
true and objective, he claims. "Interpretations of history 
sometimes seem to clash because they are employed as 
instruments in a practical conflict of interests; but from 
the point of view of the facts they may not be in conflict 
at all,since they talk about different facts." 7 
Failure to see this elementary point he sees as 
the source of much of the skepticism about the possibility 
of objectivity in the writing of history. It is false to 
say that histories written in any particular age can be 
'true only for that age and not for another. "... when the 
historians of a later age write history in terms of terminal 
consequences that are different from those with which their 
predecessors were concerned, they are not re-writing history, 
they are writing another history. 116 
In considering what enters into the choice of 
terminal consequences and the standards, if any, by which 
comparative judgments among such choices may be made, 
he notes as a first element the simple one of interesting-
ness. But this does not imply necessarily history accord-
ing to capricious interests or the evanescent values of a 
small coterie or local prejudice or passing fashion. To 
be preferred is the historian who makes his selections in 
terms of widely shared interests and "values of a more 
durable sort which express the deeper, long-standing 
commitments of a larger civilizStion." 9 
The second consideration noted by Frankel to enter 
into the choice of terminal consequences is a concern with 
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those which have the greatest explanatory value - those• 
,which may be treated themselves as causes of other events, 
as the beginnings of other histories.' 
A third consideration he discerns is the select-
ion of certain consequences because they are held tacitly 
or explicitly, to be the key variables in the formulation 
and implementation of an effective social policy in which 
the variables can and should be manipulated. As examples 
he cites (1) the historians who make the rise of science 
their central concern because they are convinced that 
science is the key social instrument that has to be under-
stood and employed if modern society is to solve its 
problems and (2) Marx and his belief that only the 
industrial proletariat had the power and interest to do 
what was needed to organize an industrial society effectively. 
Frankel concludes that: "Despite the fact that 
interpretations of history frequently enter into the 
actual explanations that are offered by historians, the 
writing of history is not condemned to be a battleground 
for irreconcilable points of view. Nor do we have to 
remain content with an uncritical pluralism which simply 
asserts that history may be read from many points of view, 
and that each man may choose his own." 
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(iv) Conclusion. 
In the light of the apparent demolitioncf 
the positivist ideal of scientific objectivity it may be 
asked what alternative there is for the historian who 
is not satisfied with objectivity in the "weakened or 
secondary sense" as proposed by Tholfsen and who cannot 
reconcile himself to the recognition of a'plurality, 
"critical" or "uncritical", of different histories 
written from different points of view. 	' 
Walsh considers 1 the question as to whether 
there is hope for the ultimate attainment of a single 
historical point of view, a set of presuppositions all 
historians might be prepared to accept. If this were 
possible, the problem of objectivity in history would be 
solved by the development of an historical "consciousness 
in general", a standard way of thinking about the subject 
matter of history. For this, he says, there would be 
needed, not only standard knowledge of how people do 
behave but also agreement about how they ought to behave. 
Many philosophers would claim, however, that to 
provide a standard set of moral and metaphysical ideas is 
impossible as they spring from non-rational attitudes. 
•As Leszek Kolakowski 2 outlined the viewpoint, ultimate, 
• evaluative assumptions can only be arbitrary. There 
can be, he says, a scientific sociology of manners and 
customs, .a history of ethical theories and a psychology 
of morals, but not a scientific normative ethics whereby 
we can be told how we ought to behave. No science can 
sanction anything as "good" or condemn anything as "evil". 
A. J. Ayer argued in Language, Truth and Logic  
that normative ethical concepts are irreducible to 
empirical concepts which leaves the way clear for the 
"absolutist" view of ethics according to which, statements 
of value are controlled by "a mysterious intellectual 
intuition". 3 This theory, he says, makes statements of 
value unverifiable, for what may be intuitively certain 
to one person may be doubtful or false, to another. 
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"... a mere appeal to intuition s worthless as a test 
of a proposition's validity." 4 
According to Ayer, the correct treatment of 
ethical statements is to take them as being unanalysable. 
Ethical concepts, he says, are pseudo-concepts and "the 
presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds 
nothing to its factual content". 5 The function of ethical 
words is purely emotive. They serve to express feeling 
or to arouse feeling and sentences which simply express 
'moral judgements do not say anything, he claims, and do 
not come under the category of truth and falsehood. 
"They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of 
pain or a word of command is unverifiable - because they 
do not express genuine propositions." 6  
Ayer dismisses metaphysical assertions as non-
sensical, as having no literal meaning and subject 
consequently to no criteria of truth or falsehood. 
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CHAPTER 10: METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND METHODOLOGICAL 
SOCIALISM. 
(i) Introduction.  
Is history something that men make, or are the 
moving agents of history certain superhuman or super-
organic entities or forces? An examination of historical 
sentences as Danto points out 1 reveals that many employ 
as grammatical subjects, proper names or definite 
descriptions of individual human beings who actually 
existed. Yet, individual human beings are not the only 
individuals directly referred to by the subjects of 
historical sentences. There are what Danto terms "social 
indiiiiduals,"2 examples of which might be, he says, social 
classes, national groups, religious organizations, large-
scale events or large-scale social Movements. 
Is the historian who employs "social individuals" 
in his sentences giving an implicit answer to the question 
above? Or is he merely using in all innocenceF:a well-
accepted device for stylistic reasons in the cause of 
communication and narrative economy? 
Most historians would deny the former question 
and answer the latter in the affirmative. Yet, many 
philosophers and historians regard with mistrust,Danto 
says, the kind of sentence employing "social individuals." 
They are reluctant to concede, he says, "that the social 
world is made up of individual human beings and other, 
super-human individuals which, though they may be said to 
contain human beings amongst their parts none the less 
are not wholly to be identified with these parts, and which 
enjoy,so to speak, a life of their own." 3 
In general they would subscribe to the position of 
methodological individualism which holds, according to 
Danto's description: 
(a) that sentences about social individuals are logically independent of sentences about individual human beings; (b) that social individuals are ontologically distinct from individual human beings; 
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Cc) that social individuals are causally 
dependent on the behaviour of individual human beings and not the other way about; (d) that explanations of the behaviour of 
social individuals are always to be rejected as 
ultimate unless these explanations are framed 
exclusively in terms of the behaviour of individual human beings; (e) the explanation of the behaviour of 
individual human beings must never be, interms of the behaviour of social individuals. 4 
The position opposed to this is "sociological 
holism" or, as Danto terms it, "methodological socialism" 
which may be characterized as Danto suggests by simply 
replacing "every occurrence of "individual human beings" 
in the theses (a) through (e) 	[above] with the 
expression "social individuals" and every occurrence 
of "social individuals" with "individual human beings." 5 
In whatever sense the "individualist" says that 
"indivddual human beings" are ultimate in the social world, 
the "socialist" says that "social individuals" are 
ultimate. 
He cites Marxism as the most conspicuous example 
of a theory satisfying the specification of methodological 
socialism. According to historical materialism, what we 
think and how we act are determined by our relations 
vis-il-vis the prevailing system of production, any changes 
in which are not brought about by individual human action. 
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(ii) A clarification of some of the issues. 
J. W. N. Watkins tries 1 to clear methodological 
individualism of two misunderstandings. One objection is, 
he says, that to make individual dispositions, belief) 
and situations the terminus of an explanation in social 
science implies that a person's psychological make-up 
is God-given, whereas it is conditioned by, and ought to 
be explained in terms of, his social inheritance and 
environment. Watkins counters by saying that methodological 
individualism does not prohibit attempts to explain the 
formation of psychological characteristics. It only 
requires that such explanations should in turn be 
individualistic, explaining the formation as a result 
of a series of conscious or unconscious responses by an 
individual to his changing situation. 
Methodological individualism encourages what he 
calls "innocent" explanations of the development of the 
human mind as contrasted with "sinister" explanations based 
on non-psychological factors such as impersonal sociological 
factors. He cites as an example of the latter the 
professed belief of Marx that "feudal ideas and bourgeois 
ideas are more or less literally generated by the water-
mill and the steam-engine." 2 
The second misunderstanding Watkins wishes to clear 
is the confusion of methodological individualism with 
"psychologise and "the Conspiracy Theory of Society" 
(Popper's terms). He characterizes psychologism as the 
belief that "all large-scale social characteristics are not 
merely the intended or unintended result of, but a 
reflectioncf, individual characteristics.n 3  It would appear 
from this that only a change of heart could put a stop 
to war. 
The conspiracy theory he describes as saying that 
all large-scale social phenomena are deliberately brought 
about by individuals or groups of individuals. In the 
event of a big bad social event this theory leads to a hunt 
for scape-goats. 
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Watkins distinguishes methodological individualism 
from psychologism and the conspiracy theory thus - 
... methodological individualism, by imputing unwanted 
social phenomena to individual'S! , responses to their 
situations, in the light of their dispositions and their 
beliefs,suggests that we may be able to make the phenomena 
disappear, not by recruiting good men to fill the posts 
hitherto occupied by bad men, nor by trying tocbstroy 
men's socially unfortunate dispositions while fostering 
their socially beneficial dispositions, but simply by 
altering the situations they confront." 4 
In the matter of social science research Watkins 
claims that individualistic explanations are more fruitful 
avenues to sociological discoveries than those of 
sociological holists. He discerns a parallel between 
holism and psychologism which, he claims, explains their 
common failure to make surprising discoveries. "A 
large-scale social characteristic should be explained, 
according to psychologism, as the manifestation of 
analogous small-scale psychological tendencies in 
individuals, and according to holism as the manifestation 
of a largescale tendency in the social whole. In both 
cases, the explicans does little more than duplicate the 
explicandum." 2 By contrast, he says that the methodological 
individualist will try to explain the large-scale effect 
as the indirect, unexpected, complex product of individual 
factors none of which, singly, may bear any resemblance to 
it at all. 
Finally, Watkins considers how social explanations 
should be framed. They should be in terms of individuals, 
their dispositions and their situations. The social 
scientists' skill consists in spotting the dispositions 
relevant to an explanation of a social regularity and then 
inventing a model which shows how, in a precise type of 
situation, those dispositions generate some typical 
regularity. 
The method is also applicable, he shows, in the 
case of the explanation of a unique constellation if events. 
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The historical situation is reconstructed in a way which 
reveals how individuals, with their beliefs and 
dispositions, generated in this particular situation the 
joint product to be explained. As an example he supposes 
an historical explanation of the growth of the early 
Catholic church as relying on the particular decisioncf 
Emperor Constantine to give Pope Silvester extensive 
temporal rights in Italy. 
The explanation is [an first examination] rather ad hoc: an apparently arbitrary fiat plays a key role in it. But if this decision can in turn be explained as the off-spring of a marriage of a set of dispositions (for instance, the Emperor's disposition to subordinate all rival power to himself) to a set of circumstances (for instance, the Emperor's recognition that Christianity could not be crushed but could be tamed if it became the official religioncf the Empire), and if the existence of these dispositions and circumstances is convincingly supported by independent evidence, then the area of the arbitrarily given, of sheer brute fact in history,although it can never be madeato vanish, will have been significantly reduced.`" 
Maurice Mandelbaum argues "that one cannot under-
stand the actions of human beings as members of a society 
unless one assumes that there is a group of facts 
'societal facts' which are as ultimate as are those facts 
which are 'psychological' in character." 7 "Societal facts", 
he says, refer to any facts concerning the forms of 
organization present in a society and "psychological 
facts" refer to any facts concerning the thoughts and 
the actions of specific human beings. 
He contends that statements concerning societal 
facts are not reducible without remainder to a conjunct-
ion of statements concerning the thoughts and actions of 
specific individuals. He gives as an example the instance 
of a person's presenting a withdrawal slip to a bank 
teller and subsequent receipt of money. The behaviour of 
these two people towards one another is unintelligible 
unless it is viewed in terms of their status and role and 
the concepts of status and role are devoid of meaning 
unless one interprets them in terms of the organization 
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of the society to which the individuals belong. He 
excludes any aspects peripheral to the social transaction 
such as the(xplanation of aloofness or friendliness on 
the part of the teller. 
Mandelbaum mentions the ontological objection 
that societal facts cannot be said to have any status of 
their own since no such facts would exist if there were 
not individuals who thought and acted in specific ways. 
He sees no conflict here. One need not hold, he says, 
that a society is an entity independent of all human 
beings in order to hold that societal facts are not 
reducible to the facts of individual behaviour. 
The warrant for this position hinges on the fact 
that individuals are born into an already functioning 
societal organization which was independent of them and 
thus, their societally oriented behaviour was conditioned 
by an already existing set of societal facts. He will not 
accept the argument of those wanting to press the 
ontological objection into remote history to the individuals 
who were not born into an already existing society and 
who formed a societal organization by virtue of certain 
patterns of repeated interpersonal actions. He points 
out that the issue concerned is one involving the nature 
of societies as they exist at present. "To argue that the 
nature of present societal facts is reducible to the facts 
of individual behaviour because the origins of a particular 
social system grew up out of certain repeated forms of 
behaviour is a clear example of the genetic fallacy."8  
Mandelbaum outlines a second method of dealing 
with the ontological objection. This, he says, consists 
in holding that one set of facts may depend for its 
existence upon another set of facts and yet not be identical 
with the latter. As an example of such a relationship 
he cites that which a traditional epiphenomenalist would 
regard as existing between brain events and the contents 
of consciousness. The epiphenomenalist, he says, would 
say that the parts of the individual's field of conscious- 
ness are to be found within the specific data of conscious- 
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ness and not in the brain events upon which consciousness 
depends. Analogously, Mandelbaum holds that the component 
parts of a society are the elements of its organization, 
its specific institutions, and not the individual human 
beings without whom it would not exist. 
Mandelbaum considers secondly the epistemological 
objection to the thesis that societal facts cannot be 
reduced to psychological facts. Social concepts are not 
capable of being pointed to. Consequently, any theory of 
knowledge which demands that all empirically meaningful 
concepts must ultimately be reducible to data which can be 
directly inspected will lead, he says, to the insistence 
that all societal concepts are reducible to patterns of 
individual behaviour. 
Mandelbaum claims that sufficient disproof of the 
epistemological objection can be found in the proof that 
the theory of knowledge above cannot account for our 
apprehension of the nature of individual action. In the 
case of a person withdrawing money from the bank what 
connects the elements of a series of actions such as 
filling in a withdrawal slip, presenting it to the teller 
and receiving money, is the person's intention to withdraw 
money. This intention is not itself a directly observable 
element. 
"Thus, unless it be admitted that we can have 
knowledge of aspects of human behaviour which are not 
directly presented to the senses, we cannot understand 
his behaviour and therefore cannot understand that which 
we seek to understand; i.e., those societal facts which 
supposedly are the summations of instances of behaviour 
of this type." 9 
A third objection to Mandelbaum's thesis is that 
it interprets individual men as the pawns of society, 
devoid of initiative, conceiving of them as mere parts 
of a self-existing social organism. He counters this by 
pointing out that his thesis does not deny the existence 
of facts concerning the thoughts and actions of specific 
individuals. He holds that this latter class of facts 
and societal facts may interact. 
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(iii) Conclusion.  
Is there any good reason to choose between 
Methodological Individualism and Methodological 
Socialism? Gellner claims that, in part, the impetus for 
the argument between holism and individualism in history 
seems to lie in the fact that views in this field appear 
to have moral and political implications. Gellner asserts 
that the simplest argument on this point runs thus: 
"if rigid, unchangeable, and wide-ranging generalisations 
are attainable with regard to historical processes, then 
an outlook which presupposes individual responsibility is 
misguided." 2 
The Methodological Individualist fears that, if 
Methodological Socialism is correct, we do not hold our 
destinies in our own hands and that we are dragged along 
by the development of the "social individuals." Danto 
denies that this is entailed by Methodological Socialism. 
He claims, indeed, that "should we ever be able to 
explain the behaviour of individual human beings with 
reference to the behaviour of large-scale processes in 
social individuals, nothing would prevent us from ... 
controlling those large-scale processes by operating at 
the "micro-level", i.e., upon individual human beings."3 
Science, he observes, is not noted for diminishing 
our control over things. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Before starting my programme of reading and 
thinking about what the most scholarly historians and 
lucid (and obscure) philosophers have said about history, 
it would have been reasonable to assume that there could 
be found, or pieced together, a cogent conclusive 
definition of what history is. The aphoristic definitions - 
"une fable convenue" (Napoleon); "history is bunk" (Henry 
Ford); "just one damned thing after another"; "history 
is organized memory" (Commager); "the register of the 
follies and misfortunes of mankind" (Gibbon) - 
momentarily charm or offend. But, impelled by dim 
memories of the certainty sensed from schoolboy learning 
of laws and generalizations in science and axioms and 
theorems in geometry, the mind dismisses these in quest 
of the demonstrably conclusive statement. 
G. R. Elton says that history "is concerned with 
all those sayings, thoughts, deeds and sufferings which 
occurred in the past and have left present posit; and 
it deals with them from the point of view of happening, 
change, and the particular." 1 And as, he claims, no 
other treatment of man's experience answers to this 
definition, he sees thereby the demarcationcf history from 
cognate sciences and the establishment of its autonomy. 
Herbert Butterfield could be said to be approach-
ing a definition of history when he describadjt as "the 
study of effective mediations genuinely leading from some-
thing old to something which the historian must regard as 
new. It is essentially the study of transition, and to 
- the historian the only absolute is change." 2  But that 
statement doesn't say it all. Butterfield needs many more 
pages to explain what he means. 
Commager says that at its most elementary, history 
is a story, but not a made-up story; history is a record. 
"It collects and organizes such facts as are available and 
relevant, provides some kind of framework for them, and 
lays down the guidelines for the presentation. It 
supplies order, harmony, direction, for what might otherwise 
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be a chaotic assemblage of miscellaneous facts." 3 History, 
he says, should rest on details and statistics and exploit 
drama, but it "should control all of these ingredients 
as an artist controls the ingredients of his materials 
and the elements of his subject - control them, master 
them, penetrate them with meaning and suffuse them with 
imagination." 4 
One is tempted, however, to dismiss this as trite 
stuff. Descriptions like these may be telling us about 
some of the thousands of things historians do in the 
pursuit of their craft; how they make use of antiquarian 
research, archaeology, epigraphy, philology, palaeography; 
how they gain greater insight into the human past by 
using the accumulated statistical information and 
generalizations of economics, sociology, psychology and 
anthropology; how they explain, tackle the matter of 
causation, interpret and judge. But such descriptions do 
not, in answer to the question, what is history?, bring 
about the "atm experience", that's it - that's what 
history is. 
Popper would say that the wrong kind of question is 
being asked. A fruitful question would be one designed 
to seek a solution to a specific problem. A "what is -?" 
question is likely to lead to a discussion of the meanings 
of words which he believes to be "not only boring, but 
harmful."5 According to Magee, Popper's view of the notion 
that precise knowledge requires precise definition is 
that it is demonstrably wrong. Every time one defines a 
term, Magee points out, 6 one has to introduce new terms 
in the definition (otherwise the definition is circular) 
and one is then required to define the new terms. In this 
way one never gets to the real discussion because the 
necessary preliminaries cannot be completed. 
Popper opposed the view of the language analysts 
who believed that there were no genuine philosophical 
problems and that the problems of philosophy,if any, were 
problems of the meanings of words. In the preface to 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery he stated his belief "that 
there is at least one philosophical problem in which all 
thinking men are interested. It is the problem of cosmology: 
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the problem of understanding the world - including ourselves, 
and our knowledge, as part of the world." 7 
And of central importance, I believe, to the 
understanding of this world is a rational understanding 
of history in accordance with the ideal of rationality 
expounded by Popper in his autobiography, Unended Quest. 8 
He stresses that he rejected, as a procedure, the 
justification of theories and replaced it by criticism. 
He points out that, previously, most philosophers had 
thought that any claim to rationality meant rational 
justification of one's beliefs. His thesis was that 
rationality meant rational criticism of one's own theory 
and of competing theories. 
Thus the old philosophy linked the ideal of 
rationality with final demonstrable knowledge ... 
while I linked it with the growth of conlectural  
knowledge. This itself I linked with the idea of 
a better and better approximation to truth, or of 
increasing truth-likeness or verisimilitude. 
According to this view, finding theories which are 
better approximations to truth is what the scientist 
aims at; the aim of science is knowing more and more. 
This involves the growth of the content of our  theories, the growth of our knowledge of the world. 9 
Of all the problems, and concomitant theories 
purporting to solve or elucidate them, emerging from history, 
those which have, perhaps, most captured the imagination 
of the readers of history have been those dealing with the 
"meaning" of history as a whole and causation and 
historical laws. Many eminent historians are wary of 
the pursuit of abstract theories on such matters. 
Butterfield enjoins us to see the value of history as 
lying in the "richness of its recovery of the concrete 
life of the past." 10 "There is not an essence of history 
that can be got by evaporating the human and the personal 
factors, the incidental or momentary or local things, 
and the circumstantial elements, as though at the bottom 
of the well there were something absolute, some truth 
independent of time and circumstance." 11 
Commager describes some historians as having 
"thrown in the sponge, as it were, and taken refuge in 
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the principle of fortuity" 12 when confronted by the seemingly 
insuperable difficulty of formulating laws or solving the 
problems of causation. He cites H. A. L. Fisher as 
"confessing" in the preface of his History of Europe that: 
One intellectual excitement has 	been denied 
me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned 
in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. 
These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see 
only one emergency following upon another as wave follows 
upon wave, only one great fact with respect to which, 
since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, 
only one safe rule for the historian: that he should 
recognize in the development of human destinies 
the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. This 
is not a doctrine of cynicism and despair. The fact 
of progress is written plain and large on the page 
of history;but progress is not a law of nature. The 
ground gained by one generation may be lost by the 
next. The thoughts of men may flow into the channels 
which lead to disaster and barbarism. 1 3 
Necessary progress is absent also from Popper's 
World 3. He proposed14 the notion of an objective world of 
material things (World 1), a subjective world of minds 
(World 2) and World 3 - "the world of objective structures 
which are the products, not necessarily intentional, of 
minds or living creatures;" 15 the World of ideas, art, 
science, language, ethics and institutions. Magee points 
out that the World 3 theory offers an analysis of the 
problem of social change. It is, he says "because of the 
objective character of man's third-world creations, and the 
transactions to which this gives rise between him and them, 
that they - ideas, institutions, languages, ethics, arts, 
sciences ... - have histories. They do not necessarily 
progress, but they are open to change ... 16 He points out 
further, that Popper's theory explains how an evolutionary 
process can have a rationale without there being any overall 
plan or plot or some spirit or vital force moving the process 
along, as it were, from inside. 
After considering the grand system-makers of the 
philosophy of history and their attempts to solve definitively 
the problems of meaning, cause and laws, Commager's 
conclusion is, "that the effort to compress the incalculably 
vast, infinitely complex, and wantonly elusive stuff of history, 
into any single framework, or to express it in any single 
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formula, is doomed to futility." 17 
Further, he sees the multiplicity of historical 
philosophies and the inability of the most profound 
historians to agree on the meaning of history as 
suggesting that the philosophies are dictated not by 
history itself, but by circumstances, or by the temperament 
and the training of the historical philosophers. Why, 
he asks, should we expect an authoritative philosophy of 
history when we still lack authoritative philosophies of 
religion, politics, or education? As G. M. Trevelyan has 
said, philosophy is not something you take to history, it 
is something you carry away from history. And, perhaps, 
the World historical reflections (Weltgeschichtliche  
Betrachtungen)of the great Jacob Burckhardt is the proof 
of this statement. 
It is not given us to know the causes of things, 
Commager says, but the search for causes is itself an 
affluent enterprise, one which enlarges the mind and 
quickens the sympathies of all who engage in it. "No 
laws of history command authority, but the study of those 
manifold forces which ceaselessly play upon history deepen* 
our understanding and brings magnanimity to our judgment. 
No philosophy encompasses or explains the trackless course 
of history, but to those who study it with sympathy and 
understanding and imagination history teaches philosophy. 
Esto perpetuo." 18 
It is in this teaching function, I believe, that 
the ultimate value of history lies; not in the facile and 
spurious attempts at prophesying the future by the 
deductions of historical analogy, but in the capacity of 
history to remove prejudice and to train the mind to better 
understand the world and its complex social and political 
problems. A mind steeped in a genuine understanding of 
history would be likely to subscribe to a political, 
historical or social formula in the mould only of that 
proposed by Popper; "P.1.,-*TS—$,EE9P.2 where P.1 is the 
initial problem, TS the trial solution proposed, EE the 
process of error elimination applied to the trial solution 
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and P.2 the resulting situation, with new problems." 19 
A consequence of the approach embodied in this 
formula is, says Magee, "the realization that complex 
structures - whether intellectual, artistic, social, 
administrative or whatever - are only to be created and 
changed by stages, through a critical feedback process of 
successive adjustments. The notion that they can be created, 
or made over, at a stroke, as if from a blueprint, is an 
illusion which can never be actualized." 20 A free society 
permitting the untrammelled assertion of differing 
proposals, followed by criticism, followed by the genuine 
possibility of change in the light of criticism is likely, 
in Popper's view, to be more effective at solving its 
problems. 
I turn to Trevelyan for the final word: "It 
is the tale of the thing done, even more than its causes 
and effects, which trains the political judgment by 
widening the range of sympathy and deepening the approval 
and disapproval of conscience; that stimulates by example 
youth to aspire and age to endure; that enables us by the 
light of what men once have been, to see the thing we are, 
and dimly to descry the form of what we should be. 'Is 
not Man's history and Men's history a perpetual evangel?' " 
155. 
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